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Humean Skepticism and the Metaphysics of Impressions: Questions for Falkenstein
Get PDFI engage with two themes from Lorne Falkenstein’s Consciousness, Time, and Skepticism in Hume's Thought. First, I consider two of Falkenstein's claims concerning Hume’s metaphysics of perceptual experience: that complex sensory impressions are “undivided wholes” and that the existence of such impressions is inconsistent with a principle central to the Treatise’s arguments against the infinite divisibility of extension. Second, I raise questions for Falkenstein’s reading of Humean skepticism, according to which Hume takes skepticism to serve a remedial function. For Falkenstein's Hume, the psychological effect of encounter with radical skeptical arguments is that one ceases to form beliefs that are at odds with the available evidence. I argue that this does not succeed in resolving the apparent tension between Hume’s skepticism and his project of constructing a science of human nature
Humean Skepticism and the Metaphysics of Impressions: Questions for Falkenstein
No full textI engage with two themes from Lorne Falkenstein’s Consciousness, Time, and Skepticism in Hume's Thought. First, I consider two of Falkenstein's claims concerning Hume’s metaphysics of perceptual experience: that complex sensory impressions are “undivided wholes” and that the existence of such impressions is inconsistent with a principle central to the Treatise’s arguments against the infinite divisibility of extension. Second, I raise questions for Falkenstein’s reading of Humean skepticism, according to which Hume takes skepticism to serve a remedial function. For Falkenstein's Hume, the psychological effect of encounter with radical skeptical arguments is that one ceases to form beliefs that are at odds with the available evidence. I argue that this does not succeed in resolving the apparent tension between Hume’s skepticism and his project of constructing a science of human nature
Body, Coherence, and Hume’s Galley
Get PDFSection 1.4.2 of Hume’s Treatise offers both a constancy-based and coherence-based explanation of the belief in body. Why two explanations of the belief rather than one? Hume says that the mechanism of the coherence-based explanation is “too weak” to support “so vast an edifice” as the belief in body. I argue that this claim stems from his holding that the belief in body is irresistible, such that its denial can be sustained “in words only.” The constancy-based explanation is required in order to explain that property of the belief. This interpretation sheds light on Hume’s engagement with Pyrrhonian skepticism
Hume's _Distinctio Rationis_
Get PDFIn section 1.1.7 of the Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume offers a theory of rational distinctions, which are understood by authors such as Fransico Suárez and René Descartes as distinctions whose distinguenda cannot exist separately. Hume’s countenancing rational distinctions appears to be in tension with his separability principle, which implies that there can be no distinction without the possibility of separation. This essay argues that the tension is merely apparent. Hume’s theory of rational distinctions is a skeptical achievement: it does not explain how we succeed in drawing distinctions between inseparable items but instead identifies an illusion that leads us to suppose that such distinctions are possible
Ideas and Intelligibility: Hume\u27s Conceptual Skepticism
No full textHume’s Treatise of Human Nature pursues a naturalistic project of providing an “anatomy” of the human mind alongside the development of a series of skeptical arguments. Implicit in Hume’s philosophy is a distinction between epistemological skepticism and conceptual skepticism. The former aims to show that some class of beliefs lacks epistemic warrant. By contrast, the latter aims to show that a class of beliefs is unintelligible, incomprehensible, or contentless. This dissertation is a study of Hume’s conceptual skepticism in the Treatise. Chapters 1-4 each consider an instance of conceptual skepticism in the Treatise. In Chapter 1, I consider Hume’s view of cognition of objects “specifically different” from the perceptions: objects that are not only numerically distinct from the perceptions that constitute sensory experience but also differ in kind from them. I argue that Hume holds that we are entirely incapable of achieving representations of external objects specifically different from perceptions. In Chapter 2, I consider Hume’s relation to another prominent skeptic of the early modern period: Pierre Bayle. In his Dictionnaire historique et critique, Bayle argued that the notion of matter is incoherent. While Hume’s discussion of space in the Treatise has traditionally been understood as an attempted refutation of Bayle’s arguments for this position, I argue that Hume ultimately accepts a position strikingly similarto Bayle’s in section 1.4.4 of the Treatise, “Of the modern philosophy.” Chapter 3 considers Hume’s theory of causal necessity, focusing on