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Politisch-philosophische Urteilsfähigkeit in der schulischen Bildung : ein Modell eines guten politischen Urteils und wie philosophiedidaktische Ansätze helfen können, die Urteilsqualität im Politikunterricht zu verbessern
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Grenzen und Möglichkeiten argumentativer Auseinandersetzungen und die unterrichtliche Ausbildung argumentativer Metakompetenzen
No full textIn dem vorliegenden Beitrag möchte ich an aktuelle argumentationsdidaktische Überlegungen anknüpfen und einen spezifischen Aspekt genauer untersuchen, der von der philosophiedidaktischen Forschung bisher ein Stück weit vernachlässigt worden ist. Dieser Aspekt betrifft die Vermittlung sogenannter argumentativer Metakompetenzen, worunter ich grob gesprochen Fähigkeiten des angemessenen Gebrauchs bzw. der verantwortungsvollen Regulation von argumentativen Kompetenzen verstehe. Die grundlegende Idee ist in diesem Zusammenhang, dass die Ausbildung basaler argumentativer Fähigkeiten zwar grundsätzlich durchaus wichtig und wünschenswert ist, dass aber gleichzeitig ein Einsatz dieser Fähigkeiten in unterschiedlichen Situationen ganz unterschiedliche Funktionen erfüllt. Dementsprechend müssen Lernende nicht nur mit argumentativen Kompetenzen ausgestattet, sondern darüber hinaus auch zu einem reflektierten und situativ angemessenen Gebrauch dieser Kompetenzen befähigt werden
Seeing the World More Clearly: Strategies for unleashing the full moral potential of thought experiments in the Philosophy Classroom
Get PDFIn this paper, I discuss the effects of using thought experiments for the purpose of conceptual clarification on students’ hermeneutical abilities. On the one hand, by providing opportunities to explore the scope of normatively loaded concepts, thought experiments can effectively help students to interpret their social and moral reality more adequately, which in some cases might even help to reduce existing hermeneutical injustices. On the other hand, given their notorious susceptibility to distorting factors that are philosophically irrelevant, they can also push students into accepting idiosyncratic intuitions that they don’t really share and thereby further impair their hermeneutical abilities. After setting out this dilemma in more detail, I will propose various strategies for facilitating the safe use of thought experiments that instructors can use to effectively exploit the empowering potential of thought experiments
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Get PDFThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Warum intellektuelle Toleranz nicht irrational ist
No full textWhen it comes to disagreements about religious, moral or political questions, many people consider a tolerant ‘live-and-let-live’ attitude to be the best reaction toward conflicting opinions. However, many epistemologists are rather skeptical about the epistemic acceptability of such a tolerant attitude. More specifically, the worry is that a tolerant reaction toward recognized disagreement is necessarily epistemically irrational. After setting out this worry in a little more detail, I will present and discuss three different arguments for the epistemic irrationality of a tolerant attitude toward disagreement. I will argue that while all these arguments ultimately fail, they still reveal some substantial limitations to the epistemic adequacy of intellectual tolerance
Warum intellektuelle Toleranz nicht irrational ist
Get PDFWhen it comes to disagreements about religious, moral or political questions, many people consider a tolerant ‘live-and-let-live’ attitude to be the best reaction toward conflicting opinions. However, many epistemologists are rather skeptical about the epistemic acceptability of such a tolerant attitude. More specifically, the worry is that a tolerant reaction toward recognized disagreement is necessarily epistemically irrational. After setting out this worry in a little more detail, I will present and discuss three different arguments for the epistemic irrationality of a tolerant attitude toward disagreement. I will argue that while all these arguments ultimately fail, they still reveal some substantial limitations to the epistemic adequacy of intellectual tolerance
Moral disagreement and moral education : what’s the problem?
Get PDFAlthough initially plausible, the view that moral education should aim at the transmission of moral knowledge has been subject to severe criticism. In this context, one particularly prominent line of argumentation rests on the empirical observation that moral questions are subject to widespread and robust disagreement. In this paper, I would like to discuss the implications of moral disagreement for the goals of moral education in more detail. I will start by laying out the empirical and philosophical assumptions behind the idea that widespread and robust moral disagreement undermines the prospects of transmitting moral knowledge in educational settings. Having thus provided a specific interpretation of the epistemic dynamics behind this so-called ‘challenge of disagreement’, I will proceed by discussing its didactical implications. More specifically, I will defend two claims: first, I will argue that the challenge of disagreement is not an effective challenge, because it undermines the possibility of knowledge transfer only with respect to a limited set of moral propositions. Second, I will argue that the challenge of disagreement is not a specific challenge, because the epistemically destructive effects of moral disagreement also pose a challenge for other prominent accounts of moral education that were originally proposed as promising alternatives to knowledge transmission accounts. If convincing, my arguments show that knowledge transmission accounts of moral education are in a much better position than is usually expected to incorporate the fact that moral questions are notoriously controversial
Grenzen und Möglichkeiten argumentativer Auseinandersetzungen und die unterrichtliche Ausbildung argumentativer Metakompetenzen
Get PDFIn dem vorliegenden Beitrag möchte ich an aktuelle argumentationsdidaktische Überlegungen anknüpfen und einen spezifischen Aspekt genauer untersuchen, der von der philosophiedidaktischen Forschung bisher ein Stück weit vernachlässigt worden ist. Dieser Aspekt betrifft die Vermittlung sogenannter argumentativer Metakompetenzen, worunter ich grob gesprochen Fähigkeiten des angemessenen Gebrauchs bzw. der verantwortungsvollen Regulation von argumentativen Kompetenzen verstehe. Die grundlegende Idee ist in diesem Zusammenhang, dass die Ausbildung basaler argumentativer Fähigkeiten zwar grundsätzlich durchaus wichtig und wünschenswert ist, dass aber gleichzeitig ein Einsatz dieser Fähigkeiten in unterschiedlichen Situationen ganz unterschiedliche Funktionen erfüllt. Dementsprechend müssen Lernende nicht nur mit argumentativen Kompetenzen ausgestattet, sondern darüber hinaus auch zu einem reflektierten und situativ angemessenen Gebrauch dieser Kompetenzen befähigt werden
Seeing the World More Clearly: Strategies for unleashing the full moral potential of thought experiments in the Philosophy Classroom
No full textIn this paper, I discuss the effects of using thought experiments for the purpose of conceptual clarification on students’ hermeneutical abilities. On the one hand, by providing opportunities to explore the scope of normatively loaded concepts, thought experiments can effectively help students to interpret their social and moral reality more adequately, which in some cases might even help to reduce existing hermeneutical injustices. On the other hand, given their notorious susceptibility to distorting factors that are philosophically irrelevant, they can also push students into accepting idiosyncratic intuitions that they don’t really share and thereby further impair their hermeneutical abilities. After setting out this dilemma in more detail, I will propose various strategies for facilitating the safe use of thought experiments that instructors can use to effectively exploit the empowering potential of thought experiments
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