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Perché il bello piace con la pretesa di un consenso universale? Le motivazioni kantiane e il problema della loro unità
A Sick Imagination: Pathologies and Errors in Judgment
In this paper I will develop an investigation of mental illness in relation to errors of judgment. Even based on the rational/irrational opposition, during the 18th century reason is seen appropriating madness, and not only whenever it classifies mental illnesses and develops special scientific knowledge about them. More importantly, madness lurks in the very workings of modern reason. And of course, it sneaks into the error of judgment, making all border between the two very thin. A case can then be made for the complementarity between reason and madness. In this sense, madness finds a place in Kant's project, from its very foundations. Recognizing the finiteness of the human intellect and stating accordingly the need for an exact survey of its limits means at the same time recognizing the possibility of error in judgment and the danger that knowledge may turn into madness. Provided one is to accept the methodological assumption that there is a continuity between the Transcendental Dialectic and the section of the Anthropology on judgment and mental illness, a constellation of essential Kantian notions comes to the fore as underpinning the overall transcendental project. A picture unfolds based on which error can affect, at the very least, perception, imagination and judgment. Errors of judgment, illusions, and madness are thus never far apart in Kant's accounts on human faculties, their dialectical drifts, and the possibility of psychopathy
Dall’idea di mondo all’idea di organismo: lo schematismo dell’uso regolativo della ragione
In the Transcendental Dialectic Kant announces a deduction of rational ideas that is needed if ideas have to be endowed with objective, even if indeterminate, validity. This deduction is aimed to be a kind of transcendental schematism, but it is only announced and scheduled and not accomplished. The paragraphs 61-68 of the Critique of the Power of Judgment seem to be an accomplishment of Kant’s program, giving reality to a schematism of the regulative use of reason. The thesis I support states that it is actually possible to compare the two definition of regulative idea, given in the first and in the third Critique, but we have also to keep in mind the evolution in Kant’s thought, moving from the idea of world to the idea of organism. Based on this conviction, I will state that the idea of organism grounds the constitutive use of the judgment on nature and allows an application of the principle of causality to natural sciences. It isn’t however the regulative idea to be subordinated to the constitutive judgment; it is rather the ideal use of the notion of nature to logically forerun the categorical synthesis.Nella Dialettica trascendentale Kant annuncia una deduzione delle idee della ragione, necessaria se le idee devono avere una validità oggettiva, seppur indeterminata. Questa deduzione dovrà costituire una sorta di schematismo trascendentale e, tuttavia, viene soltanto annunciata e programmata, ma rimane in forma di abbozzo. I paragrafi 61-68 della Critica della capacità di giudizio sembrano costituire un completamento del programma di uno schematismo dell’uso regolativo della ragione. La tesi che sostengo è che effettivamente è possibile accostare le due definizioni di idea regolativa, nella prima e nella terza Critica, restituendone la continuità, ma è anche da tener presente la significativa evoluzione del pensiero kantiano che genera uno spostamento dall’idea di mondo all’idea di organismo. Sulla base di questa convinzione, sosterrò che l’idea di organismo sta a fondamento dell’uso costitutivo del giudizio sulla natura e permette un’applicazione del principio di causalità alle scienze naturali. Non è però l’idea regolativa a dover essere subordinata al giudizio costitutivo, ma è piuttosto l’uso ideale della nozione di natura a precedere logicamente la sintesi categoriale
Aesthetic Normativity in Kant’s Account: A Regulative Model
The notion of normativity has been key to an actualizing reading of the subjective universality that for Kant characterizes the aesthetic judgment. However, in the scholarly literature little discussion is made, somehow unsurprisingly, of what exactly we should understand by normativity when it comes to Kant’s aesthetics. Recent trends show indeed the tendency to take normativity very broadly to the point of nuancing most of its core meaning. Based on how we speak about normativity in aesthetics, we seem indeed to have accepted that every kind of evaluative process is normative. I will argue that the sentimentalist elements of Kant's account call for a revision of its normative interpretations, for a better framing of its subjective universalism, and finally for a reconsideration of aesthetic normativity in favour of regulativity
Arte e tabù: il disgusto e i limiti della rappresentazione
Referring to the notion of representation, I will argue the idea that disgust continues to constitute a limitation for art and that the presence of the disgusting can be read through the Freudian notion of taboo. The indulgence of artistic creation in disgust, in fact, would confirm the fact that only what is domesticated, thus what does not arouse authentic disgust, can be assimilated by art. On the contrary, authentic disgust remains taboo insofar as it indicates the absolutely other, the unassimilable, a non-domesticated animality extraneous to the process of civilization. It is, after all, what classical aesthetics had already shown and that today can be reread in Freudian terms
Is it possible to overcome disgust? An ambivalent emotion
