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Norms of cautiousness in the criminal law
No full textWydział Prawa i Administracji: Zakład Prawa KarnegoPrzedmiotem rozprawy doktorskiej jest problematyka norm ostrożności w prawie karnym. Autor analizuje ich rolę jako przesłankę odpowiedzialności karnej, stwierdzając, iż stanowią one samodzielny element w strukturze przestępstwa, relewantny dla wszystkich typów czynów zabronionych. Nadto, autor dokonuje teoretyczno-prawnej analizy ich statusu normatywnego, rozważa ich doniosłość jako czynnik rzutujący na sędziowski wymiar kary, wskazuje na historyczne proweniencje tej instytucji oraz odnosi się do postrzegania norm ostrożności w innych porządkach prawnych tudzież w sądowej praktyce stosowania prawa. W wyniku tych rozważań okazuje się, że współczesne pojmowanie norm ostrożności nie jest wolne od szeregu nieścisłości i uproszczeń, przez które to instytucja ta nie jest należycie doceniana i wykorzystywana w prawie karnym jako element służący do ograniczenia zakresu odpowiedzialności karnej.The subject of this scientific dissertation is the question of the norms of cautiousness in the criminal law. The author analyses their significance as premise of the criminal liability, stating that they constitute an independent element in the structure of the crime, relevant for all types of the prohibited acts. Moreover, the author conducts a theoretical analysis of their normative status, considers their significance as the factor influencing the judicial choice and application of the penalty, investigates the historical roots of this institution and discusses the perception of the norms of cautiousness in other legal systems as well as in the polish judicial practice. Those investigations reveal that the current perception of the norms of cautiousness is not free from several major mistakes and shortcomings, due to which this institution is not sufficiently appraised and utilised in the criminal law as an element serving for limiting the scope of the criminal liability
Dekryminalizacja przestępstwa (nieświadomie) nieumyślnego?
No full textThe author considers the reasonableness of the recently proposed – especially in the German and Ango–American science of Criminal Law – postulates of decriminalization of the unintentional crimes. The analysis of those propositions reveals that they are based on questioning the possibility of proving guilt of the perpetrator of inadvertently negligent crime. Such doubts have generally not been shared by the Polish doctrine of criminal law, although authors considering this question seem have been aware of the special character of the criminalization of those crimes, where there is no culpability of the will.
At the same time, the analysis of the formulated on the grounds of theory of criminalization premises of the creating penal prohibitions reveals that the unintentional crimes, especially of inadvertent negligence, fulfill those premises. It does not change the fact that this type of responsibility should be applied exceptionally, more rarely than it is currently the case in the Polish Criminal Law. The achievement of this purpose could be possible by replacing in case of some crimes the unintentionality clause with recklessness clause. The chance to reflect upon this question could be the current discussion upon the changes in the Polish Criminal Code
Die aktuellen Strafrechtsreformversuche in Polen. Eine Analyse
Get PDFThe author discusses the main ideas behind the proposed reform of the criminal law in light of the project conveyed to the Polish Sejm on the 15th of May 2014. The proposed changes, being the most significant ones since the recodification of the criminal law in 1997, are based on the correct presumption that the deficiencies in current Polish criminal policy lead to overly repressive criminal law. A detailed analysis of the project, however, shows that it is not free from failures, in terms of both the formulation of legal norms as well as the reforms to institutions of the criminal law with respect to the application of penalties. It also does not take into account the arguments formulated in recent years regarding the reform of the criminal law. This leads to the conclusion thatthe proposed changes, though rightly focused on improving the most fundamental tools of criminal policy, nonetheless have the character of an ad hoc reform, which even had some elements of penal populism, influencing in such a negative way the shape of the criminal law in recent years. Yet most of those controversial changes have been abandoned during the parliamentary works on this since 1.07.2015 binding law.The author discusses the main ideas behind the proposed reform of the criminal law in light of the project conveyed to