1,720,990 research outputs found
The Origin of Familism
No full textMost firms in the world are controlled by their founders or by the founders’ families and heirs. Family ownership is nearly universal among privately held firms, but is also dominant among publicly traded firms (Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002; La Porta et al., 1999). Even in the United States, where ownership dispersion is at its highest, families exercise a significant degree of control over a third of the 500 largest corporations (Villalonga and Amit, 2009), and over more than half of all public corporations (Villalonga and Amit, 2010). Not surprisingly, the family firm literature is huge (e.g., Berrone, Cruz and Gomez-Mejia, 2012; Salvato and Aldrich, 2012). However, no study addresses determinants of family ownership so far. What is the origin of familism in corporations? Why family firms are dominant in continental Europe rather than in the United States? What leads entrepreneurs to look for partners within the family members rather than outsiders? This paper is devoted to answer these questions.
Our key conjecture is that family bonds are substitutes for the institutional and legal obligations that define the partnerships in business. More specifically, we posit the likelihood to give birth to a family firm increases with the strength of father-son ties. In addition, we predict this relation is more pronounced the lower is the shareholder protection.
To test these conjectures we merge datasets on private and listed firms (519,822 firm-year observations) over 2005-2010 in 14 European countries. We capture the strength of the parent-child relation by introducing an index based on the national-average parents’ geographical proximity to the nearest living child. In addition, we control for the father’s frequency of contacts to the most contacted child. As predicted, we find the strength of parent-child relations positively affects the likelihood to establish a family firm. Furthermore, the power of this relation decreases with the shareholder protection.
We contribute to family firm literature at least for two. First, this is the first study that addresses the origin of family capitalism: The strength of parent-child relations explains family firm birth and family firm cross-country variability. Second, our findings help explaining family firm performance (e.g., Cucculelli and Micucci, 2008; Miller et al., 2007; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). Existing literature agrees family firms over-perform as long as founders are involved in the business, while family firm performance decreases with descendants and with the number of generations working in the firm (e.g., Smith and Amoako-Adu, 1999). However, why descendants underperform with respect to founders is still at issue. Family bond strength is also decreasing with family generations: Descendant under-performance is related to the weakening of within-family obligations which is not offset by strong enough institutional obligations
Do local causations matter? The effect of firm location on the relations of ROE, R&D, and firm SIZE with MARKET-TO-BOOK
No full textFirm location affects the relations of ROE, R&D, and firm size with market-to-book. Local parameters that are specific to the firm geographic location are estimated by weighting observations in function of their proximity. The local effect of ROE increases with the earnings quality of the neighboring firms, which is consistent with the local sharing of the accounting practices. According to value-enhancing spillover of knowledge among nearby firms, the effect of R&D is boosted by within- region R&D. Finally, the small-size effect weakens with the firm isolation, which supports the superior information of local investors. Firm location endogeneity is addressed focusing on firms operating in different industries where endogenous similarities are highly unlikely, and findings remain unchanged. Local factors shape relationships of causations and enhance effects that vary firm the firm location. Overall, local causations matter
Il Consiglio di Amministrazione delle Imprese. Ruolo, composizione ed evidenze empiriche
No full textIl Consiglio di Amministrazione è il fulcro della governance aziendale, e, come tale, della redditività dell’impresa. Numerosi sono gli studi hanno tentato di definire le relazioni di causalità che intercorrono tra le molteplici caratteristiche del CdA e le performance dell’azienda. Tuttavia, la maggior parte degli studi esistenti e delle evidenze empiriche prodotte si focalizzano più su caratteristiche quantitative, quali ad esempio il numero di amministratori e le politiche di pagamento, piuttosto che sugli aspetti qualitativi dei consiglieri e del CdA unitariamente inteso.
Da tali premesse muove l’interesse per il tema, e quindi il presente lavoro, con l’obiettivo di presentare, attraverso un’analisi empirica, le tipiche caratteristiche di composizione del CdA ed i relativi effetti sulle performance aziendali. Più nello specifico, differenti aspetti qualitativi del CdA, quali ad esempio profili di età, eterogeneità di genere e nazionalità, incarichi coperti in altre aziende da parte degli amministratori, sono mappati dal punto di vista teorico, ne è fornita evidenza empirica, e sono messi in relazione con le performance d’azienda. L’ambizioso obiettivo finale è quello di fornire una best practice sulla composizione ottimale di un consiglio di amministrazione, assumendo come obiettivo di quest'ultimo la massimizzazione del valore per gli azionisti.
