University of Arts in Belgrade
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Policy brief: Outta Trust? (Post)-Pandemic Trust and Democratic Resilience in the Western Balkans
No full textIn the Western Balkans, issues linking trust and democracy acquire particular
importance and urgency in the wake of the Covid crisis. Based on a large-scale
public opinion poll carried out in the six countries of the Western Balkans,
this brief shows that the pandemic has exacerbated the region’s issues with
trust in public institutions even further. The study finds that the reticence of
publics to undergo vaccination is directly linked with mistrust in governments,
corroborating earlier research by BiEPAG that warned about the wide diffusion
of coronavirus-related conspiracy theories in the region and their relation with
vaccine scepticism. The brief also points to the profiling of a trend termed
‘authoritarian production of trust’ in the largest country of the region, Serbia.
Yet, it also identifies a ‘constituency of change’ with similar characteristics
across the region: a picture that opens space to invest trust in new actors able to
advance genuine progressive causes in South East Europe, beyond and instead
of captured institutions and the respective party establishments
Blockchain and AI in Art: A Quick Look into Contemporary Art Industries
No full textIn this exploratory text the authors review different ways in which Blockchain technology intersects with Artificial Intelligence (AI), and with art, and how it connects to a more and more frequently mentioned area such as contemporary art industries. These intersections are pointing at the two aspects worth exploring – the first one being a way in which technology (here Blockchain and AI) can be used in various fields and industries, and the other one following art as it opens its world to the new technological possibilities, enriching its forms, topics and manifestations, and questioning the status of the author as well. The art examples and case studies exhibited here will illustrate a couple of problems that can be solved and/or improved with Blockchain and AI technology. These include transparency, art data authenticity, art data monetization, smart contracts with artists, investment opportunities of NFT (non-fungible tokens), roles and activities of curators, psychology of aesthetics, and exploration of creativity
What do the Dutch Book Arguments Show?
No full textArgument(i) Holandske knjige su jedan od glavnih razloga za veliki uspeh subjektivne interpretacije verovatnoća. Ovakvi argumenti su subjektivnu interpretaciju učinili ozbiljnim kandidatom za interpreta-ciju u okviru teorije verovatnoće, u doba kada su interpretativni napo-ri favorizovali objektivističke i epistemičke pravce. Kasnije, subjektiv-na interpretacija, zajedno sa argumentima Holandske knjige, dobila je veliki tehnički razvoj i veliku upotrebu u mnogim disciplinama u kojima postoji potreba za upotrebu teorije verovatnoće, poput teorije odluči-vanja ili teorije igara. U ovom radu, ukratko ćemo prikazati zbog čega su argumenti Holandske knjige bili potrebni subjektivnoj interpretaciji u njenom razvoju, kakve dopune su ti argumenti tokom vremena doži-veli i zbog čega, a potom i prikazati glavne supstantivne pretpostavke tih argumenata. Najzad, analiziraćemo održivost takvih pretpostavki, i pokazati da, ne bismo li u potpunosti sačuvali svrhu i domete argume-nata Holandske knjige, najbolje je odlučiti se za izvestan interpretativ-ni primitivizam u okviru subjektivne interpretacije verovatnoće.The Dutch Book Arguments are one of the main reasons for the great success of the subjective interpretation of probability. These arguments helped the subjective inter-pretation to become a serious candidate for an interpretation of the axioms of prob-ability theory during the period in which there was a certain tendency towards an ob-jectivist and epistemic interpretative direction. Later, the subjective interpretation along with the Dutch Book Arguments was greatly developed in technical terms and became widely used in various scientific fields (e.g. decision and game theory) in which there was a need for probability theory. In this article, we will show how and why the Dutch Book arguments were essential for the subjective interpretation during its de-velopment, which additions to the arguments were made later, and then we will show the main substantive assumptions of the argument. Finally, we will analyze the plau-sibility of the assumptions and show that, in order to preserve the goals and conclu-sions of the Dutch Book Arguments, we should adopt a version of interpretative prim-itivism within the subjective interpretation of probability
