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How Does Downstream Firms’ Efficiency Affect Exclusive Supply Agreements?
No full textAugust 2013. Revised September 2015This study constructs a model to examine anticompetitive exclusive supply contracts that prevent an upstream supplier from selling input to a new downstream firm. With regard to the technology to transform input produced by the supplier, as an entrant becomes increasingly efficient, its input demand can decrease, and thus, the supplier earns smaller profits when a socially efficient entry is allowed. Hence, an inefficient incumbent can deter a socially efficient entry through exclusive supply contracts, even in the framework of the Chicago School argument, which comprises a single seller, buyer, and entrant
Dynamic analysis of reductions in public debt in an endogenous growth model with public capital
Get PDF* Revised： [12-08-Rev.2, 2014]* Revised： [12-08, 2012]* Revised： [12-08-Rev., 2013]We construct an endogenous growth model that includes productive public capital and government debt. We assume that the government debt-to-GDP ratio is gradually adjusted to a target level, reflecting the permanent commitment rules in the Stability and Growth Pact or the Maastricht Treaty in the EU (i.e., the well-known 60% rule). These rules affect government borrowing and public investment. Here, we examine the welfare implications of the permanent commitment rules. We find that fiscal consolidation based on the rules improves social welfare. Moreover, the improvement in welfare accelerates as fiscal consolidation progresses more rapidly. Lastly, we also discuss and derive the optimal long-run debt-to-GDP ratio
Intergenerational Politics, Government Debt, and Economic Growth
Get PDF* Revised：Intergenerational Politics, Government Debt and Economic Growth [14-23, 2014]* Revised： [14-23-Rev., 2015]This study presents a two-period overlapping-generations model featuring intergenerational conflict over fiscal policy. In particular, we characterize a Markov-perfect political equilibrium of the voting game between generations and show the following three main results. First, population aging incentivizes the government to invest more in capital for future public spending, positively affecting economic growth. Second, when the government finances its spending by issuing bonds, the introduction of the balanced budget rule results in a higher public spending-to-GDP ratio and a higher growth rate. Third, to obtain a normative implication of the political equilibrium, we compare it with an allocation chosen by a benevolent planner who takes care of all future generations. The planners allocation might feature less growth and more borrowing than the political equilibrium if the planner attaches low weights to future generations
＜書評・新刊紹介＞Andre Gunder Frank Edited and Introduced by Robert A. Denemark ReOrienting the 19th Century : Global Economy in the Continuing Asian Age / ジョン・トーピー著 『歴史的賠償と「記憶」の解剖 : ホロコースト・日系人強制収容・奴隷制・アパルトヘイト』 / 小沢弘明・山本明代・秋山晋吾編『つながりと権力の世界史』 / 飯坂晃治著『ローマ帝国の統治構造 : 皇帝権力とイタリア都市』 / 大阪大学歴史教育研究会編『市民のための世界史』 / 柄木田康之・須藤健一編『オセアニアと公共圏 : フィールドワークからみた重層性』 / 北原靖明著『東西回廊の旅』
Get PDFAndre Gunder Frank Edited and Introduced by Robert A. Denemark ReOrienting the 19th Century : Global Economy in the Continuing Asian Age Boulder, Paradigm Publishers, 2014, xiii+352 pp.,ISBN978-1-612051246ジョン・トーピー著 藤川隆男・酒井一臣・津田博司訳『歴史的賠償と「記憶」の解剖 : ホロコースト・日系人強制収容・奴隷制・アパルトヘイト』 法政大学出版局、2013年11月刊、四六判、xv+318頁、3700円＋税、ISBN978-4-588-60333-4小沢弘明・山本明代・秋山晋吾編『つながりと権力の世界史』 彩流社、2014年2月刊、A5判、272頁、3500 円＋税、ISBN978-4-7791-1988-0飯坂晃治著『ローマ帝国の統治構造 : 皇帝権力とイタリア都市』 北海道大学出版会、2014年3月刊、A5判、240頁、5000 円＋税、ISBN978-4-8329-6797-7大阪大学歴史教育研究会編『市民のための世界史』 大阪大学出版会、2014年4月刊、A5判、312頁、1900円＋税、ISBN978-4-87259-469-0柄木田康之・須藤健一編『オセアニアと公共圏 : フィールドワークからみた重層性』 昭和堂、2012年12月刊、A5判、320頁、4000円＋税、ISBN978-4-8122-1250-9北原靖明著『東西回廊の旅』 叢文社、2014年9月刊、四六判、483頁、1800円＋税、ISBN978-4-7947-0729-
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No full text社会学評論 66巻（2015）1号, p148-150, 日本社会学
