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    Perspectival Structure and Agentive Self-location

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    Perceptual experience is perspectivally structured, in at least two respects. It has characteristic sensory limitations relative to a given location (limitation-structure) and it presents objects as spatially related to a given location (egocentric-structure). Perceptual experience is also self-locating, in the sense that an episode of perceptual experience may be sufficient for thoughts about one’s location. In this chapter, I argue that perceptual experience can conceivably be perspectivally structured without locating its subject and that any account of spatial self-consciousness based upon a simple inference from the perspectival structure of perceptual experience faces serious difficulties. If this is correct, then we ought to look beyond the perspectival structure of perceptual experience in order to account for its self-locating content. The Agentive Self-Location Thesis, as developed here, suggests that we look to the relationship between perceptual experience and bodily action, and the unity of the body in mediating that relationship

    Body-Based User Interfaces

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    The relation between the body and computer interfaces has undergone several shifts since the advent of computing. In early models of interaction, the body was treated as a periphery to the mind, much like a keyboard is peripheral to a computer. The goal of the interface designers was to optimize the information flow between the brain and the computer, using these imperfect peripheral devices. Toward the end of the previous century the social body, as well as the material body and its physical manipulation skills started receiving increased consideration from interaction designers. The goal of the interface designer shifted, requiring the designer to understand the role of the body in a given context, and adapting the interface to respect the social context and to make use of the tacit knowledge that the body has of how the physical world functions. Currently, we are witnessing another shift in the role of the body. It is no longer merely something that requires consideration for interface design. Instead, advances in technology and our understanding of interaction allows the body to become part of the interface. We call these body-based user interfaces. We identify four ways in which the body becomes part of the interface: (1) The interaction might occur on or in the human body, for example using implanted tactile stimulation or touch interfaces on the body. Here the material of the body becomes part of the interface. (2) The interaction changes the morphology of the body and corresponding control structures, for example by providing users with additional skills, such as drawing or playing instruments or additional limbs that help complete complex tasks. Here the shape of the body, or the corresponding ability to act, is affected by the interface. (3) The interaction engages with or modifies how we perceive the world, for example by manipulating the sense of direction in VR or allowing users to experience non-existent stimuli, such as mid-air friction. Here, the idiosyncrasies of multi-modal perception and perceptive acts become part of the user interface. Finally, (4) the interaction might engage with the experience of having a body, for example by manipulating the sense of body ownership, location, or agency. Here the introspective access to one’s own body is used in the design of the interface. In this chapter, we present a brief history of the body’s role in human–computer interaction, leading up to a definition of body-based user interfaces. We follow this by presenting examples of interfaces that reflect the different ways in which interfaces can be body-based. We conclude by presenting outlooks on benefits, drawbacks, and possible futures of body-based user interfaces

    Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis

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    The present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed

    The Subject's Matter:Self-consciousness and the body

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    The body may be the object we know the best. It is the only object from which we constantly receive a flow of information through sight and touch; and it is the only object we can experience from the inside, through our proprioceptive, vestibular, and visceral senses. Yet there have been very few books that have attempted to consolidate our understanding of the body as it figures in our experience and self-awareness. This volume offers an interdisciplinary and comprehensive treatment of bodily self-awareness, the first book to do so since the landmark 1995 collection The Body and the Self, edited by José Bermúdez, Naomi Eilan, and Anthony Marcel (MIT Press). Since 1995, the study of the body in such psychological disciplines as cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience, psychiatry, and neuropsychology has advanced dramatically, accompanied by a resurgence of philosophical interest in the significance of the body in our mental life. The sixteen specially commissioned essays in this book reflect the advances in these fields. The book is divided into three parts, each part covering a topic central to an explanation of bodily self-awareness: representation of the body; the sense of bodily ownership; and representation of the self

    Perspectival structure and vestibular processing : a commentary on Bigna Lenggenhager & Christophe Lopez

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    I begin by contrasting a taxonomic approach to the vestibular system with the structural approach I take in the bulk of this commentary. I provide an analysis of perspectival structure. Employing that analysis and following the structural approach, I propose three lines of empirical investigation to selectively manipulate and measure vestibular processing and perspectival structure. The hope is that this serves to indicate how interdisciplinary research on vestibular processing might advance our understanding of the structural features of conscious experience

    Bodily awareness without the body

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    This chapter explores the consequences for bodily awareness of a plausible and influential metaphysics of the self. The first part of the chapter presents the animalist view that we are each identical to animals, and clarifies its relation to superficially similar metaphysical claims made in terms of ‘one’s body’. Reasons are given for animalists to adopt the anti-reificationist position that ‘one’s body’ is no more an independent entity than ‘one’s mind’. Contrary reasons for reifying the body are found wanting. The second part of the chapter proposes that bodily awareness should accordingly be conceived, not as awareness of an entity called one’s body, but as an animal’s awareness of its own non-psychological condition. It is argued that this animal selfmonitoring conception supports the view that bodily awareness is a form of self-awareness, and, despite certain differences from paradigm cases with respect to the independence of its objects, also a form of perceptual awareness

    Variations on the Author

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    “Variations on the Author” discusses two of Eduardo Coutinho’s recent films (Um Dia na Vida, from 2010, and Últimas Conversas, posthumously released in 2015) and their contribution to the general question of documentary authorship. The director’s filmography is characterized by a consistent yet self-effacing form of authorial self-inscription: Coutinho often features as an interviewer that rather than express opinions propels discourses; an interviewer that is good at listening. This mode of self-inscription characterizes him as an author who is not expressive but who is nonetheless markedly present on the screen. In Um Dia na Vida, however, Coutinho is completely absent form the image, while Últimas Conversas, on the contrary, includes a confessional prologue that moves the director from the margins to the center of his films. This article examines the ways in which these works stand out in the filmography of a director who offers new insights into the notion of cinematic authorship
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