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Current-Account Reversals in Developing Countries: The Role of Fundamentals
No full textThis paper studies episodes of current-account reversal in developing countries (DCs) in the period 1965-1994. First, a number of persistent shifts ("reversals") in the current-account balance dynamics are identified by structural break and segmented trend tests; then, the relationship between these reversals and a set of fundamentals suggested by the intertemporal approach to the current account is investigated in a panel-data set-up. We find that fundamentals play a different role in episodes of persistent deterioration or improvement of the current-account balance in DCs.This paper studies episodes of current-account reversal in developing countries (DCs) in the period 1965-1994. First, a number of persistent shifts ("reversals") in the current-account balance dynamics are identified by structural break and segmented trend tests; then, the relationship between these reversals and a set of fundamentals suggested by the intertemporal approach to the current account is investigated in a panel-data set-up. We find that fundamentals play a different role in episodes of persistent deterioration or improvement of the current-account balance in DCs.Refereed Working Papers / of international relevanc
A Simple Approach to International Monetary Policy Coordination
No full textThis paper analyzes the strategic interaction between the monetary policies of two countries, in an intertemporal general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities and imperfect competition. It offers an excursus on non-cooperative towards cooperative solutions. All the results can be read by comparing the strength of the two biases: the monopolistic distortions and the terms of trade externalities. In the best feasible allocation, the larger country retains some monopolistic distortions while the smaller country reaches the competitive level.This paper analyzes the strategic interaction between the monetary policies of two countries, in an intertemporal general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities and imperfect competition. It offers an excursus on non-cooperative towards cooperative solutions. All the results can be read by comparing the strength of the two biases: the monopolistic distortions and the terms of trade externalities. In the best feasible allocation, the larger country retains some monopolistic distortions while the smaller country reaches the competitive level.Non-Refereed Working Papers / of national relevance onl
In Search of Monetary Policy Measures: the Case of Italy in the 90s
No full textIn this paper we present a structural VAR analysis of monetary policy in Italy. A monetary policy operating regime based on the control of the overnight rate seems to fit the data better than alternative quantitative monetary regimes. The model allows us to derive an overall indicator of the monetary policy stance that is able to highlight the major episodes of monetary contraction in the sample.In this paper we present a structural VAR analysis of monetary policy in Italy. A monetary policy operating regime based on the control of the overnight rate seems to fit the data better than alternative quantitative monetary regimes. The model allows us to derive an overall indicator of the monetary policy stance that is able to highlight the major episodes of monetary contraction in the sample.Non-Refereed Working Papers / of national relevance onl
A Test of the Principle of Optimality
No full textThis paper reports on an experimental test of the Principle of Optimality in dynamic decision problems. This Principle, which states that the decision-maker should always choose the optimal decision at each stage of the decision problem, conditional on behaving optimally thereafter, underlies many theories of optimal dynamic decision making, but is normally difficult to test empirically without knowledge of the decision-maker's preference function. In the experiment reported here we use a new experimental procedure to get round this difficulty, which also enables us to shed some light on the decision process that the decision-maker is using if he or she is not using the Principle of Optimality - which appears to be the case in our experiments.This paper reports on an experimental test of the Principle of Optimality in dynamic decision problems. This Principle, which states that the decision-maker should always choose the optimal decision at each stage of the decision problem, conditional on behaving optimally thereafter, underlies many theories of optimal dynamic decision making, but is normally difficult to test empirically without knowledge of the decision-maker's preference function. In the experiment reported here we use a new experimental procedure to get round this difficulty, which also enables us to shed some light on the decision process that the decision-maker is using if he or she is not using the Principle of Optimality - which appears to be the case in our experiments.Refereed Working Papers / of international relevanc
Managing the Public Debt in Fiscal Stabilizations: the Evidence
No full textThis paper provides evidence on the behavior of public debt managers during fiscal stabilizations in OECD countries over the last two decades. We find that debt maturity tends to lengthen the more credible is the program, the lower is the long-term interest rate and the higher is the volatility of short-term interest rates. We show that this debt issuing strategy is consistent with optimal debt management if information bewteen the government and private investors is asymmetric, as it is usually the case at the outset of a stabilization attempt when private investors may lack full confidence in the announced budget cuts.This paper provides evidence on the behavior of public debt managers during fiscal stabilizations in OECD countries over the last two decades. We find that debt maturity tends to lengthen the more credible is the program, the lower is the long-term interest rate and the higher is the volatility of short-term interest rates. We show that this debt issuing strategy is consistent with optimal debt management if information bewteen the government and private investors is asymmetric, as it is usually the case at the outset of a stabilization attempt when private investors may lack full confidence in the announced budget cuts.Non-Refereed Working Papers / of national relevance onl