the Polish Sejm on the 15th of May 2014. The proposed changes, being the most significant ones since the recodification of the criminal law in 1997, are based on the correct presumption that the deficiencies in current Polish criminal policy lead to overly repressive criminal law. A detailed analysis of the project, however, shows that it is not free from failures, in terms of both the formulation of legal norms as well as the reforms to institutions of the criminal law with respect to the application of penalties. It also does not take into account the arguments formulated in recent years regarding the reform of the criminal law. This leads to the conclusion thatthe proposed changes, though rightly focused on improving the most fundamental tools of criminal policy, nonetheless have the character of an ad hoc reform, which even hadsome elements of penal populism, influencing in such a negative way the shape of the criminal law in recent years. Yet most of those controversial changes have been abandoned during the parliamentary works on this since 1.07.2015 binding law
The lex certa principle in the criminal law, the subjective side of the crime and the norms of cautiousness (selected questions)
No full textOpracowanie poświęcono nierozstrzygniętemu do tej pory problemowi braku kongruencji pomiędzy stroną przedmiotową a podmiotową czynu zabronionego w perspektywie norm ostrożności. O ile bowiem jasne jest, że w istotnej części kontynentalnych systemów prawa karnego zabronione jest sprawcy chcieć zrealizować zachowanie opisane w przepisie typizującym czyn zabroniony w sposób nieostrożny bądź też nakazane jest mu przewidzieć, iż swoim nieostrożnym w danej sytuacji zachowaniem wypełni on ustawowy opis typu czynu zabronionego, to brak jest dostatecznej jasności co oznaczać ma owa przesłanka nieostrożności działania sprawcy. Nie ma na to wpływu stosunkowo szeroki konsensus co do tego, iż warunek nieostrożności czynu eksplikuje się względnie powszechnie jako wymagający przekroczenia pewnej normy ostrożności. Powoduje to, iż liczni autorzy − w szczególności na gruncie nauki niemieckiej − kwestionują zgodność instytucji normy ostrożności i w konsekwencji całej regulacji dotyczącej odpowiedzialności za czyny zabronione o charakterze nieumyślnym, gdzie rzeczone normy ostrożności odgrywają pierwszoplanową rolę, z zasadą nullum crimen sine lege certa. Wobec tej niezgodności proponuje się rozmaite rozwiązania, począwszy od prostego dążenia do wyrugowania norm ostrożności z prawa karnego aż do propozycji tzw. wykładni prokonstytucyjnej tejże instytucji. W poniższym opracowaniu podjęto próbę zaprezentowania niedostateczności wszystkich powyższych koncepcji i przedstawienia propozycji własnego (choć opartego na jednym z już rozwiniętych) rozwiązania tego aktualnego karnistycznego problemu.The paper is devoted to the still unresolved question of the lack of compatibility between the objective and subjective side of the crime in respect to the norms of cautiousness. However clear it might be in the significant part of the continental legal systems that it is prohibited for a person to want to commit – as a result of their incautious behaviour – an act that is prohibited or that a person is positively obliged to foresee that their incautious behaviour might constitute a prohibited act, it is not certain what this premise of the incautiousness shall mean. This situation is not changed by the fact that there is a widespread consent that incautiousness is to be perceived as an infringement of a concrete norm of cautiousness. It leads to a situation when numerous authors in the literature of the subject, especially in the german science of criminal law, put in question the compatibility of the institution of the norms of cautiousness, and consequently of the entire construction of unintentional crimes, with the nullum crimen sine lege certa principle. There are also proposed various solutions to this problem, starting from an idea of entirely discarding norms of cautiousness to the proposition of their pro-constitutional interpretation. In this paper an attempt has been made to present the disadvantages of the existing answers to this problem and to propose a new solution to this unresolved in the science of substantial criminal law issue
SPORY W LITERATURZE NIEMIECKIEJ O NIEZGODNE Z PRAWDĄ ZEZNANIA OSKARŻONEGO O POPEŁNIENIE PRZESTĘPSTWA