Il volume presenta una struttura articolata in due parti, nella prima delle quali è fornita una visione organica dell’assetto istituzionale, presupposto per l’analisi empirica, prodotta nella seconda. Più nello specifico, la prima parte del volume fornisce un’analisi giuridico-finanziaria della figura dell’amministratore e del consiglio d’amministrazione, che risulta, oltre che assente in letteratura, quanto mai attuale alla luce delle recenti numerose riforme normative introdotte in materia; la seconda parte del volume offre una ampia literature review e, successivamente, uno studio empirico delle diverse caratteristiche di composizione del CdA come determinanti della performance di impresa. Quest’ultimo elemento in particolare costituisce un aspetto di novità tanto nella letteratura empirica nazionale e che internazionale
Previdenza e Fiscalità delle Stock Option in Italia: una fonte di Rischio e di Incertezza
No full textIl presente contributo fornisce una visione organica della normativa fiscale e previdenziale vigente per i compensi percepiti dagli amministratori. Alla luce delle innovazioni introdotte in materia, sono inoltre evidenziate le difficoltà di tipo competitivo e di stima dei risultati reddituali prospettici che le imprese, che fanno ricorso agli strumenti retributivi a base azionaria, si troveranno con ogni probabilità a dovere affrontare.This paper investigates, in a theoretical framework, the consequences of the new tax and welfare regime of directors’ compensation introduced in Italy. More specifically it will address the equity-based compensation. Given the optimal compensation contract which should be able to attract the right executives at the lowest cost, retain them at the lowest cost (i.e. encourage the right executives to leave the firm at the appropriate time), and motivate them to take actions that create long-run shareholder value and avoid actions that destroy value, the innovations introduced in terms of directors’ pay welfare and fiscal treatment are very likely to negatively influence the firm’s capability to appoint and retain the right directors in an increasingly global job market. Moreover, since firms which have traditionally rewarded their directors with stock options now incur additional costs tied to the exercise policy, which are completely unpredictable, the forecast of firms’ performance results are very likely to lose reliability. In conclusion, what the accounting reform of equity-based remuneration, whose latest elements are represented by the inclusion of the IFRS2 among the IAS, was aimed at (i.e. suppressing the bias in firms accounting results due to the use of stock options), is likely to be nullified by the fiscal and welfare reform of directors’ remuneration
Dataset for corporate valuation and analyses of peer effects in corporate practices and local factors favoring innovation
No full textThis data article provides cross-sectionals on the local values of the coefficients of ROE, R&D-TO-SALES, and TOTAL ASSET as regressors of the MARKET-TO-BOOK ratio and is related to the research article entitled “Do Local Causations Matter? The Effect of Firm Location on the Relations of ROE, R&D, and Firm Size with Market-to-Book” (A. Carosi, 2016) [1]. The data are aggregated at the regional level (NUTS2). The reported data are the regional average values of the coefficients of ROE, R&D-TO-SALES, and LN(TOTAL ASSET) on LN(MARKET-TO-BOOK), estimated upon the Italian non-financial listed firms in 1999–2007. Local coefficient estimates for family firms and utilities are also provided
Il Consiglio di Amministrazione nelle Società Quotate: Teoria ed Evidenza
No full textIl presente contributo esamina il consiglio d’amministrazione delle società aventi azioni quotate in Borsa Italiana, e le retribuzioni destinate ai suoi membri, alla luce delle numerose innovazioni dell’ordinamento giuridico italiano e seguendo quella linea di analisi recentemente proposta dalla letteratura avente alla propria base l’idea che gli amministratori possono influenzare a proprio vantaggio i termini del pay-package loro corrisposto.
