10,364 research outputs found
Decentralized International Risk Sharing and Governmental Moral Hazard
No full textThis paper studies the issue of moral hazard in the presence of decentralized international risk sharing.In the model presented, risk sharing is achieved through macro markets (markets in which claims to the GDP of a country can be traded).Moral hazard arises for the following reason: if foreigners hold claims to domestic GDP due to risk sharing motives, the country will not receive the full benefit from its production anymore.This can motivate for example a tax on investment (which reduces production) or simply result in reduced governmental effort to increase productivity.We show in a two-country general equilibrium framework that the moral hazard problem does not lead to a reduction in the risk sharing (households hold half of world output).This results ultimately in a 100% tax on investment and creates a huge distortion.We conclude that unregulated macro markets pose a serious threat to world welfare.The analysis also raises concern about the desirability of decentralized risk sharing in general, in particular risk sharing through international trade of equity.moral hazard;international risk sharing
The Developmental Impact of the Asian Drivers on Senegal
No full textAbstract (1250) Eric Hazard, Lotje De Vries, Mamadou Alimou Barry and Alexis Aka Anouan, with Nicolas Pinaud Copyright 2009 The Author. Journal compilation 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Jere Nash Interview with Mark Hazard
No full textInterview conducted by author Jere Nash with Mark Hazard in the process of writing Mississippi Politics: The Struggle for Power, 1976-2006. Topics covered include Hazard\u27s family and background; Hazard working for U.S. Senator James O. Eastland; Eastland\u27s staff; Hazard\u27s appointment to Farmers Home Administration in Mississippi; John Stennis; Brad Dye; Eastland\u27s involvement in state politics; Cliff Finch; Jimmy Carter\u27s presidential campaign in Mississippi; Eastland and race; Mississippi Democratic Party unification; Eastland\u27s decision not to run for reelection in 1978; Bill Waller; Aaron Henry; Judge Harold Cox; Jimmy Carter\u27s trip to the Mississippi Gulf Coast; Eastland and Stennis\u27s relationship; and Hodding Carter
Agri-Environmental Policy and Moral Hazard under Output Price and Production Uncertainty
No full textSeveral theoretical and empirical models have been developed to examine how risk aversion affects compliance with agri-environmental schemes under asymmetric information and uncertainty. However, none has examined the case where the level of compliance is a continuous variable and producers face simultaneous monitoring, output price and production uncertainty. Treating conservation effort as a continuous variable, we show that risk aversion can mitigate the moral hazard problem in most cases. However, if conservation effort has a risk-increasing impact on production the effect of risk aversion on compliance is ambiguous.Agri-environmental schemes, uncertainty, moral hazard, Environmental Economics and Policy,
Corporate insurance design with multiple risks and moral hazard
No full textThe paper provides novel insights on the effect of a firm’s risk management objective on the optimal design of risk transfer instruments. I analyze the interrelation between the structure of the optimal insurance contract and the firm’s objective to minimize the required equity it has to hold to accommodate losses in the presence of multiple risks and moral hazard. In contrast to the case of risk aversion and moral hazard, the optimal insurance contract involves a joint deductible on aggregate losses in the present setting
Thomas Hazard Jr letter to Thomas Rotch, New York 6 mo 10, 1821
No full textThe author acknowledges receipt of letters after the Rotch return to Kendal, Ohio in the late spring of 1821. Thomas Hazard mentions that his whaling ship, Dawn, has sailed to the Pacific Ocean with 23 hands on board and provisions for three years. He hopes to visit Kendal in the Fall, he also mentions that William Rotch Jr was recovering from a fever.
7.9" x 10" (20 by 25.5 cm
Library stock verification: a ritual and an occupational hazard
No full textExplains the sensitive, controversial stock verification as one of the occupational hazards and a postmortem, emphasises need for clarity of objectives and procedures regarding stock verification and responsibilities of loss, points out that the cost of stock verification often far exceeds the benefits, highlights norms and procedures of stock verification for Government of India institutions, discusses some advantages and various methods and procedures of physical verification, put forth precautionary measures to be taken against loss and mutilation of library documents, analyses the issue of responsibility of loss and ways of resolving the conflict of responsibility, presents the procedure for write-off of reasonable loss, finally concludes by stressing the need for rational and updated rules and procedures about stock verification, responsibility of loss and limits to write-off loss as well as vital role of professional bodies in this direction
Claims Reporting and Risk Bearing Moral Hazard in Workers' Compensation : The Canadian Context
No full textThis paper explores the Canadian context of workers' compensation (WC) by replicating, with Canadian data, a study carried out by Butler and Worrall (1991). These authors were the first to develop a simple model to separate claims reporting and risk bearing moral hazard in WC. Risk bearing moral hazard reflects the workers' incentive to carry more risk and consequently experience more accidents when benefits rise, while claims reporting moral hazard mirrors workers' incentive to file a claim. The estimation of these two moral hazard effects leads to results quite different with Canadian data than with American data.
Ce texte explore les mécanismes canadiens d'indemnisations pour accidents du travail en reproduisant avec des données canadiennes l'étude de Butler et Worrall (1991). Ces auteurs furent les premiers à développer un modèle simple pour distinguer deux types de risque moral liés à l'indemnisation des accidents du travail : Le risque lié au comportement préventif et le risque lié à la déclaration d'accidents. Le premier est associé à la tendance des travailleurs de prendre plus de risque lorsque la générosité des indemnisations augmente, alors que le second est associé à leur propension à faire une réclamation lorsqu'ils ont un accident. L'estimation de ces deux types de risque moral, avec des données canadiennes, donne des résultats trés différents de ceux présentés par Butler et Worrall.Worplace Accidents, Workers'Compensation, Moral Hazard, Accidents du travail, indemnisations, risque moral
Moral Hazard and the Composition of Transfers: Theory with an Application to Foreign Aid
No full textThe paper presents a theoretical and empirical analysis of a donors choice of the composition of unrestricted and in-kind/restricted transfers to a recipient and how this composition is adjusted in response to changes in the moral hazard behavior of the recipient. In-kind or restricted transfers may be used, among others, to control a recipients moral hazard behavior but may be associated with deadweight losses. Within the context of foreign aid, we use a canonical political agency model to construct a simple signaling game between a possibly corrupt politician in a recipient country and a donor to illustrate the donors optimal choice of tied (restricted) and untied foreign aid. We clarify the condition under which a reduction in the recipients moral hazard behavior (i.e., improvement in the level of governance) leads to a fall in the proportion of tied aid. We test the predictions of our theoretical analysis using data on the composition of foreign aid by multilateral and bilateral donors. --Moral Hazard,Foreign Aid,Panel Data
Moral Hazard and the Composition of Transfers: Theory with an Application to Foreign Aid
No full textThe paper presents a theoretical and empirical analysis of a donor’s choice of the composition of unrestricted and in-kind/restricted transfers to a recipient and how this composition is adjusted in response to changes in the moral hazard behavior of the recipient. In-kind or restricted transfers may be used, among others, to control a recipient’s moral hazard behavior but may be associated with deadweight losses. Within the context of foreign aid, we use a canonical political agency model to construct a simple signaling game between a possibly corrupt politician in a recipient country and a donor to illustrate the donor’s optimal choice of tied (restricted) and untied foreign aid. We clarify the condition under which a reduction in the recipient’s moral hazard behavior (i.e., improvement in the level of governance) leads to a fall in the proportion of tied aid. We test the predictions of our theoretical analysis using data on the composition of foreign aid by multilateral and bilateral donors.tied foreign aid, governance, moral hazard, political agency, restricted transfer
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