125 research outputs found
Niche vs. central firms: Pattern of technology choice and cost-price dynamics in a differentiated oligopoly
No full textWe investigate whether and how positions in the characteristics space influences technological adoption and how price levels are affected; furthermore we assess the effects of policy interventions. In an industry where a central firm competes with two peripheral/niche ones, two technologies are available: one with low marginal and high fixed costs and one with opposite pattern. The central firm is in direct competition with the all the rivals. We show that this firm has higher incentives to adopt the technology efficient at large production scale; consequently if fixed cost decreases, the diffusion of this technology in the industry starts from the center and then spreads over to the niche firms. Changes in fixed and marginal costs affect long-run prices in non-obvious way. On the normative side, subsidies affect the technology pattern and deliver relevant effects: lump-sum subsidies increase consumer surplus, but can reduce profits. A price-cap that forestalls a technological change improves welfare. Our analysis is well-suited to analyze the digitalization process that has taken place in the last years
DISCLOSING VERSUS WITHHOLDING TECHNOLOGY KNOWLEDGE IN A DUOPOLY
No full textWe study firms' incentives to transfer knowledge about production technology to a rival in a Cournot duopoly. In a setting where two technologies are available, a technology is characterized by its associated cost function and no single technology is strictly superior to the other. A firm has superior information if it knows both techniques and the other only one. Cost efficiency may be 'reversed' after the voluntary disclosure, so that the rival's costs are improved at the equilibrium level of output. Adding R&D investments to the picture, we find that a firm can decide to invest just for the purpose of acquiring knowledge that will be transferred and not used. Furthermore, for the same point in the parameter space, the acquisition of full knowledge may occur or not as a function of the initial distribution of information. Copyright � 2008 The Authors; Journal compilation � 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and The University of Manchester.
On the Effects of Entry under Flexible Production Techniques: An Example of Quasi-Anticompetitiveness
No full textWe study reactions to entry in a Cournot model, contrasting the case where firms are endowed with unchangeable technologies against that where technologies are flexible. By the latter we mean that firms
can change the installed production technique at zero cost (fully flexible
technologies). We show that when firms are technologically flexible,
entry can increase equilibrium prices. The analysis is cast in a short-
run time horizon to simplify exposition, but its predictive power may
better relate to the long run
Niche vs. central firms: Technology choice and cost-price dynamics in a differentiated oligopoly
No full textThis paper is about technology choices in a differentiated oligopoly. The main questions are: whether the position in the product space affects the choice of technology, how changes in fixed costs affect price outcomes, the strategic responses to policy interventions. The industry is an oligopoly where a central firm is competing with two peripheral (or marginal) ones. The former is shown to be more ready than the latter to adopt a technology with low marginal costs and high fixed costs (Increasing Returns to Scale) rather than one with the opposite pattern (Constant Returns to Scale). The fixed cost in the IRS affects the technology configuration and hence output prices. For instance, a lower fixed cost may trigger lower prices and it is neutral only for given technologies. A price-cap may forestall a change in technologies; nondiscriminatory ad-valorem tax and taxes on variable input, or discriminatory unit taxes can also affect the technology pattern and deliver important effects on prices
Calandria, S. (2021). Matar a la madre: Infanticidios, honor y género en la provincia de Buenos Aires (1886-1921). Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires: Biblos; Málaga: Universidad de Málaga. (Ciudadanía e Inclusión)
No full textFil: Bacchiega, Julia. Universidad de San Andrés, Argentina
Wage Bargaining and Vertical Differentiation
No full textThis paper applies the Nash Bargaining solution to wage setting in a
vertically differentiated oligopoly and studies its welfare effects. The market outcome crucially depends on the bargaining power attributed to the agents. I show that the wage bargaining structure is likely to lead to another source of inefficiency that adds to the classical one derived by oligopoly pricing and quality choice
Technology inertia and the benefits of entry
No full textWe study the effects of entry on price in an industry. This assessment is usually carried out under the implicit assumption of “technological inertia”: incumbents cannot change their technologies in response to entry. We remove this assumption by modeling a game where, before quantity competition, firms choose technologies. We identify parameter configurations where, after entry, the incumbent(s) changes technology. This leads either to a higher price after entry or to a “dampening effect” on price reduction. This effect is shown to be relevant when evaluating the welfare gains from measures intended to foster competition by increasing the number of
competitors. The converse proposition could be stated for evaluating the social costs of merger
Strategic accessibility competition
No full textWe analyze the effect of competition in market-accessibility enhancement among quality-differentiated firms. Firms are located in regions with different ex-ante transport costs to reach the final market. We characterize the equilibrium of the two-stage game in which firms first invest to improve market accessibility and then compete in prices. Efforts in accessibility improvement crucially depend on the interplay between the willingness to pay for the quality premium of the median consumer and the ex-ante difference in accessibility between regions. From the social standpoint, also the accessibility investment depends on such a comparison. Finally, we endogenize quality choice and check the robustness of the result to some natural modifications of our assumptions
Strategic Accessibility Competition
No full textWe analyze the effect of competition in market-accessibility enhancement among quality-differentiated firms. Firms are located in regions with different ex-ante transport costs to reach the final market. We characterize the equilibrium of the two-stage game in which firms first invest to improve market accessibility and then compete in prices. Efforts in accessibility improvement crucially depend on the interplay between the willingness to pay for the quality premium of the median consumer and the ex-ante difference in accessibility between regions. From the social standpoint, also the accessibility investment depends on such a comparison. Finally, we endogenize quality choice and check the robustness of the result to some natural modifications of our assumptions
On the time consistency of equilibria in a class of additively separable differential games
No full textA class of state-redundant differential games is detected, where players can be partitioned into two groups, so that the state dynamics and the payoff functions of all players are additively separable w. r. t. controls and states of any two players belonging to different groups. We prove that, in this class of games, open-loop Nash and feedback Stackelberg equilibria coincide, both being strongly time consistent. This allows us to bypass the issue of the time inconsistency that typically affects the open-loop Stackelberg solution. © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010.[ARTICLE
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