Get PDFAn attempt is being made to outline the historical evolution of the debate in the German doctrine concerning the right of the accused to lie. The considerations begin with a claim that this issue was not solved during the codification work carried out in the nineteenth century, and had consequently given rise to an ample discussion among German lawyers, that resulted in the formulation of three major positions. According to the first one, the accused in the penal process should be obliged to confess the truth. The opposite view stressed that the accused could resort to lying as long as he did not infringe the rights of others. And only recently (R. Torka) has originated a conception that under certain circumstances, namely when infringing the rights of the others is the sine que non condition for the escaping of criminal responsibility, a so-called right to lie of the accused has to be taken into account. The arguments brought to life by German lawyers may also considerably enrich the debate over the same issue in Poland.Autor stara się przedstawić ewolucję debaty na temat prawa oskarżonego do kłamstwa w doktrynie niemieckiej. Punktem wyjścia rozważań autora jest stwierdzenie, że problem ten nie został rozstrzygnięty w trakcie prac kodyfikacyjnych w XIX w. Dało to asumpt do szerszej debaty prawników niemieckich. Wykształciły się zasadniczo trzy główne stanowiska. Wedle pierwszego z nich oskarżony w procesie karnym powinien być zobligowany do wyjaśniania zgodnie z prawdą. Pogląd przeciwstawny przyznawał mu w tej materii pełną swobodę, ograniczoną jedynie prawami osób trzecich. Dopiero niedawno pojawiła się koncepcja (R. Torka), że w pewnych okolicznościach, a więc wtedy, gdy naruszenie praw innych osób ma być warunkiem sine qua non uniknięcia odpowiedzialności karnej, przyjąć należy tak zwany kontratyp prawa do kłamstwa. Argumenty podnoszone przez jurystów niemieckich mogą również wzbogacić debatę na ten temat prowadzoną w Polsce
The fiction of ministerial accountability in the Kingdom of Poland (1815-1830). Consideration of the inefficacy of extra- judicial bodies in the field of criminal responsibility
Get PDFIl saggio è il tentativo di affrontare la questione della responsabilità ministeriale nel Regno di Polonia dal 1815 al 1830. Questo tema complicato chiede, in primo luogo, che la terminologia chiave utilizzata nell’articolo sia spiegata, considerando i contributi di autori polacchi e stranieri (specialmente britannici). Le considerazioni seguenti sono state organizzate intorno a tre temi, che considero essere di importanza centrale per il saggio, precisamente: a) i fondamenti legali di vari tipi di responsabilità dei ministri, b) il dibattito pubblico sulla responsabilità ministeriale e c) i tentativi di rendere i ministri del Regno responsabili.
Ciascuna di queste parti principali è stata concettualizzata seguendo un approccio e uno stile diversi. La prima parte può sembrare una presentazione piuttosto asciutta e formale delle norme giuridiche nei più importanti disegni di legge precedenti l’elaborazione della Costituzione del 1815, così come della Costituzione stessa. Comunque, avendo recuperato queste fonti dalla Biblioteca del Principe Czartoryskich, mi sono sentito obbligato ad abbozzare il loro quadro regolamentare per mostrare che essi compongono, come è già stato indicato da alcuni studiosi polacchi, un processo lineare che risale al 1812. L’analisi dei modelli di responsabilità nella norma su menzionata ha rivelato i suoi tre tipi principali: a) responsabilità costituzionale, b) responsabilità penale e c) responsabilità politica. Tuttavia, nei fatti, la distinzione tra le prime due categorie nella prassi costituzionale del Regno di Polonia era confusa, data la mancanza di legislazione che avrebbe dovuto eseguire le rispettive norme costituzionali. Non esisteva neanche responsabilità civile da parte di un ministro o un ministero per i loro reati.
Il secondo segmento del saggio tenta non solo di citare passi rilevanti tratti dalla stampa, corrispondenza privata, memorie e documenti legali del tempo concernenti il tema della responsabilità ministeriale, ma presenta anche il panorama generale della stampa e dei media nel Regno di Polonia nel periodo 1815-1830. Ho ampiamente attinto al vasto corpo di letteratura polacca secondaria a questo riguardo, citando e seguendo i lavori preparato dagli storici per i media e per il grande pubblico, quali Zbigniew Anculewicz, Natalia Gąsiorowska, Jerzy Łojek o Tadeusz Mencel, per fare luce sulle limitazioni, molto estese, della libertà di stampa, comprendenti anche una censura spietata. Ciò ridusse enormemente il dibattito pubblico sulla responsabilità ministeriale. In aggiunta una parte importante delle fonti e dei documenti giuridici non pubblicati andò perduta durante la seconda guerra mondiale. Tutto sommato, ciò che sono stato in grado di presentare ai lettori sono citazioni di una manciata fi fonti primarie che si sono salvate. Tuttavia anche questo materiale li- mitato è sufficiente per sottolineare che la questione della responsabilità ministeriale non fu né ignorata, né trascurata nel discorso costituzionale del tempo.
