1,721,246 research outputs found
Replication data for: Resource Windfalls, Political Regimes, and Political Stability
No full textCaselli, Francesco, and Tesei, Andrea, (2016) "Resource Windfalls, Political Regimes, and Political Stability." Review of Economics and Statistics 98:3, 573-590
Replication data for: Resource Windfalls, Political Regimes, and Political Stability
No full textCaselli, Francesco, and Tesei, Andrea, (2016) "Resource Windfalls, Political Regimes, and Political Stability." Review of Economics and Statistics 98:3, 573-590
Replication data for: Resource Windfalls, Political Regimes, and Political Stability
No full textCaselli, Francesco, and Tesei, Andrea, (2016) "Resource Windfalls, Political Regimes, and Political Stability." Review of Economics and Statistics 98:3, 573-590
Dynastic management
No full textThe most striking difference in corporate-governance arrangements between rich and poor countries is that the latter rely much more heavily on the dynastic family firm, where ownership and control are passed on from one generation to the other. We argue that if the heir to the family firm has no talent for managerial decision making, dynastic management is a failure of meritocracy that reduces a Örmís Total Factor Productivity. We present a simple model that studies the macreconomic causes and consequences of dynastic management. In our model, the incidence of dynastic management depends, among other factors, on the imperfections of contractual enforcement. A plausible calibration suggests that, via dynastic management, poor contract enforcement may be a substantial contributor to observed cross country differences in aggregate Total Factor Productivity
Bad politicians
No full textWe present a simple theory of the quality (competence and honesty) of elected officials. Our theory offers three main insights. Low-quality citizens have a 'comparative advantage' in pursuing elective office, because their market wages are lower than those of high-quality citizens (competence), and/or because they reap higher returns from holding office (honesty). Hence, voters may find themselves supply constrained of high-quality candidates. Second, bad politicians generate negative externalities for good ones, making their rewards from office increasing in the average quality of office holders. This leads to multiple equilibria in quality. Third, incumbent policymakers can influence the rewards of future policymakers, leading to path dependence in quality: bad governments sow the seeds for more bad governments. © 2003 Published by Elsevier B.V
Economics and Politics of Alternative Institutional Reforms
Full text linkIn a model with heterogeneity in managerial talent, we compare the economic and political consequences of reforms aimed at reducing fixed costs of entry (deregulation) and improving the efficiency of financial markets (financial reform). The effects of these reforms depend on the market where control rights over incumbent firms are traded. In the absence of a market for control, both reforms increase the number and the average quality of firms, and are politically equivalent. When a market for control exists, financial reform induces less entry than deregulation, and endogenously compensates incumbents, thereby encountering less political opposition from them. Using this result, we show that financial reform may be used in the short run to open the way for future deregulation. Our model sheds light on the privatization and reform experiences of formerly planned economies as well as on the observed path of reforms in economies of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (c) 2008 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology..
Consumption amenities and city crowdedness
Full text linkCrowdedness varies widely among U.S. cities. A simple, static general equilibrium model suggests that plausible differences in metro areas’ consumption amenities can account for much of the observed variation. Under a baseline calibration, differences in amenities valued at 30 percent of average consumption expenditures suffice to support a twenty-fold difference in population density. Empirical results confirm that amenities help support crowdedness and suggest that they are becoming a more important determinant of where people choose to live. But for the moment, local productivity appears to be the more important cause of local crowdedness.Productivity ; Consumption (Economics)
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Full text linkThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
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