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Many Retrocausal Worlds: A Foundation for Quantum Probability
Full text linkRecent accounts of probability in the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics are vulnerable due to their dependence on probability theory per se. For this reason, the many worlds interpretation continues to suffer from the incoherence and quantitative problems. After discussing various theories of probability, I discuss the incoherence problem and argue that self-locating probabilities centered in time-extended worlds can solve it. I then discuss and refute various solutions to the quantitative problem. I argue that the only tenable way to ground these self-locating probabilities is to identify the mathematical form of the Born rule as a generic pattern in a time-extended wavefunction, and to distribute degrees of belief over the region of wavefunction occupied by this pattern. I then outline a time-symmetric version of quantum mechanics - the Fixed Point Formulation - which, interpreted within a time-symmetric Everettian framework, can provide the foundation for a theory of quantum probability
AI assistants in the archive and the lure of ‘instant history’
Full text linkAI assistants are increasingly used for navigating and analysing the contents of major archives. Applying Retrieval Augmented Generation to existing large language models, these tools draw on indexes of the relevant archives to answer, in natural language, users’ questions. In addition to being powerful finding aids, archival AI assistants are also presented as being capable of providing useful, automated answers to questions about the past. This article argues that such tools and how they are marketed result in major conceptual disruptions and uncertainties, placing pressure on our understanding of a range of roles, forms of information, and outputs involved in the production of historical knowledge. In particular, we argue that these tools may obscure well-established beliefs that ‘sources’ and ‘archives’ are not unmediated, clearly navigable, or necessarily comprehensive, and that the processes by which these are used to write ‘history’ are by no means straightforward or instantaneous. With the aim of mitigating these misunderstandings, the article makes suggestions for how deployers could more carefully frame and describe the intended use of archival AI assistants (especially for public users), to ensure that their benefits for accessibility are exploited while also avoiding misconceptions and safeguarding rigorous historical practice
Neural Hardware for the Language of Thought: New Rules for an Old Game
Full text linkThe Language of Thought (LOT) hypothesis posits that at least some important cognitive processes involve language-like representations. These representations must be processed by appropriate hardware. Since the organ of biological cognition is the nervous system, whether biological cognition relies on a LOT depends on how neural hardware works. I distinguish between different versions of LOT, articulate their hardware requirements, and consider which versions of LOT are supported by empirical evidence. I argue that the Classical LOT hypothesis (Fodor 1975) is ruled out; the version of LOT that is best supported by empirical evidence is the Nonclassical LOT thesis that some neural representations mirror some of the structure of natural language and represent in a language-like way, yet they encode information nondigitally and are processed by ordinary (nondigital, and hence Nonclassical) neural computations that rely not only on syntactic structure but many other features
A not-too-simple solution to Goodman's new riddle of induction in the age of AI
Full text linkI review the works of Gärdenfors (1990) and Scorzato (2013) and show that their combination provides an elegant solution of Goodman's new riddle of induction. The solution is based on two main ideas: (1) clarifying what is expected from a solution: understanding that philosophy of science is a science itself, with the same limitations and strengths as other scientific disciplines; (2) understanding that the concept of complexity of a model's assumptions and the concept of direct measurements must be characterized together. Although both measurements and complexity have been the subject of a vast literature, within the philosophy of science, essentially no other attempt has been made to combine them. The widespread expectation, among modern philosophers, that Goodman's new riddle cannot be solved is clearly not defensible without a serious exploration of such a natural approach. A clarification of this riddle has always been very important, but it has become even more crucial in the age of AI
Imperfection as a Constitutive Property of Artificial Intelligence
Full text linkArtificial intelligence (AI) is often framed as the pursuit of precision, efficiency,
and rationality. Yet human intelligence is marked by imperfection, errors, unpre-
dictability, and emotional nuance. This paper explores the paradox: as AI systems
increase in complexity, might they also begin to exhibit imperfection resem-
bling human cognition? I argue that imperfection should be reinterpreted as a
design principle rather than a flaw. Drawing on debates in bounded rational-
ity, explainability, and trust in AI Simon (1957); Mitchell (2019); Russell (2019),
I show how unpredictability and descriptive richness can serve as resources for
more socially aligned systems. Case illustrations from predictive policing and
