Jurnal Politik
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Patronizing the Mass: How Middle-Agents Deepened Populism and Post-Truth in Indonesia 2019 Presidential Election
Full text linkIndonesian 2019 presidential election was extensively highlighted as a populist rematch between the technocratic Jokowi and the chauvinist Prabowo. There were at least two dimensions that contributed to the existing populist atmosphere at the presidential election: the religio-social condition of the people and the personal appearance of the presidential candidates. By referring to the two factors, analysts predominantly mentioned that Prabowo was more populist than Jokowi due to his energetic rhetoric and chauvinist discourse. However, it is undeniable that the polarization at the grassroots level was equally vitriolic in both Jokowi and Prabowo supporters. To what extent, then, could a person with a subtle populist gesture and rhetoric such as Jokowi could have vitriolic supporters and a deep post-truth condition. The research at hand underlines social media and middle-agents as additional tenets for the emerging entrenchment between the two supporters. Using content analysis, this research unpacks the populism and post-truth energy of a small sample of tweets and comments to comprehend how the interaction of the people and middle-agents could deepen populist cleavage and post-truth condition. This research found that, although Jokowi and Prabowo envisaged a different populist style at the front of the electoral stage, the articulation of divisive discourse, trolling, and mockery are equally sparkling from their middle-agents in social media
Explaining the Effects of Political Islam and Preacher toward Prabowo’s Electoral Dominance: Evidence from Pekanbaru and Kampar
Full text linkUlama in Indonesia have critical roles not only in religious teachings but also in socio-political affairs. The literature on voter behavior in many countries shows that religious leaders have critical roles in directing the political orientation and behavior of their followers. This article aims to examine the influence of Ustadz Abdul Somad (UAS) toward a significant increase of Prabowo's vote share in the 2019 presidential election in Riau Province. Although Prabowo lost to Jokowi with a large margin in the last election, he was able to claim electoral victory in 13 out of 34 provinces—one of them is Riau. We assume that Prabowo gained the electoral advantage over his rival in Riau due to electoral support from UAS that ultimately gave significant effect toward a sharp increase for his votes compared to the 2014 election. We apply the quantitative method to examine the phenomenon. The data are mainly collected through a survey conducted in the two most populous regions in Riau—Pekanbaru and Kampar Regency. Our study confirms that UAS has a significant effect on Muslim voters' orientation and behavior to vote for Prabowo in the last presidential election. Other findings in this study are also in line with previous studies suggesting a critical influence of religion, particularly Islam, in driving Muslim’s political behavior. The contribution of our study is to enrich the literature on voter behavior in Indonesian politics by examining the influence of political support from a popular preacher—UAS—on the distribution of electoral support for presidential candidates in the 2019 election. This is further strengthened by the presence and role of ulama figures who give their support to each presidential candidate in the political contestation in 2019
Islamic Revivalism in Indonesia: The Caliphate, Sharia, NKRI, Democracy, and the Nation-State
Full text linkThis research examines Indonesian Islamic revivalist movements’ perspectives on the concepts of the nation-state and democracy. The Islamic revivalist movements studied in this research include Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Front Pembela Islam (FPI), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), and Forum Umat Islam (FUI). Following the fall of the authoritarian Suharto’s regime in 1998, Indonesia witnessed an escalation of Islamic activism whose goals revolve around the implementation of Sharia (Islamic law) and, to a certain extent, the reestablishment of a caliphate (transnational Islamic state). To this end, revivalist movements have been staging frequent mass protests, mainly addressing Indonesian government policies that are deemed un-Islamic. Some of the protests have ended violently, which implies that their Sharia and Islamic state goals have become a source of conflict in Indonesian society. This research suggests that this violent activism stems from different versions of the concept of the nation-state and democracy, which disagree with broadly accepted definitions. This research was conducted against this backdrop to analyze each movements’ perspectives on the concept of nation-state and democracy and argues that, despite each movement advocating the implementation of Sharia, their understandings of the concepts of the nation-state and democracy differ
Role of the Botoh as Political Brokers and Gamblers during the Tulungagung Local Election of 2018
Full text linkCurrent studies on the botoh generally focus on gambling in village-head elections (pilkades) and how its role transforms from pilkades to local elections (pilkada). However, this article defines the botoh as a political broker and gambler during the 2018 local election of Tulungagung Regency. This research found that the botoh’s way of persuading voters had a positive effect on an unfavorable candidate and helped him win. This study conducted in-depth interviews of “big” botoh, observed field operation patterns, and collected documents from related parties. The practice of gambling during pilkada is categorized into three types: ngapit, leg-leg’an, and biting. This article argues that the roles of the botoh as a political broker and gambler are caused by high-stakes gambling, compensation from candidates to be part of the campaign team, and the direct election process. In this context, candidates are likely to entrust the botoh with an important role within their campaign teams, because they are considered to understand the characteristics of voters
Desa Mawacara, Negara Mawatata: Bali’s Customary Village-Based State Policies in the Time of the Covid-19 Pandemic
Full text linkBalinese customary villages are at the center of the state’s strategy for mitigation of Covid-19. Relations between customary villages and the state predate colonial times. The historical dynamics have shown that the traditions and cultures of customary villages (desa mawacara) will always exist within the shadow of the state (negara mawatata). The symbolic narrative of desa mawacara, negara mawatata illustrates the governmentality that the state exercises over the villages. Regional Regulation No. 4/2019 on Customary Villages in Bali and the formation of the customary village-based task force were rational choices made by the Governor of Bali to place the villages at the forefront of the province’s strategy against the pandemic. This article employs Li’s (2012) adaptation of Foucault’s concept of governmentality in its analysis. Discourse analysis was conducted with regards to information extracted from mass media, in-depth interviews, and participatory observation. This article argues that the state’s policies for Balinese customary villages are deeply entrenched in its long history of intervention and cooptation. During the Covid-19 pandemic, the state has been well aware of the extensive influence that customary villages hold over their communities. The state utilizes this reality to exert its authority.
Drivers of Conflict in Urban Infrastructure: Case Study of the New Yogyakarta Airport
Full text linkThe study discusses the drivers of conflict in the construction of Yogyakarta International Airport (YIA) in Temon, Kulon Progo, using a politico-economic framework. This research employs the theory of land-based elite domination of urban growth machines and theories that explain the drivers of conflicts caused by construction and development of infrastructure. The findings of this study show that the conflict was driven by disagreements on land resource that emerged from the government’s ambition to respond to the pressure to transform the rural lands in the region into an urban area under the concepts of aerotropolis and MICE. The pressure came from the interests of local and national elite groups, which complemented the extant problem of domination of land ownership by the local political elites of Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta. Thus, the conflict was related to not only the development of infrastructure but also a land conflict that arose from urban development policies. The other drivers of the conflict include poor governance of the project and social factors
