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Semplificazione ed effettività del sistema di controllo esterno nelle s.p.a.
No full textWhy a private matter, which is the s.p.a., should be compulsorily subjected to the
control of a third party, to the so-called external control?
In order to properly answer to this question it is necessary to analyze the interests
involved in the "life" of a corporation. In other words, if any irregularities in the
governance, reporting, accounting have only harmful effects with respect to those
persons who participating in that private business, there will be no reason for a
mandatory control that would only affect those who decide themselves to risk in
that private business. In that case, we could say that the external control, and in
particular the accounting control entrusted to the external auditor, should not be
mandatory, but it should be quite a free choice of the company, to be made at the
time of incorporation or in the course of the life of the company.
After a closer look, however, the interests involved in the life of a company are also
the interests of creditors and of third parties that have to choose whether to entertain
business relationships with that company.
In order to allow the shareholders, creditors and third parties to rely on the accuracy
of the data of the company, the lawmaker, over the years, has chosen to oblige the
company to appoint an external person (or entity) who, on his own liability, makes
a judgment on the regular bookkeeping. So if the auditor should make a positive
opinion, without remark, the third would have the assurance that the company’s
accounting data are true, correct and clear and, ultimately, for him reliable.
Historically, the audit has shown a substantial inefficiency, such as to determine,
or, in any case aggravate the crisis that in recent decades have affected the market.
In general, the activity of the auditor is to:
- checkout, at least quarterly, the regular bookkeeping and correct recording
process;
- verify the fairness of the financial statements.
The goal of our research is to understand if the external control system is currently
an effective control or if it is a mere formal control, with no real effect and therefore
devoid of any avail. At most, it is likely to be source of an increase in bureaucracy
and costs for the company.
Following the historical setting, we focused our attention, in particular, on the
statutory audit, as mandatory external control, set up in the 70s in the light of the
failure of the efficiency of the internal control board.
We quickly examined the US regulations and the different theories on liability of
gatekeepers expressed by overseas doctrine and jurisprudence.
In particular, we place our attention to the legislative changes that have affected
particularly the revision, in order to understand if the desired simplification of
controls is actually been achieved and whether these legislative changes permit –
i.e. oblige - effective control.
To our question, maybe we have to answer in the most disappointing way: the
external control system, as outlined in our regulation, is ineffective. The lawmaker
seems influenced by different interests, thus providing a discipline of compromise
between those interests. Once again, then, searching the inspiring principles of the
law reform, we will investigate the "interests inspirers".Why a private matter, which is the s.p.a., should be compulsorily subjected to the
control of a third party, to the so-called external control?
In order to properly answer to this question it is necessary to analyze the interests
involved in the "life" of a corporation. In other words, if any irregularities in the
governance, reporting, accounting have only harmful effects with respect to those
persons who participating in that private business, there will be no reason for a
mandatory control that would only affect those who decide themselves to risk in
that private business. In that case, we could say that the external control, and in
particular the accounting control entrusted to the external auditor, should not be
mandatory, but it should be quite a free choice of the company, to be made at the
time of incorporation or in the course of the life of the company.
After a closer look, however, the interests involved in the life of a company are also
the interests of creditors and of third parties that have to choose whether to entertain
business relationships with that company.
In order to allow the shareholders, creditors and third parties to rely on the accuracy
of the data of the company, the lawmaker, over the years, has chosen to oblige the
company to appoint an external person (or entity) who, on his own liability, makes
a judgment on the regular bookkeeping. So if the auditor should make a positive
opinion, without remark, the third would have the assurance that the company’s
accounting data are true, correct and clear and, ultimately, for him reliable.
Historically, the audit has shown a substantial inefficiency, such as to determine,
or, in any case aggravate the crisis that in recent decades have affected the market.
In general, the activity of the auditor is to:
- checkout, at least quarterly, the regular bookkeeping and correct recording
process;
- verify the fairness of the financial statements.
The goal of our research is to understand if the external control system is currently
an effective control or if it is a mere formal control, with no real effect and therefore
devoid of any avail. At most, it is likely to be source of an increase in bureaucracy
and costs for the company.
Following the historical setting, we focused our attention, in particular, on the
statutory audit, as mandatory external control, set up in the 70s in the light of the
failure of the efficiency of the internal control board.
We quickly examined the US regulations and the different theories on liability of
gatekeepers expressed by overseas doctrine and jurisprudence.
In particular, we place our attention to the legislative changes that have affected
particularly the revision, in order to understand if the desired simplification of
controls is actually been achieved and whether these legislative changes permit –
i.e. oblige - effective control.