his claim that we “project” necessity onto causally related objects. This claim has been influential in contemporary discussions of modality, inspiring deflationary accounts of our modal commitments. According to the standard reading, Hume’s modal projectivism aims to explain an aspect of ordinary causal judgement: namely, our judging that an effect must follow its cause. Against this, I show that Hume’s projectivism does not aim to explain the content of ordinary causal judgement but rather is a debunking explanation of the distinctively philosophical commitment to mind-independent necessary connections between causally related objects, one which reveals that commitment be an unintelligible product of “trivial” and “irregular” propensities of the imagination. One of Hume’s aims in the Treatise is to provide a comprehensive, genetic account of mental content. Chapter 4 shows that this ambition is in tension with his conceptual skepticism. Hume’s conceptual skepticism leaves him unable to explain how subjects achieve thoughts that he calls “fictions” of the imagination, such as thoughts about substance and enduring selves. In addition todeveloping a new account of Humean fictions, I argue that this tension between Hume’s naturalistic aims and his conceptual skepticism explains what are perhaps the most controversial passages in his corpus: his enigmatic recantation of his theory of personal identity in the “Appendix” to the Treatise. Chapter 5 considers the relationship between Hume’s conceptual skepticism and his epistemological skepticism. I argue that Hume holds that conceptual skepticism can undermine the epistemic merit of a belief. I show that undermining of this kind is ubiquitous in the Treatise and, moreover, that it plays a significant role in Hume’s narration and resolution of a skeptical crisis in T 1.4.7, “Conclusion of this book.” An important aspect of Hume’s considered epistemological position—namely, what I call the limitation principle, according to which one ought not engage in inquires concerning matters that outstrip one’s conceptual capacities—is a result of the connection between conceptual skepticism and epistemological skepticism. An implication of this chapter is that Hume’s epistemological skepticism cannot be fully understood apart from his conceptual skepticism
Is Epicurus a Direct Realist?
Get PDFIn his Letter to Herodotus, Epicurus presents a controversial theory of perception according to which all perceptions are true. In this paper, I argue that Epicurus\u27 theory of perception should be interpreted as a version of direct realism. If this interpretation is correct, then Epicurus holds that typical human perceivers have direct perceptual awareness of mind-independent objects. In the first section, I present an interpretation of Epicurus\u27 theory of perception. I interpret Epicurus as subscribing to the view according to which our perceptions always provide us with entirely accurate information about the world. In the second section, I provide an outline of a version of direct realism. The version of direct realism I present here is strongly indebted to the work of Michael Huemer. In the third section, using the framework developed in the second section, I argue that Epicurus should be interpreted as a direct realist
Body, Coherence, and Hume’s Galley
No full textSection 1.4.2 of Hume’s Treatise offers both a constancy-based and coherence-based explanation of the belief in body. Why two explanations of the belief rather than one? Hume says that the mechanism of the coherence-based explanation is “too weak” to support “so vast an edifice” as the belief in body. I argue that this claim stems from his holding that the belief in body is irresistible, such that its denial can be sustained “in words only.” The constancy-based explanation is required in order to explain that property of the belief. This interpretation sheds light on Hume’s engagement with Pyrrhonian skepticism
Is Epicurus a Direct Realist?
Get PDFIn his Letter to Herodotus, Epicurus presents a controversial theory of perception according to which all perceptions are true. In this paper, I argue that Epicurus\u27 theory of perception should be interpreted as a version of direct realism. If this interpretation is correct, then Epicurus holds that typical human perceivers have direct perceptual awareness of mind-independent objects. In the first section, I present an interpretation of Epicurus\u27 theory of perception. I interpret Epicurus as subscribing to the view according to which our perceptions always provide us with entirely accurate information about the world. In the second section, I provide an outline of a version of direct realism. The version of direct realism I present here is strongly indebted to the work of Michael Huemer. In the third section, using the framework developed in the second section, I argue that Epicurus should be interpreted as a direct realist
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Get PDFThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
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