University of Arts in Belgrade
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Citizenship as lived experience : belonging and documentality after the breakup of Yugoslavia
Citizenship is usually thought of in terms of legal and political parameters setting the conditions for individuals’ statuses and rights, and so has been the case in its application to the post-Yugoslav context. With the primary interest in the “top-down” perspective, citizenship has been described as a tool with which new states regulated their respective citizenship bodies. But, equally, by granting us documents (passports, birth and marriage certificates, IDs, etc.) which connect us to a wider community, and by employing an array of ethnic, cultural and state symbols, citizenship instills us with a sense of belonging, membership and identity. Furthermore, through our enacting of rights and duties of citizenship, it becomes an inextricable element of our everyday experience. It is especially when questioned and contested that citizenship plays a significant role in how we perceive ourselves, how we appear to others and how intergroup relations are mediated. This paper focuses on personal narratives that reveal lived experiences of the triangular relationship between citizenship, identity and (national) belonging in the post-Yugoslav space. Its aim is to shed some light on a less examined perspective of citizenship transformations, and to complement the currently existing literature on citizenship regimes in the post-Yugoslav states with a bottom-up approach that treats citizenship in its identity-forming and recognition-bearing social role
Koliko je „politički“ Kvongov politički liberalizam?
In this short paper I ask to what extent the sharp contrast between the political and the comprehensive, on which political liberals such as Rawls and Quong place primary emphasis, caters to a truly “political” conception of liberalism. I argue that Quong’s own take on this point is more distinctively “political” than Rawls’s, in that it assigns far less weight to citizens’ comprehensive doctrines. Indeed, I suggest that Quong’s exclusion of comprehensive doctrines (exemplified by his worries about an “overlapping consensus”) has more radical implications than Quong himself seems to think. In doing so, I offer a streamlined version of Quong’s critique, which encompasses two more or less direct criticisms of Rawls’s doctrine of the overlapping consensus. I will call them the “sincerity objection” and the “liberal objection”
Obrazloženje problema dve forme semantičkog skepticizma : Vitgenštajnov paradoks sleđenja pravila i Kripkeov semantički paradoks
Despite persistent attempts to defend Kripke’s argument (Kripke 1982), analyses of this argument seem to be reaching a consensus that it is characterized by fatal flaws in both its interpretation of Wittgenstein and its argument of meaning independent of interpretation. Most scholars who do not agree with Kripke’s view have directly contrasted his understanding of Wittgenstein (KW) with Wittgenstein’s own perspective (LW) in or after
Philosophical Investigations (PI). However, I believe that those who have closely read both PI and Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language without any preconceptions have a different impression from the one that is generally
accepted: that KW does not directly oppose LW. Indeed, KW seems to present one aspect of LW with precision, although the impression that KW deviates from LW in some respects remains unavoidable.
In this paper, I will attempt to elucidate the underpinnings of this impression by formulating the paradoxes presented by Wittgenstein and Kripke and revealing the complicated relation between the two forms of semantic paradoxes. I will then not only propose a new interpretation of the argument about meaning contained in PI but also suggest a schema or condition for semantics that I think holds by itself, independent from exegetical matters
Filozofija kao...ćutanje
Centar za promociju nauke,Zrenjaninska gimnazija i dečiji stvaralački centar Maštalište u saradnji sa Institutom za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju i Srpskim filozofskim društvom organizuju seriju interaktivnih predavanja FILOZOFIJA KAO..
Ženskost u polju zazora: prilog analizi ženske pozicije u falogocentričnim okvirima jezika i pisma
Služeći se tekstualnim platformama psihoanalize, teorijske psihoanalize, poststrukturalističkih studija i studija roda, ovaj rad pruža
jedan aspekt analize specifičnosti ženske pozicije u falogocentričnim okvirima jezika i pisma, koji su ujedno i osnovni gradivni strukturalni elementi koji izvodei konstruišu rodne pozicije subjekata i uspostavljaju falogocentrično-patrijarhalnu dinamiku među njima. Razumeti način na koji ženski subjekt biva izveden u ovom kontekstu prvi je korak u planiranju i izvođenju strategije prevazilaženja ograničenja koje falogocentrično postavlja u odnosu na subjekte jezika/ pisma, što je od naročite važnosti u odnosu na žensku subjekatsku i govornu poziciju. Tekst problematizuje pojmove kao što su falogocentrično i zazorno, upućujući na koncept i delovanje ženskog pisma kao na jednu od mogućih strategija rada na resignifikaciji, alterovanju i omekšavanju
falogocentrizma i svih njegovih represivnih mehanizama
Problematika neizrecivosti Holokausta i pitanje pozicije žena u Holokaustu
Проблематика неизрецивости Холокауста покреће
низ питања: презентације, сећања, сведочења, али и питање
празнине, немогућности, неприказивости и трауме. Осим ових,
овај рад покреће и сродна питања неизразивости женске пози-
ције у фалогоцентричној култури, чинећи то на примеру кон-
кретне анализе позиције жена у Холокаусту. Женски субјект
није само игнорисан, изостављен или, уколико се он у тексто-
вима о Холокаусту и појављује, (стерео)типизован, он је осуђен
на немоћ и неизговоривост, управо као и Холокауст сам, би-
вајући тако место културне и цивилизацијске трауме – место
које зове на константну нужност говора о њему
Social Epistemology between Revisionism and Expansionism
The main aim of this article is to analyze a recent text by Nenad
Miščević dealing with social epistemology in the context of
Foucault's theory of knowledge. In the first part, we briefly note
Miščević's thoughts on the difference between analytic and
continental philosophy and his thoughts on the latter. In the second
part, we analyze both Miščević’s thesis about Foucault's dual
understanding of knowledge and his placement of social
epistemology as a proper framework for Foucault’s concept of
“new” knowledge. In opposition to Miščević's dualistic view, we
are more inclined to accept Goldman’s characterization of
Foucault’s position as a revisionist project in the context of
standard analytical epistemology that legitimately embraces even
very serious expansions of epistemological themes. Finally, we
propose that Miščević’s dualistic interpretation reflects his general
dualistic position concerning the previously described distinction
between “continental” and “analytic” philosophy