A growing interest for the emotion of disgust has recently arisen in international contexts across
several fields of research. A general definition of disgust will be primarily assumed: by disgust I understand a total rejection that generates a motion of repulsion and removal of an object that is in the proximity of the subject, without constituting a real danger. In reference to the notion of taboo, I will first of all assume its ambivalence. The emotion of disgust, essentially natural and cultural at the same time, as a typical trait of the process of human civilization that distinguishes humans from animals. At variance with other theories of disgust, I will argue that it is not possible to theoretically articulate the overcoming of disgust, but that it is possible to educate about this emotion through artistic experience. On this ground, an ethics of disgust will be outlined, which starts from the acknowledgement of one of our most bodily emotions
Die historiographischen Grundlagen des Kommentars zur italienischen Ausgabe der "Geschichte der Kunst des Alterthums" von Carlo Fea (1783-1784). Von der Istoria Universale Francesco Bianchinis bis zur "Völkergeschichte" von Antoine-Yves Goguet
Questo contributo prende le mosse dalla edizione italiana della winckelmanniana Geschichte der Kunst des Alterthums, curata da Carlo Fea (1783-1784), che succede a quella del 1779 di Carlo Amoretti, per valutare in quale misura la Lobschrift auf Winkelmann (1778) di Christian Gottlob Heyne abbia avuto un impatto sul giudizio di Fea sulla qualità del lavoro svolto da Winckelmann e gli abbia suggerito di ampliare la sfera dell'interesse storiografico ad altre civiltà e culture, come si può notare grazie a un ricco apparato di note aggiunte da Fea a quelle più tecniche di Amoretti. Altri due contributi, cioé quello di Francesco Bianchini con la sua Istoria Universale del 1697 (ben nota a Winckelmann) e quello di Antoine-Yves Goguet, con il suo De l'origine des loix, des arts, et des sciences; et de leurs progrès chez les anciens peuples (1758), hanno costituito una base importante per orientare, da una parte, la funzione dell'opera di Winckelmann verso una maggiore valorizzazione del mondo romano, come poteva convenire a Fea per ragioni culturali e politiche, e per ridurre, dall'altra parte, il ruolo centrale svolto dalla civiltà greca, che Goguet aveva messo variamente in discussione nel suo studio del 1758.This contribution is based on the Italian edition of Winckelmann's Geschichte der Kunst des Alterthums, edited by Carlo Fea (1783-1784), which succeeds that of 1779 by Carlo Amoretti, to evaluate to what extent Christian Gottlob Heyne 's Lobschrift auf Winkelmann (1778) had an impact on Fea's judgment on the quality of Winckelmann's work and suggested to extend the sphere of historiographic interest to other civilizations and cultures, as can be seen thanks to a rich array of notes added by Fea to the more technical ones of Amoretti. Two other contributions, namely that of Francesco Bianchini with his Istoria Universale of 1697 (well known to Winckelmann) and that of Antoine-Yves Goguet, with his De L'origine des loix, des arts, et des sciences; et de leurs progrès chez les anciens peuples (1758), constituted an important basis for orienting, on the one hand, the function of Winckelmann's work towards a greater appreciation of the Roman world, as it might have agreed to Fea for cultural and political reasons and to reduce, on the other hand, the central role played by Greek civilization, which Goguet had variously questioned in his study of 1758
The environmental sublime: an analysis beyond nature and culture
This article explores an actualisation of the Kantian sublime with reference to environmental aesthetics, examining its relevance and transformation in light of the current debate around the \u27environmental humanities\u27. The main thesis of this article is that it is possible to actualise the Kantian sublime in the context of environmental aesthetics, emphasising the counterpurposiveness element of nature. This aspect makes it possible to show a dialectical relationship with nature, overcoming the mere opposition between nature and culture and promoting ethical responsibility. In other words, the sublime can help us recognise the relevance of direct experience of nature and the need for a more respectful and sustainable relationship
ALFREDO FERRARIN: THE POWERS OF PURE REASON. KANT AND THE IDEA OF COSMIC PHILOSOPHY. UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS, 2015, 352 PP.
“Like rainbows over an abyss”2. By quoting Nietzsche’s fragments, Alfredo Ferrarin recalls, in the last chapter of his book, the role of the power of judgment in ensuring the transition from the domain of nature to that of morals (273). The Powers of Pure Reason. Kant and the Idea of Cosmic Philosophy is a rich, complex and very articulated book, somehow revolutionary in Kant studies thanks to its seemingly simple claim: Kant’s philosophy has to be considered as “the promotion of reason’s ends”, rather than as “logical self-consistency” or “the instrument of mankind’s progress” (292). In other words, Alfredo Ferrarin advocates a reading of Kant’s entire system in the light of a unitary notion of reason, to be further declined according to its different aims. Based on this interpretation, Kant’s inconsistencies and even contradictions are neither nullified nor blamed, but they are interpreted as necessary parts of a complex and dynamical whole amounting to the power of reason. Consequently, all those philosophical issues threatening the unity of reason are turned by this book into a tribute to Kant’s depth of reasoning (2)
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