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Corporate governance issues in family and non-family owned firms: an empirical analysis of CEO compensation, executive turnover, and earnings management
No full textAgency conflicts, family ownership, and CEO pay for performance sensitivity. Executive turnover and familial relations: family controlled firms and family CEOs in Italy. Family ownership, earnings management, and CEO turnover.Agency conflicts, family ownership, and CEO pay for performance sensitivity. Executive turnover and familial relations: family controlled firms and family CEOs in Italy. Family ownership, earnings management, and CEO turnover.LUISS PhD Thesi
Rebates and loyalty discounts schemes in EU: towards a more economic approach?; Il margin squeeze in Europa dopo TeliaSonera e Telefonica; Regulatory impact assessment in telecommunication industry
No full text1. The economics of rebates. Antitrust assessment of rebates in EU before the 2009 Guidance Paper: a form based approach. The treatment of rebates scheme in Guidance Paper on art 82. EU case after Guidance Paper: towards a more economic approach? Conditional rebates after Guidance paper: is form enough? The need of a “safe harbour” rule. 2. Recentemente la corte svedese ha comminato all’operatore incumbent una sanzione amministrativa per aver abusato della posizione dominante goduta nei servizi di accesso a banda larga. Tale sentenza è stata preceduta da una pronuncia pregiudiziale della Corte Europea sull’l’interpretazione dell’art. 102 TFUE in merito ai criteri alla luce dei quali si deve ritenere che una pratica tariffaria di compressione dei margini tra prezzo e costo costituisca abuso di posizione dominante. Sul solco di tale interpretazione la Corte di Giustizia Europea ha recentemente confermato la sanzione inflitta dalla Commissione all’operatore telefonico spagnolo (Telefonica) per violazione dell’art 102 del TFUE. L’interpretazione della corte segna una svolta in materia di margin squeeze che da un lato allarga il divario tra stati uniti ed Europa e dall’altro appare andare oltre l’approccio delineato dalla Commissione europea sull’applicazione dell’art 102 del trattato. Nel corso del lavoro si riassumeranno i punti di principali novità rappresentati dalla sentenza, gli elementi di rottura rispetto al passato e rispetto all’approccio statunitense e si cercheranno di delineare i possibili scenari futuri. 3. Il margin squeeze in EU: definizione ed evoluzione. La sentenza TeliaSonera: distanza incolmabile rispetto all’approccio statunitense? Il rapporto tra antitrust e regolamentazione di settore: le due sponde dell’oceano.1. The economics of rebates. Antitrust assessment of rebates in EU before the 2009 Guidance Paper: a form based approach. The treatment of rebates scheme in Guidance Paper on art 82. EU case after Guidance Paper: towards a more economic approach? Conditional rebates after Guidance paper: is form enough? The need of a “safe harbour” rule. 2. Recentemente la corte svedese ha comminato all’operatore incumbent una sanzione amministrativa per aver abusato della posizione dominante goduta nei servizi di accesso a banda larga. Tale sentenza è stata preceduta da una pronuncia pregiudiziale della Corte Europea sull’l’interpretazione dell’art. 102 TFUE in merito ai criteri alla luce dei quali si deve ritenere che una pratica tariffaria di compressione dei margini tra prezzo e costo costituisca abuso di posizione dominante. Sul solco di tale interpretazione la Corte di Giustizia Europea ha recentemente confermato la sanzione inflitta dalla Commissione all’operatore telefonico spagnolo (Telefonica) per violazione dell’art 102 del TFUE. L’interpretazione della corte segna una svolta in materia di margin squeeze che da un lato allarga il divario tra stati uniti ed Europa e dall’altro appare andare oltre l’approccio delineato dalla Commissione europea sull’applicazione dell’art 102 del trattato. Nel corso del lavoro si riassumeranno i punti di principali novità rappresentati dalla sentenza, gli elementi di rottura rispetto al passato e rispetto all’approccio statunitense e si cercheranno di delineare i possibili scenari futuri. 3. Il margin squeeze in EU: definizione ed evoluzione. La sentenza TeliaSonera: distanza incolmabile rispetto all’approccio statunitense? Il rapporto tra antitrust e regolamentazione di settore: le due sponde dell’oceano.LUISS PhD Thesi
