14065 research outputs found
Sort by
Algorithmic Randomness and Probabilistic Laws
Full text linkWe apply recent ideas about complexity and randomness to the philosophy of laws and chances. We develop two ways to use algorithmic randomness to characterize probabilistic laws of nature. The first, a generative chance* law, employs a nonstandard notion of chance. The second, a probabilistic* constraining law, impose relative frequency and randomness constraints that every physically possible world must satisfy. The constraining notion removes a major obstacle to a unified governing account of non-Humean laws, on which laws govern by constraining physical possibilities; it also provides independently motivated solutions to familiar problems for the Humean best-system account (the Big Bad Bug and the zero-fit problem). On either approach, probabilistic laws are tied more tightly to corresponding sets of possible worlds: some histories permitted by traditional probabilistic laws are now ruled out as physically impossible. Consequently, the framework avoids one variety of empirical underdetermination while bringing to light others that are typically overlooked
Diversity and expertise in binary classification problems
Full text linkDemocratic theorists and social epistemologists often celebrate the epistemic benefits of diversity. One of the cornerstones is the ‘diversity trumps ability’ result by Hong and Page (2004). Ironically, the interplay between diversity and ability is rarely studied in radically different frameworks. Although diversity has been studied in prediction and search problems, the diversity-expertise tradeoff has not been studied systematically for small, deliberative groups facing binary classification problems. To fill this gap, I will introduce a new evidential sources framework and study whether, when, and (if so) why diversity trumps expertise in binary classification problems
Mathematical Explanation, Metaphysical Grounding, and Explanatory Chains
Full text linkThis paper develops a theory of mathematical explanation through the lens of a separatist metaphysical grounding framework. I argue that mathematical explanations delivered by proofs are best captured by a non-causal determination relation between mathematical facts—a metaphysical grounding relation where the \textit{explanans} determines the \textit{explanandum}, where the relevant why questions at each step are answered; an explanatory proof is the one that establishes an explanatory chain between the \textit{explanans} and the \textit{explanandum}. Through a case study in algebra (e.g., the infinity of fields with characteristic zero), I argue how this relation establishes objective dependencies in terms of determination relations that answer why-questions about mathematical facts. By adopting a ground-first separatist approach—where grounding relations back explanations but are distinct from them—the theory aligns with mathematical practice, supports proof plurality, and addresses gaps in existing accounts
Three epistemological desiderata for HPS practitioners
Full text linkIn this paper, I outline an epistemology of evidential reasoning in the history and philosophy of science (HPS). Drawing upon some prominent works in HPS as case studies, I formulate three novel epistemological desiderata for using historical case studies as evidence for philosophical claims about science, to wit: independent historical evidence, metahistorical criticism, and disciplinary alignment. These desiderata pick out some epistemic qualities and contribute to the achievement of the primary goal of evidential reasoning, which is to confer justification upon philosophical conclusions on the basis of historical evidence. In this way, my proposed epistemology tackles the “methodological” problem of vicious circularity and the “metaphysical” problem of disciplinary unsuitability that allegedly jeopardise HPS practice, thereby vindicating its positive epistemic status
Quantum Probabilities as Emergent from Interacting Wavefunctions
Full text linkWe present a conceptual framework in which quantum probabilities arise from discrete events generated by real-valued alignments of inner products between two dynamically evolving wavefunctions. In this perspective, discreteness and probabilistic behavior emerge from the temporal structure of such events rather than being imposed axiomatically. Illustrative calculations show that the Born rule can appear as the limiting frequency of these events, without invoking wavefunction collapse, manyworlds branching, or decision-theoretic postulates. A two-state example demonstrates consistency with standard quantum predictions and suggests how outcome frequencies
track Born weights. Extensions to interference scenarios, quantization heuristics, and multidimensional systems indicate that this proposal provides a fresh conceptual angle on the origin of quantum probabilities. This work is exploratory and aims to highlight
the underlying idea rather than provide a completed alternative theory; questions concerning dynamical equations, general proofs, and experimental signatures remain open for future research
Einstein’s Hidden Scaffolding, with a Glance at Poincaré
Full text linkThis paper reconstructs the derivations underlying the kinematical part of Einstein's 1905 special relativity paper, emphasizing their operational clarity and minimalist use of mathematics. Einstein employed modest tools—algebraic manipulations, Taylor expansions, partial differentials, and functional arguments—yet his method was guided by principles of linearity, symmetry, and invariance rather than the elaborate frameworks of electron theory. The published text in \emph{Annalen der Physik} concealed much of the algebraic scaffolding, presenting instead a streamlined sequence of essential equations. Far from reflecting a lack of sophistication, this economy of means was a deliberate rhetorical and philosophical choice: to demonstrate that relativity arises from two simple postulates and basic operational definitions, not from the complexities of electron theory. The reconstruction highlights how Einstein’s strategy subordinated mathematics to principle, advancing a new mode of reasoning in which physical insight, rather than computational elaboration, held decisive authority. In this respect, I show that Einstein’s presentation diverges sharply from Poincaré’s
Why Should Identity Be Logical?
Full text linkLogical inferentialists have expected identity to be susceptible of harmonious
introduction and elimination rules in natural deduction. While Read and Klev have
proposed rules they argue are harmonious, Griffiths and Ahmed have criticized these
rules as insufficient for harmony. These critics moreover suggest that no harmonious
rules are forthcoming. I argue that these critics are correct: the logical inferentialist
should abandon hope for harmonious rules for identity. The paper analyzes the three
major uses of identity in presumed-logical languages: variable coordination, definitional
substitution, and co-reference. We show that identity qua variable coordination is not
logical by providing a harmonious natural-deduction system that captures this use
through the quantifiers. We then argue that identity qua definitional substitution or co-reference faces a dilemma: either its rules are harmonious but they obscure its actual
use in inference, or its rules are not harmonious but they make its actual use in
inference plain. We conclude that the inferentialist may have harmonious rules for
identity only by disrespecting its inferential use
Review of "Does Quantum Information Require Additional Structure?", by Ryszard Horodecki
Full text linkI review the following article: "Does Quantum Information Require Additional Structure?", by Ryszard Horodecki (Foundations of Physics 55:17, 2025
What role for local knowledge in ocean governance?
Full text linkWe review the recently adopted Agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ Agreement) and the role of local knowledge in more equitable ocean governance. We explore ways of strengthening the 'ecosystem approach' via the argument from ecological connectivity for marine species that straddle coasts and high seas. We identify possible epistemic injustices in how local knowledges may enter discussions about marine policy and argue for the need to rethink discussions on the role and value of local knowledge in ocean governance
Does Functional Connectivity Explain?
Full text linkMany successful explanations show how causally individuated parts are responsible for the occurrence of the phenomena that scientists seek to explain. On this view, parts that are chosen only by convention, and related only through correlations, cannot possibly figure in successful explanations. This is because without some form of causal grounding, it seems unintelligible why any explanatory relation between these parts and the phenomenon of interest would hold. This problem is particularly pronounced in functional connectivity models (FC) in neuroscience. These models typically represent time series of recurrent neural activity in conventionally determined spatial regions (as a network’s nodes) and synchronization likelihoods among these time series (as its edges). Many neuroscientists and philosophers maintain that because of this, FC models cannot provide explanations. We formulate this problem more precisely and then show that it rests on an impoverished interpretation of scientific models in general and FC models in particular. We then provide a positive account of how FC models provide a variety of neuroscientific explanations