A tal fine l’elaborato presenta una struttura articolata in due parti, nella prima delle quali viene fornita una visione organica dell’assetto istituzionale in cui l’analisi empirica, prodotta nella seconda, trova il proprio presupposto. Più specificatamente, la prima parte della tesi fornisce un’analisi giuridico-finanziaria della figura dell’amministratore (Capitolo 1) e del consiglio d’amministrazione (Capitolo 2), che risulta, oltre che assente in letteratura, quantomai attuale alla luce delle numerose e recenti riforme normative introdotte in materia. La normativa primaria, costituita dagli articoli del codice civile riguardanti gli amministratori ed i sistemi d’amministrazione e controllo (libro V, sezione VI bis, del Codice Civile) e dalle disposizioni contenute nel T.U.F., va oggi infatti completata con le nuove disposizioni contabili derivanti dall’applicazione degli IAS, ed in particolare dell’IFRS2, con le novità introdotte dalla cosiddetta Nuova Legge sul Risparmio (D. L. n. 262/2006), con le linee di comportamento descritte nella terza versione del Codice di Autodisciplina (Best Practice Code, 2006), con le prescrizioni di tipo previdenziale e fiscale contenute nelle Leggi "Finanziaria" del 2006 e del 2007, nonché con le novità in materia di governance bancaria volute da Mario Draghi (emanate a Marzo di quest’anno ma da recepire entro il 30 Giugno 2009). La seconda parte dell’elaborato, prendendo spunto dai diversi approcci utilizzati in letteratura (Capitolo 3), e con riferimento al contesto italiano, fornisce invece un’analisi empirica del sistema di compenso applicato agli amministratori. Dapprima è tracciata, relativamente al periodo indagato (1999-2006), la dinamica temporale della ricchezza distribuita ai propri amministratori dalle società italiane. Successivamente viene fornita una stima dell’intensità degli incentivi impliciti nei directors’ pay-packages (i.e. pay-performance sensitivity), unitamente ad una analisi delle determinanti che ne sono alla base. L’ipotesi che guida tale parte del lavoro è che in un contesto caratterizzato da proprietà concentrata, a causa della capacità dell’azionista di maggioranza di estrarre risorse dalla società, è ragionevole presumere che gli amministratori risultino destinatari di una remunerazione meno sensibile alle performances dell’impresa e tendenzialmente più elevata. Più semplicemente la questione che viene posta è se gli amministratori scontano la possibilità d’espropriazione, componendo convenientemente il proprio pacchetto di compenso.
I risultati ottenuti confermano la validità dell’impianto d’ipotesi proposto ed evidenziano che la qualità della corporate governance è la variabile chiave. Le imprese dotate di un efficace ed efficiente governo societario riescono a controllare il processo di formazione delle remuneration policies impedendone manipolazioni opportunistiche. Le imprese caratterizzate da weak corporate governance risultano invece non solo incapaci di attuare politiche retributive volte alla massimizzazione del valore d’impresa, ma anche esposte all’estrazione di risorse da parte dei propri amministratori.What the largest corporation pay their top managers is one of the most analyzed topics in corporate finance since Jensen and Murphy, 1990. As they noted (Jensen and Murphy 2004), a well-designed remuneration package for executives attracts the right executives at the lowest cost; retains them at the lowest cost (i.e. encourage the right executives to leave the firm at the appropriate time); and motivates executives to take actions that create long-run shareholder value and avoid actions that destroy value. However, several recent studies have shown that the characteristics of real world compensation contracts rarely meet their counterparts in compensation contracting theory because of the executives’ capability to influence the terms of their compensation package to their personal advantage. For example, Yermack (1997) provides evidence that executives influence timing of their stock option awards, receiving at-the money options just prior to releasing news that increases company stock prices. Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker (2002) and Bebchuk and Fried (2003, 2004) argue that the practice of granting options at-the-money (rather than out-of-the-money or with exercise prices indexed to market movements) reflects the influence of rent-seeking managers trying to maximize their compensation in ways that are largely camouflaged to investors and the public. Going ahead, others empirical research give proofs that the executives’ power to influence their pay package is stronger when shareholders are diffuse and more passive (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001), and when the corporate governance is weaker (Garvey and Milbourn, 2006; Harford and Li, 2007).