Le cooperative e l'integrazione europea
No full textLa compatibilità degli aiuti di Stato. Sulle "agevolazioni produttive" per le cooperative italiane. La legislazione italiana in materia cooperativa. Sulla vigente disciplina fiscale cooperativa. Crescita economica e benessere collettivo.La compatibilità degli aiuti di Stato. Sulle "agevolazioni produttive" per le cooperative italiane. La legislazione italiana in materia cooperativa. Sulla vigente disciplina fiscale cooperativa. Crescita economica e benessere collettivo.LUISS PhD Thesi
For whom the whistle blows? Secrecy, civil disobedience, and democratic accountability
No full textDemocratic implications of secrecy. Safety and security: a critique of the balance model. Democratic responses to counter excessive secrecy. Whistleblowing: a case for civil disobedience.Democratic implications of secrecy. Safety and security: a critique of the balance model. Democratic responses to counter excessive secrecy. Whistleblowing: a case for civil disobedience.LUISS PhD Thesi
Competing Concepts of Subsidiarity in the Early Warning Mechanism
No full textThe essay aims at analysing how the relationship between parliaments in the European Union (EU) –
the European, the national and the regional parliaments – are shaped after the coming into force of the Treaty
of Lisbon and how the early warning mechanism can contribute to promoting their participation in the EU
decision-making. Indeed, the control of compliance of draft legislative acts with the principle of subsidiarity
appears as a key-element for enhancing the parliamentary involvement in EU affairs, as it is the opportunity
to develop new institutional mechanisms, like the 'political dialogue', in spite of the political nature and
function of this control. This essay is based on Neil MacCormick’s theory on the subsidiarity principle and,
in particular, on the assumptions that what is called 'democratic deficit' in the EU is in reality a 'subsidiarity
deficit'. Here it is argued that the 'subsidiarity deficit' can be contrasted by the early warning mechanism
introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon and by the cooperation among the Parliaments of the EU.The essay aims at analysing how the relationship between parliaments in the European Union (EU) –
the European, the national and the regional parliaments – are shaped after the coming into force of the Treaty
of Lisbon and how the early warning mechanism can contribute to promoting their participation in the EU
decision-making. Indeed, the control of compliance of draft legislative acts with the principle of subsidiarity
appears as a key-element for enhancing the parliamentary involvement in EU affairs, as it is the opportunity
to develop new institutional mechanisms, like the 'political dialogue', in spite of the political nature and
function of this control. This essay is based on Neil MacCormick’s theory on the subsidiarity principle and,
in particular, on the assumptions that what is called 'democratic deficit' in the EU is in reality a 'subsidiarity
deficit'. Here it is argued that the 'subsidiarity deficit' can be contrasted by the early warning mechanism
introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon and by the cooperation among the Parliaments of the EU.Refereed Working Papers / of international relevanc
Abusi di mercato: la tradizione statunitense e il confronto con le "soluzioni europee" recepite dall'Italia
