181 research outputs found
Introduction: Long-Run Consequences of Electoral Rules Change: Comparing Italy and Japan
No full textIn this introductory chapter we briefly describe the main changes in the electoral rules in Italy and Japan in the early Nineties. Subsequently we summarize the content of each chapter of the book, dealing with particular impacts of electoral rule change
A Natural Experiment on Electoral Law Reform. Evaluating the Long Run Consequences of 1990s Electoral Reforms in Italy and Japan
No full textIn the early 1990s, major electoral reforms took place in both Italy and Japan: each replaced a kind of proportional representation with a mixed member system. The reform were enacted by political elites in the context of divisions within the dominant party, changing patterns of party support and party splits. The experiences of both countries provide a laboratory in which to investigate the effects and implications of electoral reforms and, more broadly, to analyze voting behavior in the context of institutional change. As the essays in this volume show, to understand why similar reforms had such different effects in the two countries we must examine how electoral systems are embedded in broader institutional and social arrangements, and consider the complex interplay of political geography, political history and the rational calculations of political actors
Comparing and contrasting the uses of two graphical tools for displaying patterns of multiparty competition: Nagayama diagrams and simplex representations
No full textWe compare two tools for displaying, in graphical form, information about vote outcomes in multiparty elections at the constituency level. One was recently proposed by Nagayama and introduced to the English-speaking world by Reed, who applied this method to Japanese and Italian election data. Reed labels the method Nagayama diagrams. Recently, Taagepera has shown how the domain of potential uses of Nagayama diagrams can be expanded significantly. A second graphical device has been used by a number of authors for various types of election analyses, but is not that well known in the comparative parties literature. This method, which uses barycentric coordinates (i.e. triangular) rather than the more familiar rectangular coordinates, has gone under a variety of names (e.g. trilinear plot, toroidal diagram and simplex representation), but we have chosen to use the last of these labels. We make use of both methods to visually present election data (by constituency) for the Italian national elections of 1994, 1996 and 2001. We show how different types of information may be readily gleaned from the two types of graph, and, perhaps most importantly, illustrate how we may improve the ready intuitive interpretability of each type of graph by specifying boundary constraints to define particular regions of the graph - a technique we call 'segmentation'
Where Have All the Parties Gone? Fraenkel and Grofman on the Alternative Vote - Yet Again
No full textThe alternative vote (AV) is a preferential electoral system that tends to reward political moderation and compromise. Fraenkel and Grofman have repeatedly attempted to show that AV is not conducive to inter-ethnic moderation in severely divided societies. In this response to their latest attempt,the author points out that neither political party coordination of the vote nor strategic voting plays any part in their analysis. In contrast, he explains how moderate parties of one ethnic group are able to induce their supporters to cast ballots for moderate parties supported by voters of another ethnic group. Prof. Horowitz also explains why the incentives for parties to arrange interethnic vote transfers are much greater under AV than they are under systems such as single transferable vote, which is in use in Northern Ireland, and shows that Fraenkel and Grofman\u27s interpretations of AV\u27s operation in Australia, Fiji, Sri Lanka, and Papua-New Guinea are contrary to the evidence
How Voters Distort their Perceptions and Why this Matters
No full textVoters’ ability to perceive political parties’ positions on policy scales is a precondition for a functioning and responsive electoral democracy. Appropriate measures of policy distance are thus key to addressing the link between political parties and the citizens. This chapter reviews the scholarship on ideal point estimation, identifying the main methodological and substantial implications for empirical studies involving issue scales. Next, the chapter applies two-stage Bayesian Aldrich-McKelvey scaling to European Election Studies data to find evidence of systematic perceptual distortions: right-wing voters perceive political parties as more progressive than they actually are, while knowledgeable voters perceive greater differences between parties. Perceptual bias is also shown to correlate with standard polarization measures based on perceived party positions
Abstract on the conferece "A ‘Reasonable Choice’ Approach to Turnout"
No full textThe Central puzzle we seek to address is “Why does what is arguably the most plausible account of the decision to vote or not to vote, namely the rational choice model proposed by Anthony Downs (1957), apparently go so badly awry in predicting voter’s turnout decisions?”.
We offer an alternative “reasonable choice” approach (Grofman, 1999) with three key features. First, we replace the usual Downsian model with a two-parameter approach to the calculus of turnout: one a motivational factor, M, that is independent of election contest specific factors or expected current election contest outcomes, and the second, E, involving factors tied to the current election, such as the nature of the campaigning, election day weather, and anticipated current election outcomes. We operationalize this two parameter approach in terms of a threshold-based model of voter participation choices based on ideas in Brians and Grofman (1999) and Arcenau and Nickerson (2009). Second, while the two parameter approach will incorporate the same factors used in rational choice models of turnout -- P, B, C, and D, and emphasizes the usefulness of utility/incentive based approaches to understanding the turnout decision, our approach uses the same factors in a rather different way, in terms a comparative statics approach, i.e., how changes in each of these factors can be expected to affect changes in turnout levels and changes in who votes, rather than examining turnout decisions in a one-shot and individual-choice focused fashion using cross-sectional data. Third, we acknowledge the explanatory limitations of models that are built on a narrow concept of motivation based solely on instrumental considerations at the individual level tied to expected changes in outcome.Universidad de Málaga. Campus de Excelencia Internacional Andalucía Tech
How an ideologically concentrated minority can trump a dispersed majority : Nonmedian voter results for plurality, run-off, and sequential elimination elections
No full textIn contrast to Downs' (1957) median voter result for two-candidate elections, we should not expect multicandidate elections to produce outcomes around the median, even on average. Rather the winning candidate will tend to be between the median voter and the mode. This is true whether we consider plurality, run-off, or sequential elimination elections, and whether or not the electorate is divided into factions that control the nomination of candidates. For an unfactionalized electorate, computer simulation with randomly positioned candidates is used to model various electoral systems. This is because no equilibrium solution exists for this case. For a factionalized electorate, a game-theoretic model of faction formation is used. The results suggest that an ideologically cohesive minority around the mode of the population distribution may have a disproportionate influence on the outcome. These results can be applied to party leadership in the U.S. House, following Grofman, Koetzle, and McGann (forthcoming)
Why party leaders are more extreme than their members : modeling sequential elimination elections in the US house of representatives
No full textGrofman et al. (forthcoming) find that party leaders in the U. S. House of Representatives tend to be more extreme than the median member of their party, and that they tend to come from the party's ideological "heartland" between the median and the mode. This paper shows that if the distribution of preferences is skewed (as is the case with both parties in the House), then we should expect sequential elimination elections to choose on average leaders between the median and modal positions. We show that this is the case whether or not the party is factionalized
Nominating Candidates under New Rules in Italy and Japan: You Cannot Bargain with Resources You Do Not Have
No full textThe paper is organized as follows. First, we describe the nomination processes in the two countries (sections 2 and 3). Next we compare the countries with respect to the characteristic that most clearly distinguishes them, the mobility of SMD candidates in Italy and their stability in Japan (section 4). In section 5 we ask why the nomination processes under such similar systems differed so widely. We analyze differences in the details of the two electoral systems (section 6) but argue that the difference was not to be found in the details but in the context and that the context was determined by historical experience (section 7)
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