1,720,983 research outputs found
Strengthening the Rule of Law in Child Justice:Towards an Appropriate Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility and Effective Procedural Rights Protection for Children in Conflict with the Law – Case Studies from Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands
No full textThe rule of law demands that States establish an appropriate minimum age of criminal responsibility (MACR) and guarantee effective procedural rights protection for children in conflict with the law. Based on case studies of the child justice systems of Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands, this chapter explores what an appropriate MACR requires in terms of procedural rights for children below and above the MACR. It is concluded that, even in supposedly progressive jurisdictions, there is still a world to win when it comes to safeguarding the rule of law and children’s rights protection in child justice
The obligation to prevent environmental harm in relation to armed conflict
No full textThe scope of protection of the environment in relation to armed conflict has continued to expand since the issue was first introduced on the international agenda in the 1970s. Today, it is recognized that the environment is a prima facie civilian object and as such it is entitled to the same layers of protection during an armed conflict as any civilian person or object. Thus, there is a legal obligation to prevent environmental harm in armed conflict, before the event. Given the magnitude of environmental damage that can be anticipated in relation to armed conflict, the obligation to prevent such damage in the first place is critical. In this regard, it is important to note that the legal obligation to prevent environmental harm originates from international environmental law. Furthermore, the obligation to prevent harm is an ongoing obligation. This article illustrates that the general preventive obligations found in international environmental law can shed much-needed light on the general preventive obligations already established under the law of armed conflict, in furtherance of environmental protection
Disinformation and other Harmful Communication : Safeguarding Freedom of Expression while Harnessing Risk in the Post-truth Era
No full textIn the post-truth era (Vazquez, 2021) where “objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief,”[1] the question arises whether protecting the free flow of information is enough to fully safeguard the function of the political debate in a democratic society. Freedom of expression increasingly comes up against a complex socio-technical communications landscape which also harbours various degrees of potentially harmful communication. Nevertheless, freedom of expression is traditionally protected both horizontally (between individuals) and vertically, between State and individuals. From the Enlightenment and onwards, protecting freedom of expression was primarily sought through non-interference by the State. (Argren, 2023, p. 39.) The harmfulness of communication varies depending on several factors and circumstances: Harmful communication directed at individuals may lead to harm that can be physically, socially, economically, or psychologically in nature. Furthermore, harmful communication is often foreseeable. The State here has at least a double role: First, of course, as a regulator, but second, also as a producer and disseminator of information – potentially based on a particular State agenda. (Pentney, 2022, p. 3).Arguably, the more harmful the result may be and the more foreseeable the risk of such harm is, the greater the positive obligation will be on the State to a) prevent such harm from occurring and b) take action to put an end to such harm, should it materialise. It is argued that preventive mechanisms that can be put into action if and when required should be sought. It is submitted that the public order in a democratic society requires the same scope of protection for freedom of expression as always, but what is required is a “preventive toolbox”, that may be temporarily activated in a regulated manner if or when needed. Such a toolbox needs to take into consideration that the socio-technical process of harmful communication involves multiple actors and parts: such as instigators, agents, a message, intermediaries and targets/interpreters. (Bontcheva &Posetti, 2020, p. 3). In addition to determining what action can lawfully be undertaken, a “preventive toolbox” would as a minimum also have to develop triggers for when respective actions are due. [1] Oxford Languages, ‘Word of the Year 2016’ Oxford University Press, available at: www.la nguages.oup.com/word-of-the-year/2016/</p