No full textGli abusi di mercato nel sistema statunitense. L'esperienza italiana alla luce della Direttiva Europea. La responsabilità dell'insider e il soggetto attivo dell’azione civile: due sistemi a confronto. Sezione I: Il danno e i rimedi civilistici nel sistema USA. Sezione II: La responsabilità civile nel sistema italiano: un problema aperto.Gli abusi di mercato nel sistema statunitense. L'esperienza italiana alla luce della Direttiva Europea. La responsabilità dell'insider e il soggetto attivo dell’azione civile: due sistemi a confronto. Sezione I: Il danno e i rimedi civilistici nel sistema USA. Sezione II: La responsabilità civile nel sistema italiano: un problema aperto.LUISS PhD Thesi
Territorialità e meccanismi applicativi dell'IVA: verso l'uniformazione del trattamento riservato a "cessione di beni" e "prestazioni di servizi"
No full textLe operazioni rilevanti ai fini IVA: in particolare, cessioni di beni e prestazioni di servizi nel sistema d'imposta. La dicotomia cessioni di beni - prestazioni di servizi alla luce della loro (differente) rilevanza territoriale. Le modifiche recate dalla Dir. 2008/8/CE alla territorialità delle prestazioni di servizi. Convivenza di distinti modelli applicativi del tributo e prospettive futuribili.Le operazioni rilevanti ai fini IVA: in particolare, cessioni di beni e prestazioni di servizi nel sistema d'imposta. La dicotomia cessioni di beni - prestazioni di servizi alla luce della loro (differente) rilevanza territoriale. Le modifiche recate dalla Dir. 2008/8/CE alla territorialità delle prestazioni di servizi. Convivenza di distinti modelli applicativi del tributo e prospettive futuribili.LUISS PhD Thesi
Human Rights and Martha Nussbaum's Capabilities Approach: Connections and Interrelations
No full textHuman rights. The early foundation of Nussbaum’s Capability Approach. Martha Nussbaum and the Capability Approach. Capabilities and Human Rights. Connections and Interrelations.Human rights. The early foundation of Nussbaum’s Capability Approach. Martha Nussbaum and the Capability Approach. Capabilities and Human Rights. Connections and Interrelations.LUISS PhD Thesi
A Schumpeterian Analysis of the Credit Market
No full textSchumpeter
shows
that
bank
credit
acts
as
money-‐capital
and,
therefore,
constitutes
the
necessary
premise
for
the
realization
of
the
innovative
processes
planned
by
entrepreneurs.
This
makes
it
important
to
specify
the
debt
contracts
between
each
bank
and
entrepreneurs
during
the
prosperity
phase
of
Schumpeter’s
cyclical
development.
The
present
paper
aims
to
point
out
the
achievements
and
the
limits
of
Schumpeter’s
monetary
theory
with
respect
to
this
point,
that
is
the
debt
contract
design.
On
the
side
of
the
limits,
I
maintain
that
Schumpeter’s
approach,
although
representing
one
of
the
most
stimulating
contributions
in
the
history
of
economic
analysis,
ask
for
refinements
as
regard
to
the
objective-‐function
of
the
individual
banks,
the
determination
of
the
interest
rates,
and
the
usableness
of
the
credit
demand
and
supply
curves.
Schumpeter’s
posthumous
treatise
on
money
provides
stimulating
insights
for
the
definition
of
these
refinements.Schumpeter
shows
that
bank
credit
acts
as
money-‐capital
and,
therefore,
constitutes
the
necessary
premise
for
the
realization
of
the
innovative
processes
planned
by
entrepreneurs.
This
makes
it
important
to
specify
the
debt
contracts
between
each
bank
and
entrepreneurs
during
the
prosperity
phase
of
Schumpeter’s
cyclical
development.
The
present
paper
aims
to
point
out
the
achievements
and
the
limits
of
Schumpeter’s
monetary
theory
with
respect
to
this
point,
that
is
the
debt
contract
design.
On
the
side
of
the
limits,
I
maintain
that
Schumpeter’s
approach,
although
representing
one
of
the
most
stimulating
contributions
in
the
history
of
economic
analysis,
ask
for
refinements
as
regard
to
the
objective-‐function
of
the
individual
banks,
the
determination
of
the
interest
rates,
and
the
usableness
of
the
credit
demand
and
supply
curves.
