1,720,956 research outputs found
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Get PDFThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Variations on the Author
Get PDF“Variations on the Author” discusses two of Eduardo Coutinho’s recent films (Um Dia na Vida, from 2010, and Últimas Conversas, posthumously released in 2015) and their contribution to the general question of documentary authorship. The director’s filmography is characterized by a consistent yet self-effacing form of authorial self-inscription: Coutinho often features as an interviewer that rather than express opinions propels discourses; an interviewer that is good at listening. This mode of self-inscription characterizes him as an author who is not expressive but who is nonetheless markedly present on the screen. In Um Dia na Vida, however, Coutinho is completely absent form the image, while Últimas Conversas, on the contrary, includes a confessional prologue that moves the director from the margins to the center of his films. This article examines the ways in which these works stand out in the filmography of a director who offers new insights into the notion of cinematic authorship
Appropriate Similarity Measures for Author Cocitation Analysis
Get PDFWe provide a number of new insights into the methodological discussion about author cocitation analysis. We first argue that the use of the Pearson correlation for measuring the similarity between authors’ cocitation profiles is not very satisfactory. We then discuss what kind of similarity measures may be used as an alternative to the Pearson correlation. We consider three similarity measures in particular. One is the well-known cosine. The other two similarity measures have not been used before in the bibliometric literature. Finally, we show by means of an example that our findings have a high practical relevance.information science;Pearson correlation;cosine;similarity measure;author cocitation analysis
Dispelling the Myths Behind First-author Citation Counts
Get PDFWe conducted a full-scale evaluative citation analysis study of scholars in the XML research field to explore just how different from each other author rankings resulting from different citation counting methods actually are, and to demonstrate the capability of emerging data and tools on the Web in supporting more realistic citation counting methods. Our results contest some common arguments for the continued
use of first-author citation counts in the evaluation of scholars, such as high correlations between author rankings by first-author citation counts and other citation
counting methods, and high costs of using more realistic citation counting methods that are not well-supported by the ISI databases. It is argued that increasingly available digital full text research papers make it possible for citation analysis studies to go beyond what the ISI databases have directly supported and to employ more
sophisticated methods
Streamlining Habeas Corpus While Undermining Judicial Review: How 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d)(1) Violates the Constitution
No full textAlthough this article focuses on the writ of habeas corpus as filed by prisoners in state custody and as regulated by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the recent developments involving the writ as filed by prisoners in federal custody and as regulated by 28 U.S.C. § 2241 are worth noting. Section II of Justice Steven\u27s majority opinion in Rasul v. Bush2 deserves reading and re-reading because it recognizes the importance of the writ of habeas corpus in American jurisprudence. Section IV of the opinion holds that even [a]liens held at the [Guantanamo Bay] base, no less than American citizens, are entitled to invoke the federal courts\u27 authority [to grant writs of habeas corpus] under § 2241 of title 28 of the United States Code. The federal court\u27s authority to grant the writ of habeas corpus to prisoners in federal custody has its foundation in Article 1, Section 9, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution which provides that [t]he privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has noted that the statutory grant of habeas jurisdiction to federal courts is constitutionally compelled by the Suspension Clause. Section 7 of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 ( MCA ), passed by Congress on September 29, 2006, and signed by the President on October 17, 2006, strips federal courts of habeas jurisdiction over an alien detained by the United States who has been determined by the United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination. Section 3 amends subtitle A of title 10 of the United States Code by defining unlawful enemy combatant as a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents ... or a person who, before, on, or after the date of the enactment of [ ] [this Act], has been determined to be an unlawful enemy combatant by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal . . . . Consequently, individuals falling under this definition cannot seek relief by filing a writ of habeas corpus whether they are aliens or citizens.\u27 For these people, the writ of habeas corpus has been suspended. Passed in response to the Supreme Court\u27s decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the MCA-according to Senator Patrick Leahy-is flagrantly unconstitutional. Limiting the discussion only to the habeas jurisdiction-stripping provision of the MCA, Section 7 can be challenged on the basis that its suspension of the writ is unconstitutional because there is no rebellion or invasion. The abrogation of the writ of habeas corpus by the MCA is not a new phenomenon brought forth by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the War on Terror. In fact, the unconstitutional abrogation of protections and rights occurs after every domestic act of terror. Just as the MCA cuts back on habeas rights of prisoners in federal custody, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ( AEDPA ) similarly cuts back on habeas rights of prisoners in state custody. Just as the MCA was passed to cut back rights of the international terrorists being held at Guantanamo Bay, AEDPA was passed to deal with homegrown terrorists such as Timothy McVeigh. AEDPA was passed as an effort to streamline federal habeas corpus petitions brought forth by prisoners in state custody. The statute added subsection (d)(1) to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and changed, inter alia, the federal habeas corpus standard