Kollegialt lärande i en rättsvetenskaplig praktikgemenskap – ett pilotprojekt
No full textThis report presents results from a pedagogical project focusing peer-review on teaching within the legal sciences at Örebro University. The model which was explored is based on teachers working in groups of three: This allowed each teacher to receive feedback on their teaching, give feedback to a colleague and to observe the process. The report notes that lack of knowledge about concepts and disagreement about criteria for and indicators of successful teaching in legal science made it harder to provide substantial feedback on the teaching. The report suggests that increased knowledge about a conceptual framework would lead to better quality feedback in similar future projects. At the same time such framework could become a foundational element in a community of practice within the legal sciences. Redaktion: Henric Bagerius och Sverre Wide.</p
Military in Security Operations (MiSO) and Biometrics under the EU AI Act
No full textThe draft European Union artificial intelligence (AI) act, unveiled in April 2021, aims to limit the use of biometric identification systems including facial recognition used for surveillance. This proposed legislation focuses primarily on strengthening rules around data quality, transparency, human oversight and accountability. The draft also proposes new rules governing the use of facial recognition technology (FRTs). In June 2023, European Union lawmakers agreed changes to the draft AI act, to include a ban on the use of the technology in biometric surveillance. The draft act is structured on a differentiation system ranging from minimal or no risk, over limited risk and high risk, to unacceptable risk. The latter gives ground for prohibited means, albeit with certain exceptions. Prohibited means could for example be the use of real-time remote FTR systems in the public domain, under peacetime conditions.The proposed draft act may have implications for military in security operations (MiSO). Although law enforcement in normal conditions is carried out by law enforcement agencies, armed forces may be called on to support civil authorities in situations where the threat level is elevated, the degree of violence or other operational challenges exceeds the capabilities of the traditional law enforcement agencies. Similarly, deploying MiSO may occur in the context of international armed conflict (including occupation) and non-international armed conflict (NIAC). For these situations, the permissive use of biometrics is regulated by an international legal framework that combines human rights law (IHRL) and the law of armed conflict (LOAC). This paper examines what implications the draft AI act will have for military security operations (MiSO), with regards to the use of biometrics in law enforcement operations in normal times, through crisis and emergencies, even crossing the threshold of NIAC. It does so by first outlining in what situations use of biometrics may become an issue in MiSO with law enforcement tasks, examining surveillance, arrest and detention, search and seizure, public order management and border management. Next, it examines the potential implications the draft AI act, may have on the use of biometrics in combination with the existing IHRL/LOAC framework. Third, the paper discusses to what extent the proposed risk-based approach aligns with, complements or contrasts with the approach of the IHRL/LOAC regime, both inherently preventive by nature. Specific attention is given to how the notion of risk is addressed in relation to the use of biometrics in these three legal regimes. Lastly, remaining challenges are pointed out and conclusions are drawn.</p
Protection of biometric private life under the European Convention on Human Rights and the law of armed conflict
