1,720,958 research outputs found
Coercive Ideology
No full textCurrent equal protection jurisprudence does not permit challenges to discriminatory government expression, no matter how blatant or extreme. This doctrine, which I label the discriminatory treatment requirement, is a manifestation of anticlassification, the prevailing equal protection framework since the mid-1970s. According to anticlassification, only suspect government classifications implicate the Equal Protection Clause. In this Article, I contend that discriminatory government expression violates the Clause because it contributes integrally to racial subordination. Through a process I call coercive ideology, discriminatory government expression serves as a veiled threat that manipulates individuals into performing public compliance with the dominant ideology. Like the script of a stage play, the aggregate of individual decisions to comply with its instructions translates the dominant ideology into a social reality. Coercive ideology reveals how both Lost Cause Confederate monuments and Jim Crow segregation signage contributed to racial subordination as discriminatory government expression in the New South. Because anticlassification fails to account both for the subordinating effects of discriminatory government expression and for the expressive effects of government classification, coercive ideology ultimately raises doubts about its continuing validity as the dominant approach to equal protection jurisprudence
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Blind Injustice: The Supreme Court, Implicit Racial Bias, and the Racial Disparity in the Criminal Justice System
No full text(Excerpt)
“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.” This statement by Chief Justice John Roberts in 2007 is alluring in both its grammatical symmetry and its logical simplicity. Yet it encapsulates the naiveté of the view of racial discrimination currently held by the majority of the justices of the Supreme Court of the United States. Chief Justice Roberts’s assertion contains the implied assumption that the only racial discrimination that exists—or at least the only kind that matters under the Constitution—is explicit and susceptible to conscious control. Decades of psychological research has demonstrated that the most insidious form of racial bias is actually implicit and subconscious, however. Moreover, research has consistently shown that such racial bias—termed “implicit racial bias” by the psychological literature—is capable of affecting conscious behavior and exists independently of individuals’ conscious and explicit beliefs about racial equality. By clinging to an outdated and incomplete definition of racial discrimination, the Court has made a series of decisions that have permitted and exacerbated the damage that implicit racial bias wreaks on racial minorities.
The most dramatic and devastating mark of implicit racial bias on the black American community is the racial disparity that permeates every level of the criminal justice system. Failure to acknowledge and account for implicit racial bias has led the Court to expand the discretion of criminal justice actors over the past half century, vastly widening the array of opportunities for implicit racial bias to influence their decisions. At the same time, the Court has rejected one of its most powerful tools for controlling the effects of such bias, spurning disparate impact theory in favor of an intent-based standard that is all but impossible for plaintiffs to meet. To fulfill its constitutional duty and give true meaning to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court must recognize the influence of implicit racial bias on the criminal justice system and change constitutional course accordingly.
This Note begins with an overview of the racial disparity in the American criminal justice system. Part II gives a brief introduction to implicit racial bias, while Part III summarizes the limited research that has been conducted thus far to document its influence on criminal justice actors. Part IV analyzes the key decisions of the Court that have permitted and exacerbated the impact of implicit racial bias on the justice system, culminating in Part V, which shows the cumulative effects of the Court’s decisions by analyzing the New York Police Department’s “stop-and-frisk” policy and one federal judge’s struggle to curtail that policy’s racially disparate impact in light of the Supreme Court’s precedents. Finally, Part VI argues that the Court should begin to address the reality of implicit racial bias by reigning in criminal justice actors’ discretion and by refocusing its equal protection analysis on disparate impact rather than intent
Blind Injustice: The Supreme Court, Implicit Racial Bias, and the Racial Disparity in the Criminal Justice System
No full text(Excerpt)
“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.” This statement by Chief Justice John Roberts in 2007 is alluring in both its grammatical symmetry and its logical simplicity. Yet it encapsulates the naiveté of the view of racial discrimination currently held by the majority of the justices of the Supreme Court of the United States. Chief Justice Roberts’s assertion contains the implied assumption that the only racial discrimination that exists—or at least the only kind that matters under the Constitution—is explicit and susceptible to conscious control. Decades of psychological research has demonstrated that the most insidious form of racial bias is actually implicit and subconscious, however. Moreover, research has consistently shown that such racial bias—termed “implicit racial bias” by the psychological literature—is capable of affecting conscious behavior and exists independently of individuals’ conscious and explicit beliefs about racial equality. By clinging to an outdated and incomplete definition of racial discrimination, the Court has made a series of decisions that have permitted and exacerbated the damage that implicit racial bias wreaks on racial minorities.