At the same time, the expropriation literature shown that dominant shareholders, especially in firms with poor corporate governance (Klapper and Love, 2004; Durnev and Kim, 2005; Dahya, Dimitrov and McConnell, 2008) and in countries with weak legal protection (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 2002; Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang, 2002; Durnev and Kim, 2005), are able to divert resources from others shareholders to himself for personal consumption. Since expropriation implies fewer resources assignable to marginal shareholder, the firms which are ex ante more likely to be expropriated, trade at discounted valuations. Despite the considerable empirical evidence on the costs bore both by the dominant shareholder and by the minorities in case of expropriation, the literature doesn’t provide evidence of the cost supported by directors. Expropriation, in fact, represents, ex ante, a cost also for directors. First, it’s a direct cost which negatively affects the expected overall compensation rewarded, when directors have part of their remuneration which is tied to company’s performances. Since expropriation is a net loss for the company, which leads to a correspondent fall in the company market valuation, the closer is the alignment of directors’ interests with those of shareholders, the bigger is this cost. Second, since directors have to perceive the maximization of shareholders’ wealth (i.e. avoid loss of it), expropriation should affect negatively the director’s reputation capital.
This work examines the director’s compensation in firms which are more likely to be expropriated by their dominant shareholders. In essence, the question I address is whether directors discount the expropriation’s possibility, setting up conveniently their compensation’s contract. I explore this issue using a sample of directors’ compensation data of Italian Listed firms made up over the period 1999-2006. The case of Italian Listed companies is of particular interest for several concomitant reasons. First, Italian firms have been historically more prone to choosing a closely-held ownership structure characterized by a wide separation between ownership and control (Johnson, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes and Shleifer, 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Volpin, 2002; and Barontini and Caprio, 2006; Mengoli, Pazzaglia, and Sapienza, 2006). Second, Italy is a country where the low protection of minority shareholders allows controlling shareholder to extract a considerable amount of private benefits (Bigelli and Mengoli, 2004; McCahery and Vermeulen, 2004; and Bigelli, Merhotra and Rau, 2006). Finally, Italy is a country where the high dominant shareholder’s capability to replace directors and where the low efficiency of the job-market of directors, provide narrowed incentives to directors in order to effective monitoring dominant shareholder’s actions (Barontini and Caprio, 2002; Volpin, 2002).
Overall, results confirm the testable hypotheses, and provide evidence of the key-role exerted by corporate governance. Firms with strong corporate governance are able to monitor the compensation policies creation process avoiding opportunistic manipulation. On the opposite, firms with weak system of corporate governance seem unable to implement compensation policies directed at the firm value maximization, and, going ahead, seem to be expropriated also by theirs directors
"Meglio soli che accompagnati": analisi dell'effetto rarità geografica in sede di IPO.
Get PDFLo studio investiga la relazione esistente tra la distribuzione spaziale delle imprese quotate e le performance di mercato in sede di prima quotazione. Coerentemente con la riconosciuta preferenza degli investitori per i titoli locali (i.e. ad essi più vicini), quanto più la impresa quotanda è distante dalle altre imprese quotate, tanto migliore è la performance di mercato di quest'ultima successivamente la prima quotazione. Per esempio, un aumento del 10 percento della distanza media della impresa quotanda dalle altre imprese già quotate implica una maggiore extra-performance di mercato che nei 120 giorni successivi la quotazione è pari a circa il 6 percento. In ultima analisi, inoltre, tale effetto rarità sembra conosciuto ma non sfruttato da nessuno degli attori coinvolti nel processo di quotazione.
This paper investigates the relationship between listed
firms’ spatial distribution and IPOs’ market performance.
According to the well documented investors’ preference towards local stocks, we find that the farther the
issuing firm is from other listed firms, the better the
post-IPO risk-adjusted performance gets. Notably, a 10 percent increase in the IPO average distance from other
listed firms implies a higher risk-adjusted performance of
about 6 percent in the next 120 days. Moreover, evidences
show that such rarity effect seems to be known but
unexploited in the goingpublic process
Financial Literacy, rischio e accesso al credito. Un'analisi empirica delle famiglie italiane
No full textIPO a ondate: Cluster temporali o cluster locali?
Get PDFThis paper investigates the relation between the success of initial public offerings in a given region and the subsequent volume of IPOs in the same region. We find that a high local performance of IPOs is able to trigger a local IPO wave due to private firms’ attempt to exploit the favorable local market conditions. Results are robust to the definition of local IPO success, which is addressed using several measures such as the average regional underpricing or the excess demand for newly issued securities. Empirical findings show that the well-documented temporal IPO waves are indeed local IPO waves
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