No full textBy definition, biometrics consists of sensitive data about the individual. Therefore, the Statemust ensure a higher degree of safeguarding measures in all phases of handling such data.This article argues that data-subjects whose biometrics are gathered for identification areprotected through the right to biometric private life under international human rights lawat all times. Furthermore, the law of armed conflict also contains relevant provisions.The European Convention on Human Rights provides detailed rules for the protection ofbiometric private life, subject to limitations and possibly derogations. This protection coversthe whole data life cycle of collection, retention and disclosure of biometrics. Twopoints are of importance here when assessing what is permissible: (1) The original purposefor which biometric data collection was initiated remains decisive. (2) The use of specialmeasures such as limitations or derogations, does not permit States to annihilate the protectionof a person’s biometric private life.The right to biometric private life remains protected during armed conflict, because internationalhuman rights law and the law of armed conflict re-enforce each other. Therefore,armed forces must: (1) define in detail for what purpose biometric data is collected,retained and disclosed, and (2) maintain strict adherence to the originally intendedusage of the biometric data and refrain from any divergence therefrom. This article arguesthat the legal framework under international human rights law in general and theEuropean Convention on Human Rights in particular, is sufficiently flexible to balancethe interests of the rights holder with those of the State or the community at large. Nevertheless,this flexibility makes it harder to predict the outcomes of a legal assessment, and acase-by-case approach must therefore be expected.Por definición, la biometría consiste en datos confidenciales sobre el individuo. Por lo tanto,el Estado debe garantizar un mayor grado de medidas de salvaguardia en todas las fases delmanejo de dichos datos. Este artículo argumenta que los individuos cuyos datos biométricosse recopilan para su identificación están protegidos en todo momento por el derecho a lavida privada biométrica en virtud del Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos.Además, el Derecho de los Conflictos Armados también contiene disposiciones pertinentes.El Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos establece normas detalladas para la protecciónde la vida privada biométrica, con sujeción a limitaciones y, en su caso, derogaciones.Esta protección cubre todo el ciclo de vida de los datos desde su recopilación, su conservacióny hasta la divulgación de mismos. Dos aspectos son importantes a la hora de evaluarlo que es permisible: (1) El propósito original por el que se inició la recopilación dedatos biométricos sigue siendo decisivo. (2) El uso de medidas especiales, tales como limitacioneso excepciones, no permite a los Estados dejar sin efecto la protección de la vidaprivada biométrica de una persona.El derecho a la vida privada biométrica sigue estando protegido durante los conflictosarmados porque el Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos y el Derecho de losConflictos Armados se refuerzan mutuamente. Por lo tanto, las fuerzas armadas deben:(1) definir en detalle con qué propósito se recopilan, conservan y divulgan los datos biométricos,y (2) mantener un estricto cumplimiento del uso originalmente previsto de los datosbiométricos y abstenerse de cualquier divergencia con respecto a estos. En este artículo seargumenta que el marco jurídico del Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos, engeneral, y del Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos, en particular, es lo suficientementeflexible como para equilibrar los intereses del titular de los derechos con los del Estado o dela comunidad en general. Sin embargo, esta flexibilidad dificulta, a la vez, la predicción delos posibles resultados de una evaluación jurídica inicial en abstracto, por lo que podríaconsiderase idóneo un enfoque previo basado en el caso por caso.Per definizione la biometria consiste in dati sensibili dell’individuo. Pertanto, lo Stato devegarantire un livello più elevato di misure di salvaguardia in tutte le fasi del trattamento ditali dati. Questo articolo sostiene che i soggetti i cui dati biometrici vengono raccolti perl’identificazione, siano protetti dal diritto alla vita privata biometrica ai sensi del dirittointernazionale dei diritti umani in qualsiasi momento. Inoltre, anche il diritto dei conflittiarmati contiene disposizioni pertinenti.La Convenzione Europea dei Diritti dell’Uomo prevede norme dettagliate per la protezionedella vita privata biometrica, passibile di limitazioni ed eventuali deroghe. Tale protezioneè applicabile all’intero ciclo di vita dei dati biometrici, dalla raccolta alla conservazione,fino alla divulgazione.Due punti sono importanti per valutare la liceità: (1) Lo scopo originario per cui è stataavviata la raccolta dei dati biometrici rimane decisivo. (2) L’uso di misure speciali comelimitazioni e deroghe non consente agli Stati di annientare la protezione della vita privatabiometrica