Infine, facendo affidamento su documenti ufficiali conservati, comprendenti i protocolli pro- venienti dalla Dieta Generale (Sejm), ho analizzato i tentativi di rendere i ministri responsabili. Si adottarono sia le forme di mozioni formali di accusa nei loro confronti davanti alla Corte Parlamentare (Sąd Sejmowy) che di commenti sul funzionamento di ciascun ministero in un tentativo di renderli politicamente responsabili per le attività dei loro rispettivi ministeri (cioè dipartimenti governativi). Tali tentativi, anche se infrazioni da parte dei ministri erano evidenti e talvolta costituivano atti criminali, non furono né efficaci, né coronati da successo. È conclusione finale di questo saggio che ciò ebbe due ragioni principali: in primo luogo l’atteggiamento strumentale delle autorità russe nei confronti del diritto, che di fatto era rispettato solo se conveniente per lo Zar e le autorità russe; in secondo luogo il concetto erroneo di responsabilità legale dei ministri in Polonia, che seguendo la tradizione risalente al XVIII secolo, come confermato nei disegni di legge precedenti la Costituzione del 1815, richiedeva una decisione a maggioranza dei deputati in Parlamento per muovere un’accusa contro un ministro. Questo modello, intrinsecamente immutato fino ad oggi, rappresenta una debolezza cruciale, che causa violazioni del diritto, incluso quello costituzionale da parte dell’esecutivo – come è stato il caso fin dal 2015 da parte di membri del governo Diritto e Giustizia in Polonia – che restano completamente impunite. Qualora lo stato democratico di diritto venga mantenuto in Polonia e in altri paesi, è urgente emendare questa procedura ed evitare la sua implementazione in una possibile futura Costituzione dell’Unione Europea.The paper is an attempt to address the question of ministerial responsibility in the Kingdom of Poland from 1815 to 1830. This complicated issue required, in the first place, the key terminology applied throughout the article to be explicated, considering the contributions of Polish and foreign (especially British) authors. The ensuing considerations have been organized around three topics, which I consider to be of central importance to the paper, namely: a) legal foundations of various types of responsibility of ministers, b) the public debate about ministerial responsibility and c) the attempts to make the ministers of the Kingdom responsible.
Each of these main parts was conceptualized following a slightly different approach and style. The first part might appear as a rather dry and formalistic presentation of the legal regulations in the major drafts prior to the elaboration of the 1815 Constitution as well as of the Constitution itself. However, having retrieved those sources from the Princes Czartoryskich Library, I felt compelled to sketch out their regulatory framework in order to show that they combine, as already been pointed by some Polish authors, to form a linear process going back to 1812. The analysis of the modes of responsibility in the aforementioned legal act revealed its three major types: a) constitutional responsibility, b) criminal responsibility and c) political answerability.
But, in fact, the distinction between those first two categories in the constitutional practice of the Kingdom of Poland was blurred, given the lack of legislation that would have executed the respective constitutional provisions. There also existed no civil responsibility on the part of a minister or a ministry for their wrongdoing. The second segment of the paper endeavours not only to quote relevant excerpts from the press, private correspondence, memoirs and legal documents of the time concerning the issue of the ministerial responsibility, but also presents the general landscape of the press and media in the Kingdom of Poland in the period 1815-1830. I relied heavily on the ample body of Polish secondary literature in this respect, quoting and following the works prepared by the historians in the media and wider society, such as Zbigniew Anculewicz, Natalia Gąsiorowska, Jerzy Łojek or Tadeusz Mencel, to highlight the far-reaching limitations of the freedom of the press, including ruthless censorship. This greatly restricted the public debate on ministerial responsibility. In addition, an important part of the unpublished sources and legal documents was lost during the Second World War. All in all, what I have been able to present to readers are quotations from a handful of preserved primary sources. Yet, even this limited material suffices to underline that the question of ministerial responsibility was neither ignored nor neglected in the constitutional discourse of the time.