Diderot et La Théologie
No full textPolazeći od sažetog pregleda značenja pojma teologija (θεολογία) – iz-među helenskog i srednjovekovnog – kao i kratkog osvrta na Didroovo (Denis Diderot, 1713–1784) formalno obrazovanje, cilj ovoga rada je da se na osnovu glavnog istraživačkog korpusa ustanovi i objasni nje-gov stav prema suštinskim teološkim pitanjima. Jedno od glavnih filo-sofsko-metodoloških načela kod Didroa je kritičko preispitivanje tradicionalnih načela. U tom smislu, on pristupa teologiji i centralnom teološkom problemu iz različitih uglova kako bi zasnovao antihri-šćansku i materijalističku teologiju. Didro se na taj način udaljava od prethodne srednjovekovne sholastičke tradicije i vraća se antičkim filosofskim uzorima. U glavni analizirani korpus ulaze spisi: Filosofske misli, O samodovoljnosti prirodne religije, Pismo o slepima, D’Alambe-rov san i Razgovor filosofa s maršalicom od ***, kao i enciklopedijski članak „Teologija“.Partant d’un bref aperçu de la signification du terme théologie (θεολογία) – entre son sens hellénique et médiéval – ainsi que d’un bref résumé de la formation théologique de Diderot (Denis Diderot, 1713-1784), le but de cet article est d’analyser ses consid-erations relatives à la théologie en tant que science humaine. Au XVIIIe siècle, Diderot vise à problématiser tous les aspects de la théologie afin d’établir une théologie an-ti-chrétienne et surtout matérialiste, à l’époque des Lumières françaises. Le penseur français s’écarte ainsi de la tradition scolastique médiévale et revient aux modèles philosophiques de l’Antiquité. Le corpus principal de notre analyse consiste en ces écrits : Pensées philosophiques (1745), De la suffisance de la religion naturelle (1746/1770), Lettre sur les aveugles à l’usage de ceux qui voient, Le Rêve de D’Alembert et Entretien d’un philosophe avec la maréchale de ***, et les articles encyclopédiques « Théologien » et « Théologie »
Može li biti ispravno ili se osećati ispravno da se mrzi. O prikladnosti i podesnosti mržnje
No full textWhat exactly is wrong with hating others? However deep-seated the intuition, when it comes to spelling out the reasons for why hatred is inappropriate, the literature is rather meager and confusing. In this paper, I attempt to be more precise by distinguishing two senses in which hatred is inappropriate, a moral and a non-moral one. First, I critically discuss the central current proposals defending the possibility of morally appropriate hatred in the face of serious wrongs or evil perpetrators and show that they are all based on a problematic assumption, which I call the ‘reality of evil agents assumption’. I then turn to the issue of non-moral emotional appropriateness and sketch a novel, focus-based account of fittingness. Next, I outline the distinctive affective intentionality of hatred, suggesting that hatred, unlike most other antagonistic emotions, has an overgeneralizing and indeterminate affective focus. Against this background, I argue that hatred cannot be fitting. Due to the indeterminacy of its focus, hatred fails to pick out those evaluative features of the intentional object that would really matter to the emoters. I close with some tentative remarks on the possibility of appropriate hatred towards corporate or group agents.Šta je zapravo pogrešno u mržnji prema drugima? Bez obzira na dubinu intuicije, literatura
je ipak oskudna i konfuzna kada treba da se navedu razlozi za neprikladnost mržnje. U ovom
članku pokušaću da budem precizniji razlikujući dva smisla prema kojima je mržnja neprikladna, moralni i vanmoralni. Prvo ću kritički razmatrati glavne savremene pozicije koje zagovaraju mogućnost moralne prikladnosti mržnje u slučaju ozbiljno rđavih ili zlih počinilaca.
Pokušaću da pokažem da su svi oni zasnovani na problematičnoj pretpostavci koju nazivam
„pretpostavka o realnosti zlih aktera“. Nakon toga ću se pozabaviti problemom vanmoralne
emocionalne prikladnosti i ocrtaću novo, na fokusu zasnovano objašnjenje podesnosti. Zatim ću predstaviti karakterističnu afektivnu intencionalnost mržnje, pri čemu sugerišem da
mržnja, za razliku od drugih antagonističkih emocija, ima prekomerno uopštavajući i neodre đen afektivni fokus. Imajući to u vidu argumentovaću da mržnja ne može da bude podesna.