To our question, maybe we have to answer in the most disappointing way: the
external control system, as outlined in our regulation, is ineffective. The lawmaker
seems influenced by different interests, thus providing a discipline of compromise
between those interests. Once again, then, searching the inspiring principles of the
law reform, we will investigate the "interests inspirers".LUISS PhD Thesi
L'intervento di volontaria giurisdizione del giudice nelle società di capitali
No full textLa volontaria giurisdizione. L’omologazione. I poteri integrativi e sostitutivi del giudice. La denunzia al tribunale.La volontaria giurisdizione. L’omologazione. I poteri integrativi e sostitutivi del giudice. La denunzia al tribunale.LUISS PhD Thesi
Essays on Applied Economics
No full textIt Never Rains But It Pours: weather shocks on sectoral wage in US counties. Does Foreign Aid Fuel Trust?It Never Rains But It Pours: weather shocks on sectoral wage in US counties. Does Foreign Aid Fuel Trust?LUISS PhD Thesi
1. ADR nei mercati finanziari. 2. Agenzie di rating e giudizio sul debito sovrano dei paesi dell'Eurozona. 3. Vigilanza finanziaria in Australia modello teorico e aspetti critici
No full text1. Quadro normativo comunitario in materia di ADR; Quadro normativo italiano in materia di ADR; Organizzazione degli ADR in materia di servizi finanziari nella legge italiana; Un ADR per ogni regolatore?; Alcune proposte di riforma degli ADR bancari-finanziari operanti in Italia. 2. Informazione sui mercati finanziari e agenzie di rating; Contenuto informativo del rating, l’elemento reputazionale e la funzione; I problemi sollevati dal ricorso al rating; Le soluzioni proposte; Debito sovrano e rating; Le metodologie in dettaglio per l’assegnazione del rating sui debiti sovrani; Un'analisi del giudizio di rating sul debito italiano alla luce delle procedure di valutazione. 3. Una panoramica delle principali politiche di regolazione; Il sistema finanziario degli anni 50-60; Il modello di regolazione; I regolatori australiani; La recente crisi finanziaria e l’impatto con il sistema di regolazione; Il tema del perimetro della regolazione prudenziale e le altre questioni alla base del dibattito sulle riforme in Australia; Il mutamento di prospettiva generato dalla crisi; Opzioni relative a possibili modifiche dell'architettura istituzionale
dei regolatori.1. Quadro normativo comunitario in materia di ADR; Quadro normativo italiano in materia di ADR; Organizzazione degli ADR in materia di servizi finanziari nella legge italiana; Un ADR per ogni regolatore?; Alcune proposte di riforma degli ADR bancari-finanziari operanti in Italia. 2. Informazione sui mercati finanziari e agenzie di rating; Contenuto informativo del rating, l’elemento reputazionale e la funzione; I problemi sollevati dal ricorso al rating; Le soluzioni proposte; Debito sovrano e rating; Le metodologie in dettaglio per l’assegnazione del rating sui debiti sovrani; Un'analisi del giudizio di rating sul debito italiano alla luce delle procedure di valutazione. 3. Una panoramica delle principali politiche di regolazione; Il sistema finanziario degli anni 50-60; Il modello di regolazione; I regolatori australiani; La recente crisi finanziaria e l’impatto con il sistema di regolazione; Il tema del perimetro della regolazione prudenziale e le altre questioni alla base del dibattito sulle riforme in Australia; Il mutamento di prospettiva generato dalla crisi; Opzioni relative a possibili modifiche dell'architettura istituzionale
dei regolatori.LUISS PhD Thesi
Tutela della concorrenza, autorganizzazione ed accordi di cooperazione tra pubbliche amministrazioni
No full textPrincipio di concorrenza e autonomia organizzativa dell'amministrazione nel mercato dei contratti pubblici. Autoproduzione di beni e servizi e cooperazione istituzionale tra pubbliche amministrazioni. La cooperazione contrattuale tra pubbliche amministrazioni. Profili teorici della cooperazione contrattuale amministrativa alla luce del diritto europeo.Principio di concorrenza e autonomia organizzativa dell'amministrazione nel mercato dei contratti pubblici. Autoproduzione di beni e servizi e cooperazione istituzionale tra pubbliche amministrazioni. La cooperazione contrattuale tra pubbliche amministrazioni. Profili teorici della cooperazione contrattuale amministrativa alla luce del diritto europeo.LUISS PhD Thesi
Quantum tort law: the law of torts in a probabilistic world
No full textDespite the findings of natural scientists and philosophers, the law of torts is still clinging on a strictly deterministic (in the Laplacian sense) idea of the world. Probabilistic considerations are not alien to the legal world, yet they are generally regarded as ad hoc exceptions to handle particularly complex cases. From this perspective, this thesis advocates the need for a theoretical shift. A probabilistic approach to reality should become the norm, whereas determinism should only be considered a heuristic tool when confronted with prima facie deterministic cases.