Finally, relying on preserved and edited official documents, including the protocols from the Sejm, I scrutinized the attempts to make ministers accountable. This adopted both the forms of formal motions to accuse them in front of the Parliamentary Court (Sąd Sejmowy) and comments about the functioning of each ministry in an attempt to make them politically answerable for the activities of their respective ministries (i.e. governmental departments). Such attempts, even though infringements by ministers were evident and sometimes amounted to criminal acts, were neither effective nor successful. It is the conclusion of this paper that it had two major reasons: firstly, the instrumental attitude of Russian authorities to the law, which in fact was respected only when convenient for the Tsar and the Russian authorities; and, secondly, the misconception of the legal responsibility of ministers in Poland, which, following the tradition going back to 18th century, as upheld in the drafts preceding the 1815 Constitution, required a majority decision of the deputies in the Parliament to file a charge against a minister. This model, intrinsically unchanged until now, is a crucial weakness, which causes breaches of the law, including that of the Constitution by the executive – as has been the case since 2015 by members of the Law and Justice government in Poland – to be totally unpunished. Should the democratic state of law be maintained in Poland and other countries, it is urgent to amend this procedure and avoid implementing it in a possible future Constitution of the European Union.
DISPUTES IN GERMAN LITERATURE REGARDING THE UNTRUE EVIDENCE PROVIDED BY A PERSON ACCUSED OF AN ALLEGED CRIME
No full textAutor stara się przedstawić ewolucję debaty na temat prawa oskarżonego do kłamstwa w doktrynie niemieckiej. Punktem wyjścia rozważań autora jest stwierdzenie, że problem ten nie został rozstrzygnięty w trakcie prac kodyfikacyjnych w XIX w. Dało to asumpt do szerszej debaty prawników niemieckich. Wykształciły się zasadniczo trzy główne stanowiska. Wedle pierwszego z nich oskarżony w procesie karnym powinien być zobligowany do wyjaśniania zgodnie z prawdą. Pogląd przeciwstawny przyznawał mu w tej materii pełną swobodę, ograniczoną jedynie prawami osób trzecich. Dopiero niedawno pojawiła się koncepcja (R. Torka), że w pewnych okolicznościach, a więc wtedy, gdy naruszenie praw innych osób ma być warunkiem sine qua non uniknięcia odpowiedzialności karnej, przyjąć należy tak zwany kontratyp prawa do kłamstwa. Argumenty podnoszone przez jurystów niemieckich mogą również wzbogacić debatę na ten temat prowadzoną w Polsce.***An attempt is being made to outline the historical evolution of the debate in the German doctrine
concerning the right of the accused to lie. The considerations begin with a claim that this issue was not
solved during the codification work carried out in the nineteenth century, and had consequently given
rise to an ample discussion among German lawyers, that resulted in the formulation of three major
positions. According to the first one, the accused in the penal process should be obliged to confess
the truth. The opposite view stressed that the accused could resort to lying as long as he did not
infringe the rights of others. And only recently (R. Torka) has originated a conception that under
certain circumstances, namely when infringing the rights of the others is the sine que non condition
for the escaping of criminal responsibility, a so-called right to lie of the accused has to be taken into
account. The arguments brought to life by German lawyers may also considerably enrich the debate
over the same issue in Poland
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Get PDFThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Variations on the Author
Get PDF“Variations on the Author” discusses two of Eduardo Coutinho’s recent films (Um Dia na Vida, from 2010, and Últimas Conversas, posthumously released in 2015) and their contribution to the general question of documentary authorship. The director’s filmography is characterized by a consistent yet self-effacing form of authorial self-inscription: Coutinho often features as an interviewer that rather than express opinions propels discourses; an interviewer that is good at listening. This mode of self-inscription characterizes him as an author who is not expressive but who is nonetheless markedly present on the screen. In Um Dia na Vida, however, Coutinho is completely absent form the image, while Últimas Conversas, on the contrary, includes a confessional prologue that moves the director from the margins to the center of his films. This article examines the ways in which these works stand out in the filmography of a director who offers new insights into the notion of cinematic authorship
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