S obzirom na neodređenost svog fokusa mržnja ne može da prati evaluativna svojstva inten cionalnog objekta koja bi zaista imala značaja za osobu koja doživljava emociju. Tekst zaključujem s provizornom napomenom o mogućnosti prikladne mržnje prema korporacijskim i
grupnim akterima
Etički zasnovan ‘dokaz identiteta’ Božje egzistencije. Ontologija za filoterapiju
No full textA resurgence of scholarly work on proof of God’s existence is noticeable over the past decade, with considerable emphasis on attempts to provide ‘analytic proof’ based on the meanings and logic of various identity statements which constitute premises of the syllogisms of the ‘proof’. Most recently perhaps, Emmanuel Rutten’s ‘modal-epistemic proof’ has drawn serious academic attention. Like other ‘analytic’ and strictly logical proofs of God’s existence, Rutten’s proof has been found flawed. In this paper I discuss the possibility of an ‘ethics-based’ identity proof of God’s existence. Such a proof, the first version of which, I believe, has been offered, indirectly, by Nikolai Lossky, utilizes the form and structure of the analytic proof, but fundamentally rests on the perception of moral values we associate with God and Godliness. The nature of the proof shifts the focus of the very attempt to ‘prove’ God’s existence from what I believe is an unreasonable standard, unattainable even in ‘proving’ the existence of the more mundane world, towards a more functional, practical and attainable standard. The proof proposed initially by Lossky, and in a more systematic form here, I believe, shows the indubitable existence of God in the sense of his moral presence in the lives of the faithful, at least with the same degree of certainty as the presence or ‘existence’ of anything else that can be epistemically proven in principle.Tokom poslednje decenije uočljiva je intenziviran rad na izvođenju dokaza o postojanju Boga, sa posebnim naglaskom na takozvane “analitičke dokaze”, koji su zasnovani na značenjima i logici različitih iskaza o identitetu, koji predstavljaju premise samog silogizma “dokaza”. Možda akademski najuticajniji skorašnji analitički dokaz o postojanju Boga izložio je Emanuel Ruten u formi svog “modalno-epistemičkog dokaza”.
Kao i za ostale analitčke i strogo logičke dokaze postojanja Boga, i za Rutenov je utvrđeno da je neispravan. Kroz kritiku Rutenovog dokaza, koju koristim kao uvod, ja u ovom tekstu rahzmatram mogućnost dokaza o postojanju Boga koji bi bio zasnovan na etičkim argumentima. Takav dokaz, Like other ‘analytic’ and strictly logical proofs of God’s existence, Rutten’s proof has been found flawed. In this paper I discuss the possibility of an ‘ethics-based’ identity proof of God’s existence. Such a proof, čiju je prvu verziju, po mom mišljenju, već izneo Nikolaj Loski, koristi formu i strukturu analitičkih dokaza, ali se fundamentalno oslanja na doživljaj moralnih vrednosti koje povezujemo sa Bogom ili božanstvenošću. “Etički” dokaz pomera naglasak samog rada na izvođenju dokaza o postojanju Boga sa jednog standarda za koji smatram da je nerazuman i koji se ne može dostići ni kada se “dokazuje” postojanje mnogo manje kontroverznih ontoloških kategorija, kao što su različite kategorije svakodnevnog, “običnog” sveta. Istovremeno, etički dokaz pomera naglasak dokazivanja ka jednom funkcionalnom, praktičnom i dostižnom standardu dokazivanja. Ovaj dokaz, i u formi u kojoj ga je izveo Loski, a i u sistematičnijoj formi u kojoj ga ovde izlažem, pokazuje nesumnjivo postojanje Boga u smislu moralnog prisustva Boga u životima verujućih ljudi. “Izvesnost” takvog dokaza nije ništa manja od izvesnosti bilo čega drugog što se uopšte može epistemički dokazivati