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Cramton, Roger C. - Clip 01
No full textFrom the video archives of the Cornell Law School Heritage Project. The interviewer is Peter W. Martin; the videographer, Jae-Hyon Ahn. This video covers the circumstances under which Roger Cramton came to Cornell Law School as dean, his deanship and public service activities, and his subsequent teaching and scholarship in the field of professional responsibility. (Duration 59:13) The initial phase of this project was sponsored by a generous grant from the law firm of Sutherland Asbill and Brennan LLP.1_0wv9y32
Roger C. Cramton - Clip 1
No full textFrom the video archives of the Cornell Law School Heritage Project. The interviewer is Peter W. Martin; the videographer, Jae-Hyon Ahn. This video covers the circumstances under which Roger Cramton came to Cornell Law School as dean, his deanship and public service activities, and his subsequent teaching and scholarship in the field of professional responsibility.
Professor Cramton was a graduate of Harvard University, Magna Cum Laude and a graduate of the University of Chicago Law School, Order of the Coif. After graduating from Law School in 1955, Roger Cramton clerked for the Hon. Sterry R. Waterman of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and then for Justice Harold H. Burton of the U.S. Supreme Court. He was admitted to the Vermont, Michigan, and New York bars. He entered the legal academy in 1957 and taught at University of Chicago Law School and University of Michigan Law School before joining the Cornell Law School faculty in 1973. From 1973 to 1980 he served as Dean of the Law School.
Before arriving at Cornell, Professor Cramton served briefly as Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel in the United States Department of Justice, a post in which he was preceded by William H. Rehnquist, who was later to become Supreme Court Chief Justice, and followed by Antonin Scalia, who also became Supreme Court Justice.
Prior to this post, President Richard M. Nixon appointed him as chairman of the Administrative Conference of the United States, an independent federal agency dedicated to improving federal administrative procedures. Later, while serving as Dean at Cornell Law, President Gerald Ford appointed Cramton as the first chairman of the Legal Services Corporation, the single largest funder of civil legal aid for low income Americans in the nation, a post in which he was followed by Hillary Rodham Clinton.
Professor Cramton’s teaching and scholarship were focused primarily in the fields of legal ethics, legal profession, conflict of laws, and torts. He served as an advisor on a number of American Law Institute projects, including Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers (1999) and Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability (1998). He created The American Legal Ethics Library, a unique online collection of state ethics codes accompanied by narratives on the law of lawyering of the respective states.
Professor Cramton died on February 3, 2017, at the age of 87
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Commenting on Peter O. Steiner\u27s The Legalization of American Society: Economic Regulation
No full textCommenting on Peter O. Steiner\u27s The Legalization of American Society: Economic Regulation
Professor Cramton opened with praise for Professor Steiner\u27s integration of various theories into a new and effective statement of those characteristics endemic to economic regulation which tend to make its results suboptimal. While Cramton saw Steiner\u27s typology of the three types of regulation as helpful in focusing attention on the purposes of regulation, he cautioned that the typology should be viewed as involving dominant characteristics or ideal types rather than a description of historical purity. The three types of regulation are often intermixed , Cramton reminded his audience, in the constant historical growth of regulation.
Cramton followed this cautionary corrective with a more direct challenge to Steiner\u27s hypotheses about what causes change in regulation . Steiner\u27s remarks underemphasize the responsiveness of our political institutions to self-interest, crisis, and catastrophe, said Cramton, who proposed to discuss the dynamics of political change that can disrupt stable regulatory regimes
Commenting on Peter O. Steiner\u27s The Legalization of American Society: Economic Regulation
No full textCommenting on Peter O. Steiner\u27s The Legalization of American Society: Economic Regulation
Professor Cramton opened with praise for Professor Steiner\u27s integration of various theories into a new and effective statement of those characteristics endemic to economic regulation which tend to make its results suboptimal. While Cramton saw Steiner\u27s typology of the three types of regulation as helpful in focusing attention on the purposes of regulation, he cautioned that the typology should be viewed as involving dominant characteristics or ideal types rather than a description of historical purity. The three types of regulation are often intermixed , Cramton reminded his audience, in the constant historical growth of regulation.
Cramton followed this cautionary corrective with a more direct challenge to Steiner\u27s hypotheses about what causes change in regulation . Steiner\u27s remarks underemphasize the responsiveness of our political institutions to self-interest, crisis, and catastrophe, said Cramton, who proposed to discuss the dynamics of political change that can disrupt stable regulatory regimes
Virtual Power Plant Auctions
No full textSince their advent in 2001, virtual power plant (VPP) auctions have been implemented widely. In this paper, we describe the simultaneous ascending-clock auction format that has been used for virtually all VPP auctions to date, elaborating on other design choices that most VPP auctions have had in common as well as discussing a few aspects that have varied significantly among VPP auctions. We then evaluate the various objectives of regulators in requiring VPP auctions, concluding that the auctions have been effective devices for facilitating new entry into electricity markets and for developing wholesale power markets.Auctions, electricity auctions, market design, virtual power plant auctions, clock auction, combinatorial auction
Price Is a Better Climate Commitment
No full textAt the international level, a global carbon price is a better form of commitment to reduce carbon emissions than a system of national caps. Peter Cramton and Steven Stoft outline a price-based approach that is simple, effective, and remarkably affordable.
Reducing Healthcare Costs Requires Good Market Design
No full textHealthcare costs are no doubt too high, and Congress has been pushing for 13 years to harness market forces in Medicare procurement. But despite all this time, we are on the precipice of adopting a very poor market design, according to Peter Cramton of University of Maryland and Brett Katzman of Kennesaw State University
Comment on Hoerger: Early Pilots of Medicare Auctions Bring No Solace to Auction Experts
No full textPeter Cramton and Brett Katzman stick to their guns: Medicare auctions remain fatally flawed and must be fixed. They argue that contrary to Hoerger's comment, no comfort can be drawn from the fact that the market was able to withstand price reductions in early pilots.
Making Sense of the Aggregator Bank
No full textOn Tuesday, 10 February 2009, Treasury Secretary Geithner proposed the aggregator bank ("public-private investment fund") as a key instrument to resolve the financial crisis. He left out many details, so Lawrence Ausubel and Peter Cramton explain how an aggregator bank might operate in practice, and argue that with proper design, such a bank could be better than TARP.
Auction Design Critical for Rescue Plan
No full textThe details of the auction design could make or break the Treasury's plan to invest $700 billion in mortgage-related securities to resolve the financial crisis, using market mechanisms such as reverse auctions to determine prices, according to Lawrence M. Ausubel and Peter Cramton.
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