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Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Full text linkThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Governing and Deciding Who Governs
Full text linkIn McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, Chief Justice Roberts wrote that, Campaign finance restrictions that pursue other objectives [than eradicating quid pro quo corruption or its appearance], we have explained, impermissibly inject the Government \u27into the debate over who should govern.\u27 And those who govern should be the last people to help decide who should govern.
This passage sounds great — after all, who could object to an attempt to purge official self-dealing, especially in the election-law context? And therein lies its insidiousness: this rousing language masks a programmatic attempt by Roberts and his colleagues to distance themselves rhetorically from the structures and processes of governance and thereby to justify their privileged place above the other branches with regard to such issues.
This essay, written for the University of Chicago Legal Forum\u27s 2014 Does Election Law Serve the Electorate? symposium, identifies and unpacks two distinct distancing strategies exemplified in that passage. First, the Court\u27s use of the first-person plural ( we have explained ) posits a trans-temporal unified identity for the Court, which is implicitly contrasted with the shifts and vagaries of mere electoral politics. Part I examines this judicial self-presentation by contrasting the treatment of corruption in Caperton, on the one hand, and Citizens United and McCutcheon, on the other. Second, Roberts\u27s implicit contrasting of the Court with those who govern serves to suggest that the Court is somehow removed from the arena of partisan politics. Part II discusses this claim with reference to Bush v. Gore, Shelby County, and election-law disputes surrounding the 2014 midterms.
The conclusion considers what these rhetorical distancing strategies get the Court, and what a critical evaluation of them gets us
Congress\u27s Constitution
Full text linkCongress has significantly more constitutional power than we are accustomed to seeing it exercise. By failing to make effective use of its power, Congress has invited the other branches to fill the vacuum, resulting in a constitutional imbalance. This Article considers a number of constitutional tools that individual houses—and even individual members—of Congress, acting alone, can deploy in interbranch conflicts. Although the congressional powers discussed in this Article are clearly contemplated in constitutional text, history, and structure, many of them have received only scant treatment in isolation. More importantly, they have never before been considered in concert as a set of tools in an ongoing interbranch power struggle. This holistic perspective is necessary because these powers in combination are much greater than the sum of their parts.
Borrowing terminology from international relations scholarship, this Article groups the congressional powers under discussion into “hard” and “soft” varieties. Congressional hard powers are tangible and coercive; the hard powers discussed in this Article are the power of the purse and the contempt power. Congressional soft powers are intangible and persuasive; soft powers considered by this Article include Congress’s freedom of speech and debate, the houses’ disciplinary power over their own members, and their power to determine the rules of their proceedings. Each of these powers presents opportunities for Congress to enhance its standing with the public, and thereby enhance its power. This Article aims to demonstrate both the ways in which these powers are mutually supporting and reinforcing and the ways in which Congress underutilizes them. In doing so, the Article examines a number of examples of congressional use of, and failure to use, these powers, including the release of the Pentagon Papers, the 1995–1996 government shutdowns and 2011 near-shutdown, the 2007–2009 contempt-of-Congress proceedings against White House officials, and the use of the filibuster, among others.
The Article concludes by arguing that Congress should make a more vigorous use of these powers and by considering their implications for the separation of powers more generally
The Unconstitutionality of the Filibuster
Full text linkThis Article, written for the Connecticut Law Review\u27s 2010 Is Our Constitutional Order Broken? symposium, argues that the filibuster, as currently practiced, is unconstitutional.
After a brief introduction in Part I, Part II describes the current operation of the filibuster. Although the filibuster is often discussed in terms of unlimited debate, this Part argues that its current operation is best understood in terms of a sixty-vote requirement to pass most bills and other measures through the Senate.
Part III presents a structural argument that this supermajority requirement for most Senate business is unconstitutional. This Part argues that the words passed in Article I’s description of the legislative process, determine in the Rules of Proceedings Clause, and consent in the Appointments Clause must be understood to contain an implicit premise that a determined and focused legislative majority must be able to get its way in a reasonable amount of time. Or, to put it differently, the Constitution cannot countenance permanent minority obstruction in a house of Congress.
Part IV responds to the most prominent counterarguments. First, it rejects the counterargument from plenary cameral rule-making authority, arguing that rules made pursuant to this authority still cannot run afoul of the structural principle described in Part III. Second, it rejects the counterargument based on historical pedigree. Surveying the history of the House of Commons, the House of Representatives, and the Senate, it finds no longstanding tradition in Anglo-American legislatures of indefinite minority obstruction. And third, it rejects the counterargument that legislative entrenchment is unproblematic.
Finally, Part V suggests choreography for eliminating the filibuster. It begins by noting that this is not a matter for Article III courts; the arguments here are - and must be - addressed to constitutionally conscientious Senators. It then suggests that the filibuster need not be eliminated at the beginning of a new Congress; if the filibuster is unconstitutional, then the presiding officer may so rule at any time, and the Senate may uphold that ruling by simple majority. Finally, it notes that the filibuster need not be replaced with a simple majority cloture rule and suggests potential alternatives
The Unconstitutionality of the Filibuster Is Our Constitutional Order Broken - Structural and Doctrinal Questions in Constitutional Law: The Use of the Filibuster and Potential Senate Reform
No full textThis Article argues that the filibuster, as currently practiced, is unconstitutional. After a brief introduction in Part I, Part II describes the current operation of the filibuster. Although the filibuster is often discussed in terms of “unlimited debate,” this Part argues that its current operation is best understood in terms of a sixty-vote requirement to pass most bills and other measures through the Senate. Part III presents a structural argument that this supermajority requirement for most Senate business is unconstitutional. This Part argues that the words “passed” in Article I’s description of the legislative process, “determine” in the Rules of Proceedings Clause, and “consent” in the Appointments Clause must be understood to contain an implicit premise that a determined and focused legislative majority must be able to get its way in a reasonable amount of time. Or, to put it differently, the Constitution cannot countenance permanent minority obstruction in a house of Congress. Part IV responds to the most prominent counterarguments. First, it rejects the counterargument from plenary cameral rule-making authority, arguing that rules made pursuant to this authority still cannot run afoul of the structural principle described in Part III. Second, it rejects the counterargument based on historical pedigree. Surveying the history of the House of Commons, the House of Representatives, and the Senate, it finds no longstanding tradition in Anglo-American legislatures of indefinite minority obstruction. And third, it rejects the counterargument that legislative entrenchment is unproblematic. Finally, Part V suggests choreography for eliminating the filibuster. It begins by noting that this is not a matter for Article III courts; the arguments here are—and must be—addressed to constitutionally conscientious Senators. It then suggests that the filibuster need not be eliminated at the beginning of a new Congress; if the filibuster is unconstitutional, then the presiding officer may so rule at any time, and the Senate may uphold that ruling by simple majority. Finally, it notes that the filibuster need not be replaced with a simple majority cloture rule and suggests potential alternatives
How Long Is History's Shadow
No full textIn Congress's Constitution, Josh Chafetz takes issue with those who have questioned the value of Congress in recent years. He argues that Congress's critics focus too heavily on its legislative function and ignore several important nonlegislative powers that enable Congress to exert significant authority vis-a-vis the other branches. Chafetz engages in close historical examination of these nonlegislative powers and notes that in some cases, Congress has ceased exercising them as robustly as it once did, while in others it has unwittingly ceded them to another branch. Congress's Constitution urges Congress to reassert several of its ceded powers more aggressively going forward, in order to recapture some of the authority and influence it has lost over time
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