170,232 research outputs found
A Numerical Algorithm to find Soft-Constrained Nash Equilibria in Scalar LQ-Games
No full textIn this paper we provide a numerical algorithm to calculate all soft-constrained Nash equilibria in a regular scalar indefinite linear-quadratic game.The algorithm is based on the calculation of the eigenstructure of a certain matrix.The analysis follows the lines of the approach taken by Engwerda in [7] to calculate the solutions of a set of scalar coupled feedback Nash algebraic Riccati equations
Calculation of an approximate solution of the infinite time-varying LQ-problem
No full textLinear Programming;Algorithm;Optimal Control;operations research
Local strong D-Monotonicity of the Kalai-Smorodinsky and Nash bargaining solution
No full textbargaining
The (in)finite horizon open-loop Nash LQ game: An application to EMU
No full textContains fulltext :
141595.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Closed access)In this paper, we study macroeconomic stabilization in the Economic and Monetary Union(EMU) using a dynamic games approach. In modeling this problem, it turns out that theplayers include the time derivative of the state variable of the game in their performancecriterion. As far as the authors know, this kind of problem has not before been dealt withrigorously in dynamic games theoretic literature. Therefore, we first consider a generalizationof the linear‐quadratic differential game, in which we allow for cross terms in theperformance criteria. Following the analysis of Engwerda [10,12], we present formulas tocalculate open‐loop Nash equilibria for both the finite‐planning horizon and the infinite‐planninghorizon. Particular attention is paid to computational aspects. In the second part ofthis paper, we use the obtained theoretical results to study macroeconomic stabilization inthe Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).23 p
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
No full textThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Performance of Delta-hedging strategies in interval models - A robustness study
No full texthedging;volatility;option pricing
Algorithms for Computing Nash Equilibria in Deterministic LQ Games
No full textIn this paper we review a number of algorithms to compute Nash equilibria in deterministic linear quadratic differential games.We will review the open-loop and feedback information case.In both cases we address both the finite and the infinite-planning horizon.Algebraic Riccati equations;linear quadratic differential games;Nash equilibria
On the Sensitivity Matrix of the Nash Bargaining Solution
No full textIn this note we provide a characterization of a subclass of bargaining problems for which the Nash solution has the property of disagreement point monotonicity.While the original d-monotonicity axiom and its stronger notion, strong d-monotonicity, were introduced and discussed by Thomson [15], this paper introduces local strong d-monotonicity and derives a necessary and sufficient condition for the Nash solution to be locally strong d-monotonic.This characterization is given by using the sensitivity matrix of the Nash bargaining solution w.r.t. the disagreement point d.Moverover, we present a sufficient condition for the Nash solution to be strong d-monotonic.Nash bargaining solution;d-monotonicity;diagonally dominant Stieltjes matrix
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