Schumpeter’s
posthumous
treatise
on
money
provides
stimulating
insights
for
the
definition
of
these
refinements.Refereed Working Papers / of international relevanc
Workers’ Effort: A Comparison Between Capitalist and Cooperative Firms
No full textThe
purpose
of
this
paper
is
to
establish
a
comparison
between
capitalistic
and
cooperative
firms
by
focusing
on
workers’
effort
during
productive
activity
in
a
model
in
which
owners
and/or
managers
suffer
from
information
asymmetries.
In
our
model
agency
relations
do
not
mainly
concern
the
design
of
incentive
mechanisms
but
the
setting
of
an
optimal
form
of
monitoring,
centered
on
management
control
(albeit
incomplete)
on
workers'
effort
during
production.
By
using
a
principal-‐agent
framework,
we
show
that
in
the
presence
of
information
asymmetries
on
the
actual
effort
offered
by
each
worker,
the
cooperative
firm
requires
less
monitoring
to
achieve
an
optimal
level
of
worker
effort.
Being
also
owners
of
the
firm
and
choosing
the
person
responsible
for
management
functions
inside
their
circle,
cooperative
workers
develop
relations
based
on
solidarity
and
forms
of
‘peer
monitoring’
which
reduce
monitoring
costs.
Consequently,
the
manager
of
the
cooperative
firm
can
devote
more
of
his/her
effort
to
organizational
activity
which
increases
the
efficiency
of
the
production
process.
Hence,
in
terms
of
working
effort,
governance
in
the
cooperative
firm
is
more
efficient
than
in
the
capitalist
firm.
However,
the
opposite
result
is
achieved
when
the
purchasing
cost
of
capital
in
the
two
kinds
of
firm
is
taken
into
consideration.
Therefore,
the
financial
constraints
to
the
purchase
of
capital
reduce
the
production
efficiency
of
the
cooperative
relatively
to
the
capitalistic
firm.
In
addition,
such
constraints
represent
an
obstacle
to
achieving
an
optimal
rate
of
long-‐term
growth
for
the
cooperative
firm
and
benefiting
from
the
related
virtuous
circle
between
increases
in
the
level
of
employment
and
growth
rate.The
purpose
of
this
paper
is
to
establish
a
comparison
between
capitalistic
and
cooperative
firms
by
focusing
on
workers’
effort
during
productive
activity
in
a
model
in
which
owners
and/or
managers
suffer
from
information
asymmetries.
In
our
model
agency
relations
do
not
mainly
concern
the
design
of
incentive
mechanisms
but
the
setting
of
an
optimal
form
of
monitoring,
centered
on
management
control
(albeit
incomplete)
on
workers'
effort
during
production.
By
using
a
principal-‐agent
framework,
we
show
that
in
the
presence
of
information
asymmetries
on
the
actual
effort
offered
by
each
worker,
the
cooperative
firm
requires
less
monitoring
to
achieve
an
optimal
level
of
worker
effort.
Being
also
owners
of
the
firm
and
choosing
the
person
responsible
for
management
functions
inside
their
circle,
cooperative
workers
develop
relations
based
on
solidarity
and
forms
of
‘peer
monitoring’
which
reduce
monitoring
costs.
Consequently,
the
manager
of
the
cooperative
firm
can
devote
more
of
his/her
effort
to
organizational
activity
which
increases
the
efficiency
of
the
production
process.
Hence,
in
terms
of
working
effort,
governance
in
the
cooperative
firm
is
more
efficient
than
in
the
capitalist
firm.
However,
the
opposite
result
is
achieved
when
the
purchasing
cost
of
capital
in
the
two
kinds
of
firm
is
taken
into
consideration.
Therefore,
the
financial
constraints
to
the
purchase
of
capital
reduce
the
production
efficiency
of
the
cooperative
relatively
to
the
capitalistic
firm.
In
addition,
such
constraints
represent
an
obstacle
to
achieving
an
optimal
rate
of
long-‐term
growth
for
the
cooperative
firm
and
benefiting
from
the
related
virtuous
circle
between
increases
in
the
level
of
employment
and
growth
rate.Refereed Working Papers / of international relevanc