healthcare highlight how excessive optimization can entrench bias and undermine
human judgment Lum and Isaac (2016); Topol (2019). Reframing imperfection
as a constitutive element of intelligence opens new pathways for ethical and
accountable AI. Rather than minimizing error at all costs, future AI design should
balance precision with human-like unpredictability, enabling systems that are
more adaptive, trustworthy, and socially embedded
Science and Democracy
Full text linkThe chapter explores the relationship between science and democracy and argues for the importance of engaging with a multiplicity of theories of democracy. It begins by discussing, in section two, traditional claims about the purported kinship between science and democracy, from simplistic conditional relationships to Dewey's more nuanced understanding grounded in a shared epistemic attitude. Section three moves on to contemporary accounts of science’s role in democracies which are predominantly based on liberal political theories. From this perspective, the importance of science’s independence from political interference, combined with a responsibility to respect public values or principles of justice, can be supported with good reason, as explored in section four. Finally, section five engages with critiques of liberal democratic theory, particularly from non-ideal and agonistic perspectives, to reflect on the limitations of two kinds of idealized assumptions in discussions of the science-democracy relation: the focus on autonomous individuals and the aspiration of establishing a non-political common ground or consensus through science. This shows that the question of the role of science in democratic politics cannot be discussed separately from the question how to understand democracy
The Philosophical Prospects of Large Language Models in the Future of Mathematics
Full text linkIn this article, we examine the philosophical implications Large Language Models might have on mathematical practice in the near future. Some prominent researchers argue that Large Language Models will soon have the ability to generate or check proofs, lifting a great burden of human mathematicians.
We claim, however, that the implementation of LLM technologies in mathematics is not merely a neutral tool that assists mathematicians to continue on as before, but instead entails a radical change to the practices of mathematics with important philosophical implications.
We will argue that we cannot be confident such tools will continue to work as expected, even if they become arbitrarily more reliable than they currently are, and that the kind of justification we get from LLM-generated proofs can never be properly mathematical. We will evaluate solutions to this problem involving either computer verification or human checking and argue that these cannot fix the philosophical gap to give us proper mathematical justification
An Extendible Spacetime Without Closed Timelike Curves Whose Every Extension Contains Closed Timelike Curves
Full text linkBy removing a fractal from time-rolled Minkowski spacetime, we construct an extendible spacetime without closed timelike curves whose every extension contains closed timelike curves. This settles a question posed by Geroch (1970)
Intertheoretical relationships based on three-model framework
Full text linkIntertheoretical relationships have been traditionally investigated through the notions of reduction and emergence. Recently, the focus has shifted towards the relationship between models for elaborating intertheoretical relationships in physics. This article demonstrates that three, rather than two, types of models are essential for elucidating some intertheoretical relationships. Beyond the conventional higher- and lower-level models, an intermediate-level model is crucial for establishing connections between the theories. This framework is not only applicable to some practical cases but also effectively captures the characteristics of two significant intertheoretical relationships: between classical and quantum mechanics, and between thermodynamics and statistical mechanics. By applying this framework to these cases, this study highlights both the similarity and the difference in these intertheoretical relationships
Failure in Practice and Dialectic in Theory: More Value, Context, Relativity and Plurality in Science
Full text linkIn this paper I point to different features and cases of scientific inquiry that suggest the relevance of a broad pattern of negativism. I have noted the role in categories of description and more normative epistemic and methodological standards across different sciences. Finally, I have focused on causal description and reasoning and identified and examined important implications. The relational character of this dialectical pattern at work, synchronic and diachronic, and the cognitive, methodological and practical values it provides renders the picture not just plural, in a descriptive sense, but also pluralistic. This is contextual and integrated; in the case of scientific change, it is not the simple global dialectics of Popperian conjectures and refutations or Kuhnian paradigms and revolutions. The picture I provide for appreciating much scientific practice is one of contextual, synthetic pluralism that has been missed. Additional empirical examination can shed some light on the details of specific cases and their various forms of contributing to scientific change without substituting for a contextual account a monolithic Hegelian caricature