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Overweging op zondag 9 maart 2025 door Kees de Groot bij: Deuteronomium 5,6-21 Romeinen 10,8-13 Lucas 4,1-1
Religie valt uiteen en wordt op veel plaatsen vloeibaar
Het idee van secularisatie heeft ons blind gemaakt voor wat zich in de hele wereld aan fascinerends afspeelt. Er is veel meer aan religie en sacraliteit dan we dachten, stelt godsdienstsocioloog Kees de Groot, hoogleraar in Tilburg
Hungry ghosts eat casino chips:Associations between dispositional greed and gambling
Dispositional greed is characterized as the insatiable desire for more. Although greed may be a driving force for wealth accumulation, it can also relate to increased financial difficulties and risk-taking. Across two studies in different countries, The Netherlands (Study 1, N = 1,118) and England, Study 2, N = 4,855), we tested the degree to which dispositional greed was associated with gambling outcomes. Greedy individuals reported greater gambling participation and more negative gambling-related consequences. Moreover, Study 2 found that greed was associated with maladaptive gambling-related cognitions (e.g., cognitive distortions, positive expectations, and the perceived inability to stop) beyond that explained by trait motor impulsiveness. In addition, dispositionally greedy individuals reported being more focused on financial motivations for gambling, having greater confidence in winning, and less concern with realized losses. The current study demonstrates links between dispositional greed and risk-taking in a real-world context, highlighting biased decision-making cognitions for greedy individuals
Overconfidence and Information Aggregation
This paper explores the macroeconomic implications of overconfidence in noisy-information models. Relative overconfidence—where agents underestimate the precision of others’ signals—reduces welfare by intensifying the use of public information. Absolute overconfidence—where agents overestimate the precision of their private signals—can improve aggregate welfare in static settings by mitigating inefficiencies stemming from an overreliance on public signals. Welfare gains can be as large as 24% of the welfare in a rational benchmark. I generalize the result to a dynamic framework, showing that absolute overconfidence can partially counteract inefficiencies arising from strategic complementarities, improving long-run welfare
From video games to real-life ”games”:The emergence of real-life expertise in (serious) video games
In-betweens:Inside and outside global law
La resistencia prolongada y enconada de los movimientos altermundistasy antiglobalización en todo el mundo demuestra que la globalización del derecho se traduce en la globalización de la inclusión y la exclusión. La humanidad está dentro y fuera del derecho globalen todas sus posibles manifestaciones.¿Cómo es posible? Conceptualmente:¿Cómo deben estructurarse los ordenamientos jurídicos de modo que, aunque ahora podamos hablar de derecho más allá de las fronteras estatales, no sea posible ningún ordenamiento jurídico global emergente que pueda incluir sin excluir?Desde el punto de vista normativo: ¿Es posible una política autoritativa de los confines que ni postule la posibilidad de realizar un ordenamiento jurídico global que incluya a todos ni acepte la resignación o la parálisis ante la globalización dela inclusión y la exclusión?
Developing countries, tax treaty shopping and the global minimum tax
Analysis of the international network of double tax treaties reveals a large potential for tax avoidance. Developing countries are, on average, not more likely to suffer from tax revenue losses than other countries. Yet, this average masks the fact that several countries, such as Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Kenya, Uganda and Zambia, are vulnerable to substantial potential losses of withholding tax revenue by treaty shopping. The analysis combines tax parameters of more than a hundred countries with an algorithm from network theory, which simulates the tax minimizing behaviour of multinational enterprises. We introduce the notion of potentially aggressive tax treaties. These are the key treaties in treaty shopping routes, that may lead to substantial tax revenue losses in developing countries. Moreover, under the rules of the global minimum tax, the treaty partners are often in a prime position to top-up tax undertaxed profits of developing countries that offer tax incentives to attract investment, thus nullifying the incentive effect