502 research outputs found
Introduzione. L'anno del podestà forestiero
No full textIl 2012 è stato l’anno di Monti, il «podestà forestiero» al quale il presidente Giorgio Napolitano aveva affidato il compito di salvare l’Italia dal baratro finanziario e di restituire credibilità al paese nell’arena internazionale. Misurato sull’arco dell’intero anno, il bilancio del governo tecnico presenta luci e ombre: allontanato il pericolo del default, sono mancati invece risultati concreti sul versante della crescita economica. La «strana maggioranza» che ha sostenuto il governo Monti in Parlamento – Pdl, Pd e Udc – non ha fatto meglio. Nonostante la moral suasion di Napolitano, i partiti hanno perso un’altra occasione – l’ultima? – per attuare riforme istituzionali improrogabili e per mettere mano seriamente ai costi e ai privilegi della politica. Chi ha beneficiato di questa situazione è stato il Movimento 5 stelle, che mira a un rovesciamento di tutti gli equilibri politici. A fine 2012 le condizioni dell’Italia restano difficili. Lo sforzo di risanamento avviato a caro prezzo dal governo Monti può essere vanificato in poco tempo e il rischio che l’orologio del paese torni alle drammatiche settimane dell’autunno 2011 non è scongiurato
Introduction: the year of the external Podestà
No full textIn 2012, the spotlight was on Prime Minister Monti and his government of non-elected ministers. Early in the year, the new government’s economic policy was effective in stopping the international downgrading of the country’s credit rating. However, in terms of the entire year, the success of the Monti government appears less definitive. There were no clear achievements in terms of growth, and the structural features of the economy remained weak. Monti successfully initiated some reforms and policy changes, but there were failures as well. Furthermore, the “odd majority” (made up of the PdL, PD, and UdC) that supported Monti in Parliament performed more weakly than the government. The parties were to change the electoral law, reform the parliamentary institutions, cut costs, and reduce the privileges of the political class, but failed. Their inaction was accompanied by a series of scandals and crimes, all of which facilitated the emergence of new political forces, such as the Five Star Movement. When Monti eventually resigned in December 2012, President Napolitano called for new elections, and the parties redefined their proposals and lists. At the end of the year, the political and economic conditions of the country remained fragile
Coronavirus : quanto e come c’entra la nonviolenza?
No full textPodcast given online on 20 June 2020Organized by 'Luca Coscioni Association' 2020 it explores issues relating to freedom, science and rights.Con gli esperti di nonviolenza Claudio Radaelli Professore di Politiche pubbliche, University College di Londra e Roberto Baldoli, ricercatore presso la stessa scuola di Politiche Pubbliche, Marco Perduca ha parlato di come alcuni comportamenti individuali e collettivi possano essere analizzati dal punto di vista della nonviolenza, “auto-governo”, senso della responsabilità partecipazione attiva e solidale sono ingredienti di una “bio-politica” che potrebbe riscrivere le dinamiche Stato(mercato) e cittadino, ma anche il modo di agire e gli obiettivi di movimenti sociali attivi in giro per il mondo
Regulatory Quality in the European Commission and the UK: Old questions and new findings. CEPS Working Document No. 362, January 2012
No full textThis paper examines the quality of impact assessments in the European Commission and the United Kingdom for the period 2005-2010. We coded 477 impact assessments for the UK and 251 for the European Commission, using a detailed scorecard - adjusted to reduce the bias evidenced by previous usages of this instrument. The findings suggest that impact assessment is not merely a perfunctory activity in the European Union and the UK. Quality has improved steadily over the years, arguably as a result of learning and regulatory oversight. The UK and the European Commission are strikingly similar on a number of impact assessment dimensions (such as economic analysis
and identification of costs and benefits). The impact assessments of the European Commission seem to pay more attention to social and environmental aspects, however. The
conclusions reflect on the implications of our findings for current policy discussions on regulatory quality and the role of regulatory oversight bodies
Don’t think it’s a good idea! Four building sites of the ‘ideas school’
