68 research outputs found

    The intentional stance as structure learning: a computational perspective on mindreading

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    Recent theories of mindreading explain the recognition of action, intention, and belief of other agents in terms of generative architectures that model the causal relations between observables (e.g., observed movements) and their hidden causes (e.g., action goals and beliefs). Two kinds of probabilistic generative schemes have been proposed in cognitive science and robotics that link to a “theory theory” and “simulation theory” of mindreading, respectively. The former compares perceived actions to optimal plans derived from rationality principles and conceptual theories of others’ minds. The latter reuses one’s own internal (inverse and forward) models for action execution to perform a look-ahead mental simulation of perceived actions. Both theories, however, leave one question unanswered: how are the generative models – including task structure and parameters – learned in the first place? We start from Dennett’s “intentional stance” proposal and characterize it within generative theories of action and intention recognition. We propose that humans use an intentional stance as a learning bias that sidesteps the (hard) structure learning problem and bootstraps the acquisition of generative models for others’ actions. The intentional stance corresponds to a candidate structure in the generative scheme, which encodes a simplified belief-desire folk psychology and a hierarchical intention-to-action organization of behavior. This simple structure can be used as a proxy for the “true” generative structure of others’ actions and intentions and is continuously grown and refined – via state and parameter learning – during interactions. In turn – as our computational simulations show – this can help solve mindreading problems and bootstrap the acquisition of useful causal models of both one’s own and others’ goal-directed actions

    Sentence processing: linking language to motor chains

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    A growing body of evidence in cognitive science and neuroscience is pointing towards the existence of a deep interconnection between cognition, perception and action. According to this embodied perspective language understanding is based on a mental simulation process involving a sensory-motor matching system known as the mirror neuron system. However, the precise dynamics underling the relation between language and action are not yet well understood. In fact, experimental studies are not always coherent as some report that language processing interferes with action execution while others find facilitation. In this work we present a detailed neural network model capable of reproducing experimentally observed influences of the processing of action-related sentences on the execution of motor sequences. The proposed model is based on three main points. The first is that the processing of action-related sentences causes the resonance of motor and mirror neurons encoding the corresponding actions. The second is that there exists a varying degree of crosstalk between neuronal populations depending on whether they encode the same motor act, the same effector or the same action-goal. The third is the fact that neuronal populations’ internal dynamics, which results from the combination of multiple processes taking place at different time scales, can facilitate or interfere with successive activations of the same or of partially overlapping pools

    Sentence processing: Linking language to motor chain. (Special topic, Action and language integration in cognitive systems.)

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    A growing body of evidence in cognitive science and neuroscience points towards the existence of a deep interconnection between cognition, perception and action. According to this embodied perspective language is grounded in the sensorimotor system and language understanding is based on a mental simulation process (Jeannerod, 2007; Gallese, 2008; Barsalou, 2009). This means that during action words and sentence comprehension the same perception, action, and emotion mechanisms implied during interaction with objects are recruited. Among the neural underpinnings of this simulation process an important role is played by a sensorimotor matching system known as the mirror neuron system (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). Despite a growing number of studies, the precise dynamics underlying the relation between language and action are not yet well understood. In fact, experimental studies are not always coherent as some report that language processing interferes with action execution while others find facilitation. In this work we present a detailed neural network model capable of reproducing experimentally observed influences of the processing of action-related sentences on the execution of motor sequences. The proposed model is based on three main points. The first is that the processing of action-related sentences causes the resonance of motor and mirror neurons encoding the corresponding actions. The second is that there exists a varying degree of crosstalk between neuronal populations depending on whether they encode the same motor act, the same effector or the same action-goal. The third is the fact that neuronal populations' internal dynamics, which results from the combination of multiple processes taking place at different time scales, can facilitate or interfere with successive activations of the same or of partially overlapping pools

    Neuronal chains for actions in the parietal lobe: a computational model.

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    The inferior part of the parietal lobe (IPL) is known to play a very important role in sensorimotor integration. Neurons in this region code goal-related motor acts performed with the mouth, with the hand and with the arm. It has been demonstrated that most IPL motor neurons coding a specific motor act (e.g., grasping) show markedly different activation patterns according to the final goal of the action sequence in which the act is embedded (grasping for eating or grasping for placing). Some of these neurons (parietal mirror neurons) show a similar selectivity also during the observation of the same action sequences when executed by others. Thus, it appears that the neuronal response occurring during the execution and the observation of a specific grasping act codes not only the executed motor act, but also the agent's final goal (intention).In this work we present a biologically inspired neural network architecture that models mechanisms of motor sequences execution and recognition. In this network, pools composed of motor and mirror neurons that encode motor acts of a sequence are arranged in form of action goal-specific neuronal chains. The execution and the recognition of actions is achieved through the propagation of activity bursts along specific chains modulated by visual and somatosensory inputs.The implemented spiking neuron network is able to reproduce the results found in neurophysiological recordings of parietal neurons during task performance and provides a biologically plausible implementation of the action selection and recognition process.Finally, the present paper proposes a mechanism for the formation of new neural chains by linking together in a sequential manner neurons that represent subsequent motor acts, thus producing goal-directed sequences

    Parietal lobe: from action organization to intention understanding

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    Inferior parietal lobule (IPL) neurons were studied when monkeys performed motor acts embedded in different actions and when they observed similar acts done by an experimenter. Most motor IPL neurons coding a specific act (e.g., grasping) showed markedly different activations when this act was part of different actions (e.g., for eating or for placing). Many motor IPL neurons also discharged during the observation of acts done by others. Most responded differentially when the same observed act was embedded in a specific action. These neurons fired during the observation of an act, before the beginning of the subsequent acts specifying the action. Thus, these neurons not only code the observed motor act but also allow the observer to understand the agent's intentions
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