233 research outputs found
BRICS: two geopolitical aspects
Apresentação do palestrante Octavio Amorim Neto - FGV EBAPE no contexto do evento "Brics: Desafios e Oportunidades". Mais informações em:
Impactos do COVID-19: Defesa nacional
As Forças Armadas possuem uma importante reserva estratégica à disposição dos governos. Em vários países, elas têm sido uma grande aliada no combate à pandemia. Nesse momento, a defesa nacional tem recebido missões como a construção de hospitais de campanha, patrulhamento de fronteiras e transporte de alimentos às populações mais necessitadas. Saiba mais sobre o assunto com o professor Octavio Amorim Neto, da FGV EBAPE
sj-pdf-1-ppq-10.1177_13540688211049545 – Supplemental Material for The remoteness of democratic representation
Supplemental Material, sj-pdf-1-ppq-10.1177_13540688211049545 for The remoteness of democratic representation by Gregory Michener, Octavio Amorim Neto and Jamil Civitarese in Party Politics</p
Octavio AMORIM NETO. «De Dutra a Lula: A condução e os determinantes da politica externa brasileira». Río de Janeiro: Elsevier Editorial Ltda. y Fundación Konrad Adenauer, 2012. 216 pp. ISBN: 9788535253320.
[ES] Reseña del libro De Dutra a Lula: A condução e os determinantes da politica externa brasileira, de Octavio Amorim Neto, de 2012
Caracteristicas da precipitacao e risco de erosao na regiao tropical semi-arida brasileira.
A variabilidade anual da precipitacao e da erosividade foi avaliada utilizando-se dados do posto meteorologico de Catole do Rocha, PB. Resguardando-se as limitacoes da utilizacao de apenas uma localidade e de um periodo relativamente curto, os resultados permitiram as seguintes conclusoes: 1. A precipitacao anual e muito variavel e sua distribuicao e extremamente irregular. 2. Grandes precipitacoes diarias sao mais frequentes em janeiro, marco e abril. 3. Aproximadamente 44% da precipitacao tem intensidade superior a 20 mm/h. 4. As intensidades maxima da chuva, para periodos de ocorrencia superiores a 30 min, foram maiores do que as de outras regioes tropicais brasileiras. 5. O periodo de maior risco de erosao, por falta de cobertura vegetal e por causa da mobilizacao de solo para o plantio, vai de janeiro a marco
De Dutra a Lula: a condução e os determinantes da política externa brasileira
I beg your pardon: Octavio wrote a book on what?! For those familiar with previous publications and the career path of Amorim Neto - and there are many in Brazil as well as abroad - nothing could be more surprising than him writing a book on foreign policy
Aspectos do mercado eleitoral brasileiro: análise econométrica do impacto dos gastos de campanha nas eleições para a Câmara e o Senado de 2002
Executive authority, the personal vote, and budget discipline in Latin American and Carribean countries
Recent scholarship on the impact of fiscal institutions on budgeting outcomes in Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries indicates that political institutions impact the level of budget discipline. BuiIding upon this previous research, we argue that the principle problem that must be addressed to insure strong fiscal discipline is the common pool resource (CPR) problem. The source of the problem, as well as its solution, differ in the government and in the legislature. At the cabinet level, the CPR problem arises because ministers consider the spending and tax implications of decisions on their ministries (only) instead of on the general population. As Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999) indicate, the appropriate solution at the cabinet level depends upon the coalition structure of the government. Given that all LAC countries have either presidential or oneparty parliamentary systems, a strong central player like the finance minister can reduce the CPR problem at the cabinet level. A similar strengthening of the executive vis-à-vis the legislature, in contrast, does not necessarily lead to tighter fiscal discipline. The level of the CPR problem in the legislature depends upon the type of electoral system. If states have open list proportional representation systems, then increases in district magnitude increase the problem, while under closed lists increases in district magnitude decrease the problem. Using a data set of LAC countries for the period 1988-97 and following Carey and Shugart (1995), we create an index for the incentives for the personal vote. We find that executive power in the budget process is most effective in reducing budget deficits when the personal vote is high in the legislature, while strengthening the president (or prime minister) in countries where the personal vote is low in the legislature has no statistically significant effect. This finding has practical implications for the design of fiscal institutions in LAC countries—granting the executive a privileged position vis-à-vis the legislature has beneficial effects on the budget balance only when the CPR problem in the legislature is large. Moreover, an alternative institutional change is to reform a country’s electoral system. The second option may be more feasible in countries where legislators are unlikely to give the president more power, or where dictatorial pasts make populations wary of granting the executive too much authority on any policy area. --
The Presidential Calculus
Conteúdo online de acesso restrito pelo editorThis article proposes a decision-theoretic model to explain how cabinets help presidents implement their policy-making strategies. Presidents are assumed to have two policy-making strategies: a strategy based on the use of statutes ora strategy based on executive prerogatives. If the president's preferences and the institutional incentives and economic conditions faced favor a statutory strategy, the president is more likely to appoint a majority cabinet, select more partisan ministers, and distribute portfolios to parties on a proportional basis. Econometric analysis of 106 cabinets appointed in 13 countries of the Americas demonstrates that the determinants of cabinet legislative status are the size of the president's party, extremist presidents, and economic crises. The share of partisan ministers and proportionality in portfolio allocation are affected by the size of the president's party, extremist presidents holding decree powers, the extension of the president's veto powers, and the elapsing of the president's term
De João Goulart a Hugo Chávez: A política venezuelana à luz da experiência brasileira
Valendo-se das hipóteses formuladas por Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos para explicar o golpe de 1964 no Brasil, o texto procura identificar as condições que propiciaram a ruptura institucional havida na Venezuela em 1999. A análise de dados relativos à produção legislativa e à distribuição de cadeiras parlamentares e de preferências ideológicas, entre 1959 e 1999, indica que as hipóteses de Santos têm um considerável poder explicativo da crise política que atingiu a Venezuela no final da década de 90, oferencedo oferecem predições mais precisas a respeito dos motivos da ruptura institucional ter ocorrido em 1999
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