di una persona.Il diritto alla vita privata biometrica rimane protetto durante i conflitti armati poiché ildiritto internazionale dei diritti umani e il diritto dei conflitti armati si rafforzano a vicenda.Pertanto, le forze armate devono (1) definire dettagliatamente le finalità per le quali idati biometrici vengono raccolti, conservati e divulgati e (2) attenersi rigorosamenteall’uso originariamente previsto dei dati biometrici e astenersi da qualsiasi divergenza.Questo articolo sostiene che il quadro giuridico previsto dal diritto internazionale deidiritti umani in generale e dalla Convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo in particolare,sia sufficientemente flessibile per bilanciare gli interessi del titolare dei diritti con quellodello Stato o della comunità in generale. Tuttavia, questa flessibilità rende più difficile prevederegli esiti di una valutazione dal punto di vista legale preferendo perciò un approcciocaso per caso.Grundsätzlich bestehen biometrische Daten aus sensiblen Daten über das Individuum.Deshalb muss der Staat in allen Phasen des Umgangs mit solchen Daten ein höheresMaß an Schutzmaßnahmen gewährleisten. In diesem Artikel wird dargelegt, dassPersonen, von denen biometrische Daten zur Identifizierung gesammelt werden, jederzeitdurch das Recht auf ein biometrisches Privatleben entsprechend internationalenMenschenrechtsnormen geschützt werden. Außerdem enthält das Recht der bewaffnetenKonflikte auch relevante Bestimmungen.Die Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention verschafft detaillierte Regeln für den Schutzdes biometrischen Privatlebens, vorbehaltlich Einschränkungen und möglicher Abweichungen.Dieser Schutz erstreckt sich auf den gesamten Lebenszyklus der Sammlung,Speicherung und Weitergabe biometrischer Daten. Dabei gibt es zwei Punkte, die wichtigsind bei der Beurteilung dessen, was zulässig ist: (1) Das ursprüngliche Ziel, für dasdie Sammlung biometrischer Daten vorgenommen wurde, bleibt maßgeblich. (2) DieAnwendung von Sondermaßnahmen, wie Einschränkungen oder Abweichungen, erlaubtes Staaten nicht, den Schutz des biometrischen Privatlebens einer Personzunichtezumachen.Während bewaffneter Konflikte bleibt das Recht auf ein biometrisches Privatlebengeschützt, weil internationale Menschenrechtsnormen und das Recht der bewaffneten Konflikteeinander verstärken. Deshalb müssen Streitkräfte: (1) in allen Einzelheiten bestimmen,zu welchem Ziel biometrische Daten gesammelt, gespeichert und weitergegebenwerden, und (2) die ursprünglich beabsichtigte Benutzung der biometrischen Daten strikteinhalten und auf jede Abweichung davon verzichten. In diesem Artikel wird dargelegt,dass der rechtliche Rahmen der internationalen Menschenrechtsnormen im Allgemeinenund der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention im Besonderen ausreichend flexibelist, um die Interessen des Inhabers der Rechte und jene des Staates oder der Gemeinschaftim Allgemeinen auszubalancieren. Dennoch erschwert diese Flexibilität die Vorhersagedes Ergebnisses einer rechtlichen Beurteilung. Es muss somit mit einer Einzelfallprüfunggerechnet werden.Par définition, les données biométriques comprennent des données sensibles sur l'individu.Par conséquent, l'État doit garantir un niveau plus élevé de mesures de protection danstoutes les phases du traitement de ces données. Cet article avance que les personnesdont les données biométriques sont collectées à des fins d'identification sont protégéespar le droit à la vie privée biométrique prévu par le droit international relatif aux droitsde l'homme à tout moment. En outre, le droit des conflits armés contient également des dispositionspertinentes.La Convention européenne des droits de l'homme prévoit des règles détaillées pour la protectionde la vie privée biométrique, sous réserve de limitations et éventuellement de dérogations.Cette protection couvre l'ensemble du cycle de vie des données, à savoir la collecte, laconservation et la divulgation des données biométriques. Deux points sont importants pourévaluer ce qui est admissible: (1) La finalité initiale de la collecte des données biométriquesreste déterminante. (2) Le recours à des mesures spéciales, telles que des limitations ou desdérogations, ne permet pas aux États d'anéantir la protection de la vie privée biométriqued'une personne.Le droit à la vie privée biométrique reste protégé pendant les conflits armés, car le droitinternational relatif aux droits de l'homme et le droit des conflits armés se renforcentmutuellement. Par conséquent, les forces armées doivent: (1) définir en détail à quellesfins les données