No full textIdeational explanations of policy change are popular in the fields of political economy, comparative politics and policy analysis. And yet, to make the case for ideational explanations, we must make further progress on the nature of ideas, where they come from, what they consist of, and how they change over time. We highlight four critical building sites concerning the definitional aspects of ideational explanations, micro-foundations, mechanisms and the difference between ideational and cognitive analysis. We make recommendations on how to carry out work in the building sites and describe the range of suggestions and ways forward found in the articles of this Symposium. We also suggest cross-fertilising political science with the findings of neighbouring disciplines that have developed empirically robust models of ideation and cognition
Controlling Bureaucracies with Fire Alarms: Policy Instruments and Cross-Country Patterns
No full textnotes: This article is based on research carried out with the support of the European Research Council (ERC) grant (#230267) Analysis of Learning in Regulatory Governance, ALREG, directed by Claudio Radaelli. Dunlop and Radaelli gratefully acknowledge the support of the ERC. The dataset was coded and prepared by Dr Nicola Corkin, associate research fellow in ALREG. The authors would like to thank Dr Fabrizio De Francesco for his contribution to this part of the ALREG project. The authors wish to express their gratitude to the organisers and participants of the ‘Coping with Power Dispersion’ workshop at the University of Copenhagen, 13-14 December 2012. Previous versions of this paper were also presented at the UK Political Studies Association (PSA) annual conference in Cardiff, 25-27 March 2013, the International Research Society for Public Management (IRSPM) annual conference in Prague, 10-12 April 2013 and the Europe@LSE seminar, LSE, 5 December 2013. We are grateful to Federica Bicchi, Jens Blom-Hansen, Nicola Corkin, Matt Flinders, Fabrizio Gilardi, Gilles Jeannot, Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, Martin Lodge, Martino Maggetti, Rod Rhodes, Mark Thatcher and Koen Verhoest, the three special issue editors and two anonymous referees for their insightful comments on earlier drafts. The usual disclaimer applies.publication-status: Acceptedtypes: ArticleThe political control of the bureaucracy is a major theme in public administration scholarship, particularly in delegation theory. There is a wide range of policy instruments suitable for the purpose of control. In practice, however, there are economic and political limitations to deploying the full arsenal of control tools. We explore the implications of the costs of control by examining cross-country patterns of fire alarms. We identify and categorise a set of control instruments and their rationale using accountability typologies. We then code the presence or absence of different instruments by drawing on an original dataset of 14 instruments in a population of 17 European countries. Using configurational analysis, we analyse cross-country patterns. In the conclusions, we reflect on the patterns identified, their implications for controlling bureaucracy in advanced democracies and the literature on administrative traditions. We finally propose how our empirical findings may be extended to further explanatory analyses
The politics and economics of regulatory impact assessment
No full textThis draft chapter that has been published by Edward Elgar Publishing in Handbook of Regulatory Impact Assessment edited by Claire A. Dunlop and Claudio M. Radaelli, published in 2016. DOI: 10.4337/9781782549567. ISBN: 978178254955
Technocrats in Office. Italian Politics 2012
No full textIn 2012, the spotlight was on Prime Minister Monti and his government of non-elected ministers. Early in the year, the new government’s economic policy was effective in stopping the international downgrading of the country’s credit rating. However, in terms of the entire year, the success of the Monti government appears less definitive. There were no clear achievements in terms of growth, and the structural features of the economy remained weak. Monti successfully initiated some reforms and policy changes, but there were failures as well. Furthermore, the “odd majority” (made up of the PdL, PD, and UdC) that supported Monti in Parliament performed more weakly than the government. The parties were to change the electoral law, reform the parliamentary institutions, cut costs, and reduce the privileges of the political class, but failed. Their inaction was accompanied by a series of scandals and crimes, all of which facilitated the emergence of new political forces, such as the Five Star Movement. When Monti eventually resigned in December 2012, President Napolitano called for new elections, and the parties redefined their proposals and lists. At the end of the year, the political and economic conditions of the country remained fragile
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