5,221 research outputs found

    Philosophy of Management in Theory and Practice:A Dialogue between Chris Cowton and Roger Crisp Facilitated by Nigel Laurie

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    This article is an edited transcript of the keynote session at the 16th annual Philosophy of Management conference in Oxford on 23 June 2024. The keynote took the form of a dialogue between Roger Crisp (Director of the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics and Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Oxford) and Chris Cowton (Emeritus Professor and former Dean of the Business School at the University of Huddersfield and formerly Associate Director of the Institute of Business Ethics). The dialogue was facilitated by Nigel Laurie, formerly managing partner at London Facilitators and founder of the Philosophy of Management journal and the annual conference (Laurie and Cherry 2001). This dialogue joins a long-lasting conversation in the journal of Philosophy of Management on philosophy and its applications to management practice and theory (Eabrasu, 2023; Tsahuridu, 2023) by offering insightful personal perspectives especially as seen through institutional lenses

    Against Partiality

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    This is the text of the Lindley Lecture for 2018 given by Roger Crisp, a Professor of Moral Philosophy at St. Anne’s College, Oxford

    Hume: sobre virtude, utilidade e moralidade

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    In this paper, Roger Crisp offers an account of Hume’s theory of virtue. Crisp claims that the central place of virtue in Hume’s ethics gives Hume an extremely sophisticated position that virtue ethics cannot afford to ignore. In particular, he argues that though Hume’s position may ultimately be described as motive utilitarian, it is both an extremely sophisticated form of motive utilitarianism, and one which may remove the very possibility of non-utilitarian virtue ethics.  En este artículo, Roger Crisp nos presenta una interpretación de la teoría de la virtud de Hume. Crisp sostiene que el lugar central de la virtud en la ética de Hume le proporciona a Hume una posición extremadamente sofisticada que la ética de la virtud no puede ignorar. En particular, argumenta que aunque la posición de Hume pueda al final ser descrita como un utilitarismo de motivos, constituye en todo caso una forma extremadamente sofisticada de utilitarismo de motivos, una forma de utilitarismo que puede volver imposible una ética de la virtud de raíz no-utilitarista.  Neste artigo, Roger Crisp preséntanos unha interpretación da teoría da virtude de Hume. Crisp sostén que o lugar central da virtude na ética de Hume proporciona a Hume unha posición extremadamente sofisticada que a ética da virtude non pode ignorar. En particular, argumentando que, aínda que a posición de Hume en última instancia pode ser descrita como utilitarismo de motivos, é en todo caso unha forma extremadamente sofisticada de utilitarismo de motivos, unha forma de utilitarismo que pode facer imposible unha ética de virtude de raíz non-utilitaria

    Hume: sobre virtude, utilidade e moralidade

    No full text
    En este artículo, Roger Crisp nos presenta una interpretación de la teoría de la virtud de Hume. Crisp sostiene que el lugar central de la virtud en la ética de Hume le proporciona a Hume una posición extremadamente sofisticada que la ética de la virtud no puede ignorar. En particular, argumenta que aunque la posición de Hume pueda al final ser descrita como un utilitarismo de motivos, constituye en todo caso una forma extremadamente sofisticada de utilitarismo de motivos, una forma de utilitarismo que puede volver imposible una ética de la virtud de raíz no-utilitarista.  In this paper, Roger Crisp offers an account of Hume’s theory of virtue. Crisp claims that the central place of virtue in Hume’s ethics gives Hume an extremely sophisticated position that virtue ethics cannot afford to ignore. In particular, he argues that though Hume’s position may ultimately be described as motive utilitarian, it is both an extremely sophisticated form of motive utilitarianism, and one which may remove the very possibility of non-utilitarian virtue ethics.  Neste artigo, Roger Crisp preséntanos unha interpretación da teoría da virtude de Hume. Crisp sostén que o lugar central da virtude na ética de Hume proporciona a Hume unha posición extremadamente sofisticada que a ética da virtude non pode ignorar. En particular, argumentando que, aínda que a posición de Hume en última instancia pode ser descrita como utilitarismo de motivos, é en todo caso unha forma extremadamente sofisticada de utilitarismo de motivos, unha forma de utilitarismo que pode facer imposible unha ética de virtude de raíz non-utilitaria

    Roger Abrahams, author

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    Roger Abrahams, director of the African and Afro-American Research Institute at the University of Texas-Austin and author of Positively Black, argues the case for ethnic diversity in this interview. He also discusses that the idea of "new ethnicity" is not restricted to black or brown America and he sees a widespread return to old mores inherent in the traditional ethnic value system. Interviewed by WTMJ-TV host Jim Peck.GrayscaleSoun

    Unlucky for Some : 13 poems by Roger McGough

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    Inspired by and featuring the poetry of Roger McGough (by permission of the author), Unlucky for Some is a spare, minimalistic work about homelessness, mental illness and class division performed entirely in slow motion.\ud \ud This multimedia work also utilised prerecorded and live feed video and music, and experimented with synchronous and asynchonous live and mediatised performance

    Roger Crisp and Brad Hooker (eds.), Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin

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    Book Information Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin. Edited by Roger Crisp and Brad Hooker. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 2000. Pp. xii + 316. Hardback, £35.Garrett Cullit

    Reply to Crisp

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    We are grateful for, but unconvinced by, Roger Crisp's defence of the Priority View against our critique. In this reply, we show that Crisp fails to grapple with, much less defeat, the central claim of our critique. We also show that an example that Crisp offers in support of the Priority View in fact lends support to our critique of that view.</jats:p

    A Good Health: Who Best to Bring It?

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    The author supports the right of persons to terminate their lives when it would be in their "best interests" to do so. He considers cases in which persons are unable to kill themselves and request euthanasia or have requested it beforehand in a living will. Crisp rejects relatives, friends, and most physicians as the agents to carry out the request because of the emotional trauma to the agents and the damage to the image of physicians as savers of lives. He proposes that the practice of euthanasia be part of "telostrics," an area of medical specialization in the care of the terminally ill, and that these "telostricians" should perform voluntary euthanasia. (KIE abstract
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