5,487 research outputs found
Why Delusions Matter
Full text linkWhen we talk about delusions we may refer to symptoms of mental health problems, such as clinical delusions in schizophrenia, or simply the beliefs that people cling to which are implausible and resistant to counterevidence; these can include anything from beliefs about the benefits of homeopathy to concerns about the threat of alien abduction.Why do people adopt delusional beliefs and why are they so reluctant to part with them? In Why Delusions Matter, Lisa Bortolotti explains what delusions really are and argues that, despite their negative reputation, they can also play a positive role in people's lives, imposing some meaning on adverse experiences and strengthening personal or social identities. In a clear and accessible style, Bortolotti contributes to the growing research on the philosophy of the cognitive sciences, offering a novel and nuanced view of delusions
What’s wrong with ‘mental’ disorders? : a commentary on ‘What is a mental/psychiatric disorder? : from DSM-IV to DSM-V’ by Stein et al
Full text linkThe editorial by Stein et al. (2010) is timely and
relevant given the development of DSM-V and the
likely impact that such a development will have on
mental health services in the USA. The revision of the
DSM will also affect international psychiatric research
and global practice thanks to the interplay between the
development of DSM and ICD (Fulford & Sartorius,
2009). The editorial by Stein and colleagues is very rich
and there are many themes suitable for further examination
and discussion. For this response, however,
we have chosen to focus on two themes: the use of the
term ‘mental’ and the idea of psychiatric disorders
being ‘in’ an individual
Philosophy of Psychology: An Introduction
No full textAre we rational creatures? Do we have free will? Can we ever know ourselves? These and other fundamental questions have been discussed by philosophers over millennia. But recent empirical findings in psychology and neuroscience suggest we should reconsider them. This textbook provides an engrossing overview of contemporary debates in the philosophy of psychology, exploring the ways in which the interaction and collaboration between psychologists and philosophers contribute to a better understanding of the human mind, cognition and behaviour. Miyazono and Bortolotti discuss pivotal studies in cognitive psychology, social psychology, developmental psychology, evolutionary psychology, clinical psychology and neuroscience, and their implications for philosophy. Combining the latest philosophical and psychological research with an accessible style, Philosophy of Psychology is a crucial
Are delusions bad for you?
Full text linkLisa Bortolotti argues that there is more to judging delusions than whether they accurately reflect the worl
Kengo Miyazono and Lisa Bortolotti PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2021
Full text linkBOOK REVIEW Kengo Miyazono and Lisa Bortolotti, PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2021, ISBN-13: 978-1509515486 (paper), ISBN-13: 509515488 (e-book), Hardcover, 20.00, e-book, 40.89, Paperback, 24.9
Agential Epistemic Injustice in Clinical Interactions Is Bad for Medicine
Full text linkIn interactions characterized by agential epistemic injustice, the interpreter avoids engaging with the speaker’s perspective and challenges or distorts the speaker’s contribution before taking time to explore it. Where the success of the interaction depends on a genuine knowledge exchange between interpreters and speakers, epistemic injustice compromises the success of the interaction. Building on recent qualitative work on communication in youth mental health, I argue that clinical interactions are less likely to achieve their aims when practitioners fail to engage with the perspective of the person seeking support, and challenge or distort the person’s contribution before taking time to explore it
RECENZIJA KNJIGE: Lisa Bortolotti THE EPISTEMIC INNOCENCE OF IRRATIONAL BELIEFS, Oxford University Press, 2020
No full textThis is a review of Lisa Bortolotti's THE EPISTEMIC INNOCENCE OF IRRATIONAL BELIEFS, Oxford University Press, 2020Ovo je recenzija knjige od Lise Bortolotti, THE EPISTEMIC INNOCENCE OF IRRATIONAL BELIEFS, Oxford University Press, 202
Irrationality
No full textWe talk about irrationality when behaviour defies explanation or prediction, when decisions are driven by emotions or instinct rather than by reflection, when reasoning fails to conform to basic principles of logic and probability, and when beliefs lack coherence or empirical support. Depending on the context, agents exhibiting irrational behaviour may be described as foolish, ignorant, unwise or even insane.
In this clear and engaging introduction to current debates on irrationality, Lisa Bortolotti presents the many facets of the concept and offers an original account of the importance of judgements of irrationality as value judgements. The book examines the standards against which we measure human behaviour, and reviews the often serious implications of judgements of irrationality for ethics and policy. Bortolotti argues that we should adopt a more critical stance towards accepted standards of rationality in the light of the often surprising outcomes of philosophical inquiry and cognitive science research into decision making.
Irrationality is an accessible guide to the concept and will be essential reading for students and scholars interested in the limitations of human cognition and human agency
Experience and expertise
No full textIn this paper, I discuss the notion of «expertise by experience» in the context of mental health, building on the recent philosophical literature on this issue. I consider two common objections to viewing personal or lived experience as a source of expertise. First, one may argue that the contribution offered by experts by experience lacks objectivity. Second, one may see the main contribution by experts by experience as having the form of a personal narrative, and narratives are not the sort of thing that can count as evidence. I resist both claims, and defend the value of expertise by experience in some key domains
Delusional beliefs and reason giving
Full text linkDelusions are often regarded as irrational beliefs, but their irrationality is not sufficient to explain what is pathological about them. In this paper we ask whether deluded subjects have the capacity to support the content of their delusions with reasons, that is, whether they can author their delusional states. The hypothesis that delusions are characterised by a failure of authorship, which is a dimension of self knowledge, deserves to be
empirically tested because (a) it has the potential to account for the distinction between endorsing a delusion and endorsing a framework belief; (b) it contributes to a
philosophical analysis of the relationship between rationality and self knowledge; and (c) it informs diagnosis and therapy in clinical psychiatry. However, authorship cannot provide a demarcation criterion between delusions and other irrational belief states
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