In Chapter II it is shown that a strictly deterministic concept of causation is inadequate to face the intricacies characterizing modern litigation. In fact, the deterministic version of the ‘but for’ test necessarily creates frictions with the kind of evidence produced by modern science. The introduction of a purely probabilistic concept of causality is advocated and a distinction is drawn between the ex-ante and the ex-post probabilistic approach to causation. The former seems to be a better approach for lagged torts, whereas the latter is more appropriate to handle instant torts. Also, it is shown that in a probabilistic world the very concept of harm assumes a different meaning.
Building on the new definition of harm introduced in Chapter II, in Chapter III it is suggested that the debate on the goals of tort law should be reconsidered. In a probabilistic world welfare maximization and corrective justice are not mutually exclusive, but must be regarded as necessary complements.
In Chapter IV, it is argued that the problems created by a deterministic mindset stretch way beyond the analysis of causation. In fact, a Laplacian (deterministic) view of the world often prevents us from contemplating probabilistic solutions even when deterministic options have failed. From this perspective, Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) are a perfect example. Both the legal and the economic literature have advanced solutions to improve CRAs incentives to issue accurate ratings. Yet, in most cases, the proposed solutions did not exploit the probabilistic nature of ratings, thus they were not framed exclusively in probabilistic terms. To the contrary, by designing a simple and legally workable strict liability rule it is possible to tie CRAs profits to the quality of their probabilistic predictions.
In Chapter V, it is investigated whether the law and economics movement can be considered the answer to the indeterminacy of predictions haunting other sciences. Not surprisingly, the answer to this question is no. Even the extremely simplified world of tort law and economics is dominated by an indeterminacy principle.Despite the findings of natural scientists and philosophers, the law of torts is still clinging on a strictly deterministic (in the Laplacian sense) idea of the world. Probabilistic considerations are not alien to the legal world, yet they are generally regarded as ad hoc exceptions to handle particularly complex cases. From this perspective, this thesis advocates the need for a theoretical shift. A probabilistic approach to reality should become the norm, whereas determinism should only be considered a heuristic tool when confronted with prima facie deterministic cases.
In Chapter II it is shown that a strictly deterministic concept of causation is inadequate to face the intricacies characterizing modern litigation. In fact, the deterministic version of the ‘but for’ test necessarily creates frictions with the kind of evidence produced by modern science. The introduction of a purely probabilistic concept of causality is advocated and a distinction is drawn between the ex-ante and the ex-post probabilistic approach to causation. The former seems to be a better approach for lagged torts, whereas the latter is more appropriate to handle instant torts. Also, it is shown that in a probabilistic world the very concept of harm assumes a different meaning.
Building on the new definition of harm introduced in Chapter II, in Chapter III it is suggested that the debate on the goals of tort law should be reconsidered. In a probabilistic world welfare maximization and corrective justice are not mutually exclusive, but must be regarded as necessary complements.
In Chapter IV, it is argued that the problems created by a deterministic mindset stretch way beyond the analysis of causation. In fact, a Laplacian (deterministic) view of the world often prevents us from contemplating probabilistic solutions even when deterministic options have failed. From this perspective, Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) are a perfect example. Both the legal and the economic literature have advanced solutions to improve CRAs incentives to issue accurate ratings. Yet, in most cases, the proposed solutions did not exploit the probabilistic nature of ratings, thus they were not framed exclusively in probabilistic terms. To the contrary, by designing a simple and legally workable strict liability rule it is possible to tie CRAs profits to the quality of their probabilistic predictions.
In Chapter V, it is investigated whether the law and economics movement can be considered the answer to the indeterminacy of predictions haunting other sciences. Not surprisingly, the answer to this question is no. Even the extremely simplified world of tort law and economics is dominated by an indeterminacy principle.LUISS PhD Thesi
L'accertamento di questioni nell'arbitrato: la perizia contrattuale
No full textIn this work, the Author reconstructs and analyzes the institutional practice of perizia contrattuale. It can be called also expert determination, and It consists in a mechanism through which two subjects commission one or more third parties with specific technical-scientific skills – so called “periti,” field-experts – to verify a relevant technical matter in a legal relationship or a controversy. The verification is considered binding by the parties involved.
The “history” about the phenomenon in question shows that it has been always compared to arbitraggio and arbitration.
In short, the work is organized in six chapters.
The first chapter begins with a short investigation into the historical context about arbitration and arbitraggio, in particular in the roman and medieval law.
In the second chapter, the Author explains the main theories about perizia contrattuale; in this chapter there is also an evaluation about the irregular arbitration and a short investigation into institutions in other legal systems which have the same characteristics of perizia.
The third chapter analyzes Spanish system of arbitration law; in this system perizia contrattuale is considered something different to arbitration.