The most dramatic and devastating mark of implicit racial bias on the black American community is the racial disparity that permeates every level of the criminal justice system. Failure to acknowledge and account for implicit racial bias has led the Court to expand the discretion of criminal justice actors over the past half century, vastly widening the array of opportunities for implicit racial bias to influence their decisions. At the same time, the Court has rejected one of its most powerful tools for controlling the effects of such bias, spurning disparate impact theory in favor of an intent-based standard that is all but impossible for plaintiffs to meet. To fulfill its constitutional duty and give true meaning to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court must recognize the influence of implicit racial bias on the criminal justice system and change constitutional course accordingly.
This Note begins with an overview of the racial disparity in the American criminal justice system. Part II gives a brief introduction to implicit racial bias, while Part III summarizes the limited research that has been conducted thus far to document its influence on criminal justice actors. Part IV analyzes the key decisions of the Court that have permitted and exacerbated the impact of implicit racial bias on the justice system, culminating in Part V, which shows the cumulative effects of the Court’s decisions by analyzing the New York Police Department’s “stop-and-frisk” policy and one federal judge’s struggle to curtail that policy’s racially disparate impact in light of the Supreme Court’s precedents. Finally, Part VI argues that the Court should begin to address the reality of implicit racial bias by reigning in criminal justice actors’ discretion and by refocusing its equal protection analysis on disparate impact rather than intent
Coercive Ideology
Full text linkCurrent equal protection jurisprudence does not permit challenges to discriminatory government expression, no matter how blatant or extreme. This doctrine, which I label the discriminatory treatment requirement, is a manifestation of anticlassification, the prevailing equal protection framework since the mid-1970s. According to anticlassification, only suspect government classifications implicate the Equal Protection Clause. In this Article, I contend that discriminatory government expression violates the Clause because it contributes integrally to racial subordination. Through a process I call coercive ideology, discriminatory government expression serves as a veiled threat that manipulates individuals into performing public compliance with the dominant ideology. Like the script of a stage play, the aggregate of individual decisions to comply with its instructions translates the dominant ideology into a social reality. Coercive ideology reveals how both Lost Cause Confederate monuments and Jim Crow segregation signage contributed to racial subordination as discriminatory government expression in the New South. Because anticlassification fails to account both for the subordinating effects of discriminatory government expression and for the expressive effects of government classification, coercive ideology ultimately raises doubts about its continuing validity as the dominant approach to equal protection jurisprudence
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Full text linkThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Variations on the Author
Full text link“Variations on the Author” discusses two of Eduardo Coutinho’s recent films (Um Dia na Vida, from 2010, and Últimas Conversas, posthumously released in 2015) and their contribution to the general question of documentary authorship. The director’s filmography is characterized by a consistent yet self-effacing form of authorial self-inscription: Coutinho often features as an interviewer that rather than express opinions propels discourses; an interviewer that is good at listening. This mode of self-inscription characterizes him as an author who is not expressive but who is nonetheless markedly present on the screen. In Um Dia na Vida, however, Coutinho is completely absent form the image, while Últimas Conversas, on the contrary, includes a confessional prologue that moves the director from the margins to the center of his films. This article examines the ways in which these works stand out in the filmography of a director who offers new insights into the notion of cinematic authorship
Appropriate Similarity Measures for Author Cocitation Analysis
Full text linkWe provide a number of new insights into the methodological discussion about author cocitation analysis. We first argue that the use of the Pearson correlation for measuring the similarity between authors’ cocitation profiles is not very satisfactory. We then discuss what kind of similarity measures may be used as an alternative to the Pearson correlation. We consider three similarity measures in particular. One is the well-known cosine. The other two similarity measures have not been used before in the bibliometric literature. Finally, we show by means of an example that our findings have a high practical relevance.information science;Pearson correlation;cosine;similarity measure;author cocitation analysis
Dispelling the Myths Behind First-author Citation Counts
Full text linkWe conducted a full-scale evaluative citation analysis study of scholars in the XML research field to explore just how different from each other author rankings resulting from different citation counting methods actually are, and to demonstrate the capability of emerging data and tools on the Web in supporting more realistic citation counting methods. Our results contest some common arguments for the continued
use of first-author citation counts in the evaluation of scholars, such as high correlations between author rankings by first-author citation counts and other citation
counting methods, and high costs of using more realistic citation counting methods that are not well-supported by the ISI databases. It is argued that increasingly available digital full text research papers make it possible for citation analysis studies to go beyond what the ISI databases have directly supported and to employ more
sophisticated methods
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