1,720,986 research outputs found
Disagreeing about the treatment of animals : an analysis and a modest proposal
No full textIn contemporary political philosophy, the dispute over the moral status of animals is not usually taken as a paradigmatic case of irreducible disagreement, as those of abortion, human cloning, or the status of embryos. Although in animal ethics disagreements about substantive issues are increasing and widespread, no attention has been devoted to their character and nature. The aim of this paper is to analyse the type of disagreement concerning some widely debated issues in animal ethics. Our goal is not to propose specific solutions to such disputes, but to understand the kind of disagreement at stake and how it should be treated. We begin by confronting debated issues in animal ethics with other types of normatively relevant controversies (such as climate change, abortion, death penalty) aiming at distinguishing between empirical and normative components of such discussions. The idea is to disentangle the diverse sources of disagreement and propose to assess them separately. This strategy seems promising because issues of animal ethics often rely both on empirical evidence, for example about evolutionary patters, and normative judgments about how such evidence should be assessed, for example about the moral significance of non-human animals’ capacity to feel pain. Understanding such different components, and how they relate to each other is fundamental to understand how disagreements about the treatment of animals should be addressed. Indeed, if it seems correct to consider disagreements about empirical matters as possible cases of peer disagreement, when it comes to disagreements about normative matters things are not so straightforward for different metaethical understandings of the nature of morality imply different understandings of normative disagreement. Out attempt is to explore how such different understandings imply particular commitments about how to tackle disagreement. Finally, we draw some conclusions concerning the different available options to deal with disagreements about the treatment of animals within democratic societies
Disagreement, peerhood, compromise
No full textAlthough disagreement is one of the most debated issues in political philosophy, political theorists have relatively neglected its epistemic analysis. The aim of this paper is to fill this gap and provide an epistemic analysis of some normatively relevant disagreements and draw some implications on what kind of political solution could be more appropriate. From such discussion, we argue for a compromise solution to the problem of normative disagreement within democratic societies.
We start by considering two relevant examples of normative issues currently subjected to reasonable disagreement: the experiments on animals in scientific laboratories and affirmative action. We characterize such disagreements as reasonable, though not in the Rawlsian sense. Indeed, the idea of reasonableness we work with is characterized by two distinctions. The first one is that between first-level disagreements, regarding the clash between judgments, and second-level disagreements, concerning the grounding and justification of first-level judgments. The second distinction is that between empirical features of disagreements and normative features of disagreements. Reasonable disagreements are those empirical and normative disagreements in which two or more parties hold mutually incompatible claims, but they are justified in holding their respective claims. The complexity of understanding factual issues and individuals’ diverse allegiances to contrasting ultimate principles makes the case for reasonable disagreements.
Then, we defend epistemic fallibilism, namely the view that no rational justification can raise the truth of our beliefs to the level of absolute certainty. It is important to stress that arguing for fallibilism does not entail defending some form of skepticism: the idea that claims to knowledge can, in principle, be mistaken, does not turn into saying that none of those claims are ever justified. From the defense of epistemic fallibilism, we derive the idea that the condition of epistemic peerhood should be considered as a default position when it comes to citizens of democratic societies involved in reasonable disagreements and in need of arriving to some kind of political decision.
Given epistemic fallibilism and its commitment to peerhood, in cases of reasonable disagreements, in which there is no proof that one of the parties at dispute is epistemically superior to the other, we propose a principle of respect for rationality that calls for a compromise solution. Indeed, if parties cannot justify their respective beliefs in a conclusive way and cannot be certain about their claims, they ought to give up part of their demands and strike a balance between their positions. This form of compromise is not intended as a modus vivendi solution precisely because it is grounded in the idea of respect for rationality and, thus, it is not the result of a mere balance of power. There are two main advantages of this approach. First, such a solution is appealing in not requiring citizens to change their inner convictions, but only to recognize the fallibility of their justifications. Second, this solution is in principle applicable to a number of cases of disagreement in contemporary societies
Durkheim and Weber: methodological reflections for management and Business Studies
Get PDF<p>The central concern of management and business research is to understand why some strategies rise while others fall, why some firms outperform others and are more successful than their competitors (Barney and Clark, 2007; Rumelt, (1987). Management and business research has heavily drawn on Emile Durkheim's ideas about social milieu and identity and Max Weber's ideas about institutions to explain why and how certain strategies are optimal, or at least efficient;
however, very little is known about their methodological contributions.</p>
<p>Nowadays, almost all the articles published on top tier management and business journals present a methodology section to carry out their studies; however, little reference is made to recall the methodological augmentations of Durkheim and Weber. The purpose of this essay is to explore the methodological contributions of Durkheim and Weber. Although the discussion and reflections
about their methodological dilemmas can not be exhaustive, we believe that the representation of their paradigms can shed light on the different methodological approaches for conducting a study in the field of business and
management.</p>
<p>Specifically, we shall conduct this study comparing and contrasting their different visions under the following sections: (1) scientific knowledge and subject matter; (2) the role of the researcher; (3) approaches to empirical
data. In doing that, we shall further examine these two philosophers, juxtaposing the positivistic paradigm to that of the interpretative paradigm to which they belong.</p>
Disagreement, Peerhood, and Compromise
Get PDFThis paper addresses the problem of pluralism in democratic societies, by exploiting some insights from the debate about the epistemology of disagreement. First, by focusing on the permissibility of experiments on nonhuman animals for research purposes, we provide an epistemic analysis of deep normative disagreements. We understand that to mean disagreements in which epistemic peers disagree about both the substantive content of an ethical issue and the correct justificatory reasons for their contrary claims. Second, we argue for a compromise solution in which the reasons for reaching it are not prudential but grounded on the recognition of epistemic peerhood
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Get PDFThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Variations on the Author
Get PDF“Variations on the Author” discusses two of Eduardo Coutinho’s recent films (Um Dia na Vida, from 2010, and Últimas Conversas, posthumously released in 2015) and their contribution to the general question of documentary authorship. The director’s filmography is characterized by a consistent yet self-effacing form of authorial self-inscription: Coutinho often features as an interviewer that rather than express opinions propels discourses; an interviewer that is good at listening. This mode of self-inscription characterizes him as an author who is not expressive but who is nonetheless markedly present on the screen. In Um Dia na Vida, however, Coutinho is completely absent form the image, while Últimas Conversas, on the contrary, includes a confessional prologue that moves the director from the margins to the center of his films. This article examines the ways in which these works stand out in the filmography of a director who offers new insights into the notion of cinematic authorship
- …