In the fourth chapter, that is the heart of the work, after a description of the main differences between perizia contrattuale and arbitraggio, the Author compares perizia contrattuale to arbitration. He analyzes also the contract of ascertainment, and finally he explains that perizia contrattuale is a particular kind of irregular arbitration; perizia and arbitration differ only with regards to the object of verification.
In the fifth chapter, putting together the insights derived from the evolution of court decisions and making reference to the legal doctrine that has produced most in-depth studies of the phenomenon, the Author proposes the regulation of the phenomenon in question.
In the last chapter there is an investigation into the contestation of perizia contrattuale.In this work, the Author reconstructs and analyzes the institutional practice of perizia contrattuale. It can be called also expert determination, and It consists in a mechanism through which two subjects commission one or more third parties with specific technical-scientific skills – so called “periti,” field-experts – to verify a relevant technical matter in a legal relationship or a controversy. The verification is considered binding by the parties involved.
The “history” about the phenomenon in question shows that it has been always compared to arbitraggio and arbitration.
In short, the work is organized in six chapters.
The first chapter begins with a short investigation into the historical context about arbitration and arbitraggio, in particular in the roman and medieval law.
In the second chapter, the Author explains the main theories about perizia contrattuale; in this chapter there is also an evaluation about the irregular arbitration and a short investigation into institutions in other legal systems which have the same characteristics of perizia.
The third chapter analyzes Spanish system of arbitration law; in this system perizia contrattuale is considered something different to arbitration.
In the fourth chapter, that is the heart of the work, after a description of the main differences between perizia contrattuale and arbitraggio, the Author compares perizia contrattuale to arbitration. He analyzes also the contract of ascertainment, and finally he explains that perizia contrattuale is a particular kind of irregular arbitration; perizia and arbitration differ only with regards to the object of verification.
In the fifth chapter, putting together the insights derived from the evolution of court decisions and making reference to the legal doctrine that has produced most in-depth studies of the phenomenon, the Author proposes the regulation of the phenomenon in question.
In the last chapter there is an investigation into the contestation of perizia contrattuale.LUISS PhD Thesi
I rapporti fra arbitrato e processo
No full textLa qualificazione dei rapporti fra arbitri e giudici. l’exceptio compromissi. l’impugnazione della decisione sull’eccezione d’incompetenza. la translatio iudicii nei rapporti fra arbitri e giudici. l’efficacia della decisione sulla potestas iudicandi arbitrale. la contemporanea pendenza di due procedimenti aventi ad oggetto controversie identiche o connesse.La qualificazione dei rapporti fra arbitri e giudici. l’exceptio compromissi. l’impugnazione della decisione sull’eccezione d’incompetenza. la translatio iudicii nei rapporti fra arbitri e giudici. l’efficacia della decisione sulla potestas iudicandi arbitrale. la contemporanea pendenza di due procedimenti aventi ad oggetto controversie identiche o connesse.LUISS PhD Thesi
I rapporti tra la maggioranza e la minoranza azionaria: verso il superamento della classica nozione di "abuso" di maggioranza
No full textI rapporti tra maggioranza e minoranza azionaria. Abuso della maggioranza azionaria. Verso il superamento dell’abuso di maggioranza in una prospettiva giuridico-economica finalizzata al perseguimento dell’interesse sociale.I rapporti tra maggioranza e minoranza azionaria. Abuso della maggioranza azionaria. Verso il superamento dell’abuso di maggioranza in una prospettiva giuridico-economica finalizzata al perseguimento dell’interesse sociale.LUISS PhD Thesi
La gestione delegata: la prestazione gestoria e la responsabilità degli amministratori non esecutivi
No full textThis thesis is concerned with normative and regulatory developments with regards to the evaluation and information duties of non executive directors. This study is conducted with reference to a medium size public company, which has adopted a traditional governance model and delegated its administrative functions either to single individuals or to an executive committee.
The aim of this study is to establish what levels of performance a company can expect from it non-executive directors. As such it identifies the theoretical frameworks and analytical tools to establish the foundations and the limits of their liabilities. In particular, this thesis will highlight the importance of supervisory and monitoring function of the executive board and of the company's organizational, administrative and accounting structure in delivering an efficient and effective governance.This thesis is concerned with normative and regulatory developments with regards to the evaluation and information duties of non executive directors. This study is conducted with reference to a medium size public company, which has adopted a traditional governance model and delegated its administrative functions either to single individuals or to an executive committee.
The aim of this study is to establish what levels of performance a company can expect from it non-executive directors. As such it identifies the theoretical frameworks and analytical tools to establish the foundations and the limits of their liabilities. In particular, this thesis will highlight the importance of supervisory and monitoring function of the executive board and of the company's organizational, administrative and accounting structure in delivering an efficient and effective governance.LUISS PhD Thesi