of review from de novo to an unusual one: the state court\u27s decision must now be contrary to, or . . . an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. This article makes the argument that this new standard of review is unconstitutional because it infringes upon a federal court\u27s province to exercise judicial review. Section II of the article provides a brief history of federal habeas corpus, while section III provides a brief background of AEDPA, the legislative history of § 2254(d)(1), and identifies the various ways that the statute implicates the Constitution. This section also discusses the Supreme Court\u27s interpretation of the statute in Williams v. Taylor and Penry v. Johnson. Section IV discusses the four Supreme Court cases of Marbury v. Madison, Martin v. Hunter\u27s Lessee, Cohens v. Virginia, and United States v. Klein which establish the Court\u27s power to exercise judicial review, while Section V argues that § 2254(d)(1) is unconstitutional under these precedents
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Streamlining Habeas Corpus While Undermining Judicial Review: How 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d)(1) Violates the Constitution
No full textAlthough this article focuses on the writ of habeas corpus as filed by prisoners in state custody and as regulated by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the recent developments involving the writ as filed by prisoners in federal custody and as regulated by 28 U.S.C. § 2241 are worth noting. Section II of Justice Steven\u27s majority opinion in Rasul v. Bush2 deserves reading and re-reading because it recognizes the importance of the writ of habeas corpus in American jurisprudence. Section IV of the opinion holds that even [a]liens held at the [Guantanamo Bay] base, no less than American citizens, are entitled to invoke the federal courts\u27 authority [to grant writs of habeas corpus] under § 2241 of title 28 of the United States Code. The federal court\u27s authority to grant the writ of habeas corpus to prisoners in federal custody has its foundation in Article 1, Section 9, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution which provides that [t]he privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has noted that the statutory grant of habeas jurisdiction to federal courts is constitutionally compelled by the Suspension Clause. Section 7 of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 ( MCA ), passed by Congress on September 29, 2006, and signed by the President on October 17, 2006, strips federal courts of habeas jurisdiction over an alien detained by the United States who has been determined by the United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination. Section 3 amends subtitle A of title 10 of the United States Code by defining unlawful enemy combatant as a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents ... or a person who, before, on, or after the date of the enactment of [ ] [this Act], has been determined to be an unlawful enemy combatant by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal . . . . Consequently, individuals falling under this definition cannot seek relief by filing a writ of habeas corpus whether they are aliens or citizens.\u27 For these people, the writ of habeas corpus has been suspended. Passed in response to the Supreme Court\u27s decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the MCA-according to Senator Patrick Leahy-is flagrantly unconstitutional. Limiting the discussion only to the habeas jurisdiction-stripping provision of the MCA, Section 7 can be challenged on the basis that its suspension of the writ is unconstitutional because there is no rebellion or invasion. The abrogation of the writ of habeas corpus by the MCA is not a new phenomenon brought forth by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the War on Terror. In fact, the unconstitutional abrogation of protections and rights occurs after every domestic act of terror. Just as the MCA cuts back on habeas rights of prisoners in federal custody, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ( AEDPA ) similarly cuts back on habeas rights of prisoners in state custody. Just as the MCA was passed to cut back rights of the international terrorists being held at Guantanamo Bay, AEDPA was passed to deal with homegrown terrorists such as Timothy McVeigh. AEDPA was passed as an effort to streamline federal habeas corpus petitions brought forth by prisoners in state custody. The statute added subsection (d)(1) to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and changed, inter alia, the federal habeas corpus standard of review from de novo to an unusual one: the state court\u27s decision must now be contrary to, or . . . an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. This article makes the argument that this new standard of review is unconstitutional because it infringes upon a federal court\u27s province to exercise judicial review. Section II of the article provides a brief history of federal habeas corpus, while section III provides a brief background of AEDPA, the legislative history of § 2254(d)(1), and identifies the various ways that the statute implicates the Constitution. This section also discusses the Supreme Court\u27s interpretation of the statute in Williams v. Taylor and Penry v. Johnson. Section IV discusses the four Supreme Court cases of Marbury v. Madison, Martin v. Hunter\u27s Lessee, Cohens v. Virginia, and United States v. Klein which establish the Court\u27s power to exercise judicial review, while Section V argues that § 2254(d)(1) is unconstitutional under these precedents
koamabayili/VECTRON-author-checklist: VECTRON author checklist
No full textWe have done our best to complete the author checklist relating to the use of animals in the hut study. Note that the objective for the hut study was to evaluate the IRS treatment applications for residual efficacy against Anopheles mosquitoes, including the local An. coluzzii mosquito population. Cows were only used to attract mosquitoes into the huts and no tests were carried out directly on the cows. The author checklist is intended for use with studies where experiments are carried out on animals, which is why we have had such difficulty in completing this for the hut study, as many of the questions do not relate to how the cows were used
Author-wise bibliometric analysis based on entropy.
No full textAuthor-wise bibliometric analysis based on entropy.</p
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