1,721,012 research outputs found
AI and policy: what makes AI different?
No full textDoes artificial intelligence (AI) present a fundamentally new challenge for policy, or does it simply magnify issues already familiar from previous technological waves? On one hand, AI carries forward many challenges that policymakers have grappled with in the past—though their significance may shift in the AI context. On the other hand, AI introduces new opportunities and challenges. These uncharted complexities demand more research and entirely fresh policy approaches
Strategic differentiation by business models: free-to-air and pay-TV
No full textBroadcasting markets are marked by the coexistence of outlets with radically different business models, some offering content free of charge and relying on advertising, others charging for access and airing few ads. We develop a model with competing broadcasters that leads to endogenous differentiation in business models. Differentiation is not driven, as in classic works, by the heterogeneity of agents. Rather it relates to the "two-sided" nature of these markets. A key driver is a strong form of strategic substitutability induced by natural properties of technology that allows advertisers to reach viewers
Pricing payment cards
Full text linkPayment card networks, such as Visa, require merchants' banks to pay substantial "interchange" fees to cardholders' banks on a per transaction basis. This paper shows that anetwork's profit-maximizing fee induces an inefficient price structure, oversubsidizing card usage and overtaxing merchants. We show that this distortion is systematic and arisesfrom the fact that consumers make two distinct decisions (membership and usage), whereas merchants make only one (membership). In general, we contribute to the theory of two-sided markets by introducing a model that distinguishes between extensive and intensive margins, thereby explaining why two-part tariffs are useful pricing tools for platforms. (JEL D42, D85, G21, L12)
A Theory of Community Formation and Social Hierarchy
No full textWe analyze the classic problem of sustaining trust when cheating and leaving trading partners is easy, and outside enforcement is difficult. We construct equilibria where individuals are loyal to smaller groups– com- munities– that allow repeated interaction. Hierarchies provide incentives for loyalty and allow individuals to trust agents to extent that the agents are actually trustworthy. We contrast these with other plausible institu- tions for engendering loyalty that require inefficient withholding of trust to support group norms, and are not robust to coalitional deviations. In communities whose members randomly match, we show that social mobil- ity within hierarchies falls as temptations to cheat rise. In communities where individuals can concentrate their trading with pre-selected members, hierarchies where senior members are favored for trade sustain trust even in the presence of proximate non-hierarchical communities. We link these results to the emergence of trust in new market environments and early human societies
Issues in online advertising and competition policy: A two-sided market perspective
Full text linkThe advertising markets raise several issues for the conduct of competition policy that are related to the unconventional nature of the market and its functioning. In this paper we take a first pass at these
Market power, competition and innovation in digital markets: A survey
Full text linkThis article focuses on the economics of digital markets with particular emphasis on those features that are commonly deemed critical for Antitrust. Digital markets are often concentrated due to network effects and due to the need of large amounts of Data for production. We review papers characterizing the nature of social harms caused by market power and the role of competition FOR the market and IN the market to relief some of that harm. Special emphasis is given to the role of (i) human attention (which is monetized and is a key input in advertising markets), (ii) Data (which is the oil that powers these markets) and (iii) innovation (incentives, entry for buyout and killer acquisitions)
The impact of consumer multi-homing on advertising markets and media competition
Full text linkWe develop a model of advertising markets in an environment where consumers may switch (or "multi-home") across publishers. Consumer switching generates inefficiency in the process of matching advertisers to consumers, because advertisers may not reach some consumers and may impress others too many times. We find that when advertisers are heterogeneous in their valuations for reaching consumers, the switchinginduced inefficiency leads lower-value advertisers to advertise on a limited set of publishers, reducing the effective demand for advertising and thus depressing prices. As the share of switching consumers expands (e.g., when consumers adopt the Internet for news or increase their use of aggregators), ad prices fall.We demonstrate that increased switching creates an incentive for publishers to invest in quality as well as extend the number of unique users, because larger publishers are favored by advertisers seeking broader "reach" (more unique users) while avoiding inefficient duplication
Either or both competition: A "two-sided" theory of advertising with overlapping viewerships
Full text linkIn media markets, consumers spread their attention to several outlets, increasingly so as consumption migrates online. The traditional framework for competition among media outlets rules out this behavior by assumption. We propose a new model that allows consumers to choose multiple outlets and use it to study the effects on advertising levels and the impact of entry and mergers. We identify novel forces which reflect outlets' incentives to control the composition of their customer base. We link consumer preferences and advertising technologies to market outcomes. The model can explain several empirical regularities that are difficult to reconcile with existing models
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Full text linkThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
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