1,721,003 research outputs found
So far, so close: Competition Analysis of Backbone and Local Access for Broadband Internet
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Leniency Policies and Illegal Transactions
Full text linkForthcoming in the Journal of Public Economics. We study the consequences of leniency – reduced legal sanctions for wrongdoers who spontaneously self-report to law enforcers – on sequential, bilateral, illegal transactions, such as corruption, manager-auditor collusion, or drug deals. It is known that leniency helps deterring illegal relationships sustained by repeated interaction. Here we find that - when not properly designed - leniency may simultaneously provide an effective governance mechanism for occasional sequential illegal transactions that would not be feasible in its absence
So Soft, So Hard: Competition Issues in the Provision of Content and e-Commerce Services
No full textThe effect of mergers on variety in grocery retailing
Full text linkWe study a merger between two Dutch supermarket chains to assess its effect on the depth as well as composition of assortment. We adopt a difference-in-differences strategy that exploits local variation in pre-merger competitive conditions and thus in the merger outcomes. To define our control group, we account for selection on observables through a matching procedure. We observe that, after the merger, the assortment of the merging parties converges in markets where they are not directly competing one with the other. Instead, the merging parties reposition their assortment to avoid cannibalization in the areas where they directly competed before the merger. While the target's stores reduce the depth of their assortment when in direct competition with the acquirer's, the latter increase their assortment. This suggests that variety is a strategic variable in retail chains’ response to changes in local competition
Whistleblower rewards, false reports, and corporate fraud
No full textIt is often claimed that rewards for whistleblowers lead to fraudulent reports, but for several US programs this has not been a major problem. We model the interaction between rewards for whistleblowers, sanctions against fraudulent reporting, judicial errors, and standards of proof in the court case on a whistleblower's allegations and the possible follow-up for fraudulent allegations. Balancing whistleblower rewards, sanctions against fraudulent reports, and courts' standards of proof is essential for these policies to succeed. When the risk of retaliation is severe, larger rewards are needed and so are tougher sanctions against fraudulent reports. The precision of the legal system must be sufficiently high, hence these programs are not viable in weak institution environments, where protection is imperfect and court precision low, or where sanctions against false reporting are mild
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