23 research outputs found
To commercialize inside or outside of the firm: behavioral considerations in patent exploitation by family firms
No full textResearch SummaryThis article examines the relationship between family ownership and patent use strategy using primary data from a patent survey, as well as patent and firm-level data from secondary sources. The findings reveal that family firms are less likely than non-family firms to license their patents and more likely to internally commercialize them. We show that the decision of family firms to license less does not depend on lower patent quality or inefficient patent use. Instead, it arises from their preference for patent uses that allow them to exert greater control over the value they can derive from their innovations. We also show that family firms commercialize more patents because they leverage their managerial discretion to explore and seize emerging internal patent commercialization opportunities.Managerial SummaryWhether the desire of families in family firms to maintain control over the company and strategic resources negatively impacts their economic performance has important governance implications. Within the context of patent commercialization, in line with this desire for control, our study highlights the preference of family firms to prioritize internal commercialization over licensing. To offset their underlicensing tendency, family firms internally commercialize more patents by being nimble to identify and capitalize on emerging commercialization opportunities. This enables them to align their control ambitions with patent commercialization efficiency, akin to nonfamily firms
Bribery and investment: firm-level evidence from Africa and Latin America
No full textUsing a unique database that measures firm-level bribery in Africa and Latin America, we corroborate extant results in the literature that paying bribes deters firm investments in fixed assets. Our contribution is to explore four mechanisms. By adopting a reverse causality approach (Gelman and Imbens, 2013), we find evidence consistent with one of them: short-term oriented firms prefer to bribe rather than invest in fixed assets, while the opposite is true for firms with a long-term orientation. We rule out that bribe payments drain financial resources for investment, that firms that invest do not bribe because fixed assets make them less flexible and more vulnerable to future bribes, and that less efficient firms bribe rather than inves
Book review: "Cheeseman, Nic (Ed.). Institutions and Democracy in Africa: How the Rules of the Game Shape Political Developments. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Year: 2018. ISBN-10: 1316602559; 394 pp."
No full textInternational audienc
The Role of National Corporate Governance in EU Acquisitions
No full textInternational audienceThe authors examine the role of national corporate governance characteristics on both the number of deals and the total value of acquisitions in 28 European countries between 2008 and 2015. In line with previous studies, our analysis suggests that deal value and number of acquisitions follow a cyclical trend but each with different peaks and troughs throughout the sample period. Likewise, we observe a positive relationship between the level of GDP and the number as well as the total value of acquisitions. Among the three types of corporate governance institutions, namely corporate ethics, accountability, and financial market development (efficiency), the authors find that efficiency and a relatively higher level of corporate ethics within the target country in comparison to the acquirer country are positively related to the value of acquisitions
Book Review: "Aaron G. Jake, Egypt's Occupation: Colonial Economism and the Crises of Capitalism. Publisher: Stanford University Press, 2020. 376 pages. ISBN-10: 1503612619."
No full textInternational audienceAaron Jakes has written an excellent account of the decades of occupation of Egypt by the British rulers. In eight chapters compiled in 256 pages, Jakes tightly argued the experimental model of colonial governance that the British rulers exercised in Egypt, the persistence of British rulers to enforce the model despite its repeated failures, and the tenacious struggle of Egyptians for their independence. The analysis features the role of the expansion of global finance on the political economy of this colonial relationship.<br/
Book review: "Cheeseman, Nic (Ed.). Institutions and Democracy in Africa: How the Rules of the Game Shape Political Developments. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Year: 2018. ISBN-10: 1316602559; 394 pp."
No full textInternational audienc
Unlocking the Potential of EMNEs for Attaining the SDGs in Developing Economies
No full textInternational audienceEmerging market multinational enterprises (EMNEs) are vital in achieving the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in developing economies that often lack alternative investment avenues. By leveraging an abundant workforce that is largely unskilled and low-skilled, EMNEs not only provide substantial employment opportunities but also contribute to the eradication of poverty (SDG 1). EMNEs’ ambitions to expand into adjacent markets offer SMEs valuable opportunities to integrate into regional and global value chains. This in turn spurs economic growth (SDG 8) and reduces inequalities (SDG 10). The access of EMNEs to leapfrogging and relatable technologies mitigates infrastructural bottlenecks and cultivates innovation (SDG 9) in these economies. For EMNEs to successfully deliver on these goals, key stakeholders, especially NGOs and governments, must take an active role in persuading, enabling, and incentivizing these enterprises
Book review: "Stephens, Rhiannon, Poverty and Wealth in East Africa: A Conceptual History”
No full textInternational audienc
Bridging Institutional Distance: The Role of M&A Advisors in Cross-border Acquisitions
No full textInternational audienceIn this chapter, the authors draw insights from the literature on institutional distance and examine whether firms engaging in cross-border acquisitions overcome the liability of foreignness by using external advisors. Specifically, the authors argue that acquiring and target firms may alleviate heightened information asymmetries and transaction costs by leveraging the information-production and uncertainty-reduction roles of M&A advisors. Using a global sample of cross-border M&As from 2001 to 2020, the results suggest that institutional distance triggers both acquirers and targets to use M&A advisors. Among the four types of institutional distance the authors examined, cultural distance – and to a lesser extent administrative distance – greatly contributes to the use of various types of advisors in cross-border deals. Interestingly, although both parties in the transaction rely on advisors to overcome distance barriers, acquiring firms appear to hire advisors more often than target firms