biométriques sont collectées, conservées et divulguées, et (2) respecterstrictement l'utilisation initialement prévue des données biométriques et s'abstenir detoute divergence par rapport à celle-ci. Cet article affirme que le cadre juridique prévupar le droit international relatif aux droits de l'homme en général et de la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme en particulier est suffisamment souple pour équilibrerles intérêts du titulaire des droits et ceux de l'État ou de la communauté dans son ensemble.Néanmoins, cette flexibilité rend plus difficile de prévoir les résultats d'une évaluation juridique,et il faut donc s'attendre à une approche au cas par cas.Daarom moet de staat in alle fasen van de behandeling van dergelijke gegevens zorgenvoor een hogere mate van beschermingsmaatregelen. Dit artikel betoogt dat personenvan wie biometrische gegevens worden verzameld voor identificatie, te allen tijde wordenbeschermd door het recht op een biometrisch privéleven in overeenstemming met het internationaalrecht inzake de mensenrechten. Bovendien bevat ook het recht van de gewapendeconflicten relevante bepalingen.Het Europees Verdrag voor de Rechten van de Mens bevat gedetailleerde regels voor debescherming van het biometrische privéleven, behoudens beperkingen en mogelijkeafwijkingen. Deze bescherming heeft betrekking op de hele levenscyclus van de verzameling,bewaring en openbaarmaking van biometrische gegevens. Bij de beoordelingvan wat toelaatbaar is, zijn twee punten van belang: (1) Het oorspronkelijke doel dataanleiding gaf tot de verzameling van biometrische gegevens, blijft doorslaggevend.(2) Het gebruik van bijzondere maatregelen, zoals beperkingen of afwijkingen, staatstaten niet toe de bescherming van het biometrische privéleven van een persoon teniette doen.Het recht op een biometrisch privéleven blijft beschermd tijdens gewapende conflicten,omdat het internationaal recht inzake de mensenrechten en het recht van de gewapendeconflicten elkaar versterken. Daarom moeten de strijdkrachten (1) gedetailleerd omschrijvenmet welk doel biometrische gegevens worden verzameld, bewaard en bekendgemaakt,en (2) zich strikt houden aan het oorspronkelijk bedoelde gebruik van debiometrische gegevens en zich onthouden van elke afwijking daarvan. In dit artikelwordt betoogd dat het juridisch kader van het internationaal recht inzake de mensenrechtenin het algemeen en het Europees Verdrag voor de Rechten van de Mens inhet bijzonder flexibel genoeg is om de belangen van de rechthebbende en die van destaat of de gemeenschap in het algemeen met elkaar in evenwicht te brengen. Desalnietteminmaakt deze flexibiliteit het moeilijker om de resultaten van een juridische beoordelingte voorspellen en daarom moet een benadering van geval tot geval wordenverwacht.</p
Combatting Climate Change [Elektronisk resurs] : A Matter of Human Rights
No full textThis chapter explores to what extent the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) could be a forum for climate change litigation, with particular attention paid to the right to information. More specifically, this chapter analyses how the human right to information, (as an integral part of freedom of expression) and the right to information about the environment (emanating from the right to respect for family life and home) may relate to climate change.</p
Application of Article 18 : Seeking to Uphold the Rule of Law under the ECHR
No full textThe rule of law, a fundamental principle of European democratic societies, ensures that laws are clear, consistent, and applied without arbitrariness. Should the respect for the rule of law begin to backslide, Article 18 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is meant to function as a safety device. This chapter begins by tracing how the notion of the rule of law, not a justiciable right under the ECHR as such, has been conceptualised by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and positioned in relation to the said Treaty. Next, the chapter outlines the linkage between the rule of law and the notion of European public order. Thereafter, the potential power of Article 18 is explored in relation to the anticipated function of preventing a decline in the respect for the rule of law. Additionally, the chapter traces the history of applying Article 18 and indicates unclear areas that remain with regard to the use of this provision. Furthermore, the chapter highlights the pros and cons of the contextual references increasingly relied on by the ECtHR in Article 18 judgments
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