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Deriving the Geodesic Principle
Get PDFIn the recent philosophy literature, there have been several attempts to use the seminal result by Geroch and Jang (1975) to precisify Harvey Brown’s claim that the geodesic principle can be recovered as a theorem in General Relativity, and then to critique it. We contend that the philosophical debate has unfolded in a curious way: even though Geroch and Jang’s paper contains two distinct approaches to the problem of geodesic motion, the philosophical literature has focused on only one of them. We then argue that the neglected approach offers an alternative—and more physical—set of resources to explain geodesic motion. Motivated by this approach, we prove a new “physical Geroch-Jang theorem,” which provides a scale-relative interpretation of the geodesic principle in General Relativity. We, thereby, make new resources available to re-evaluate Brown’s arguments as well as those of his critics
Drug-Centered or Drug-Assisted? Epistemic Perspectives and Methodological Tensions in Psychedelic Psychotherapy
Get PDFThis paper distinguishes the drug-centered view of psychedelics (DCP) and the drug-assisted view of psychedelics (DAP). While these approaches differ conceptually, both rely on the methodology of evidence-based medicine, using randomized controlled trials to validate therapeutic efficacy. Using MDMA-assisted psychotherapy as a case study of DAP, we reconstruct the causal reasoning underlying its proposed therapeutic effects, identify two key causal assumptions, and critically examine them. Our analysis shows that the DAP community’s reliance on evidence-based medicine is not merely methodological, but also reflects questionable epistemological assumptions inherited from the empirically supported therapy tradition. We conclude by proposing value-based practice as a complementary methodology better suited to the relational and value-laden dimensions of DAP
The Rise and Fall of a Myth about British Emergentism
Get PDFWhile emergentism enjoys some good fortune in contemporary philosophy, attempts at elucidating the history of this view are rare. Among such attempts, by far the most influential certainly is McLaughlin’s landmark paper “The Rise and Fall of British Emergentism” (1992). While McLaughlin’s analysis of the recent history of emergentism is insightful and instructive in its own ways, in the present paper we offer reasons to be suspicious of some of its central claims. In particular, we advance evidence that rebuts McLaughlin’s contention that British Emergentism did not fall in the 1920–1930s because of philosophical criticism but rather because of an alleged empirical inconsistency with fledgling quantum mechanics
Revised version of The Born-Oppenheimer Approximations and the Reduction of Chemistry
Get PDFThe article sets out to clarify a number of confusions that exist in connection with the Born-Oppenheimer approximation (BOA). It is generally claimed that chemistry cannot be reduced to quantum mechanics because of the nature of this commonly used approximation in quantum chemistry, that is popularly believed to require a ‘clamping’ of the nuclei. It is also claimed that the notion of molecular structure, which is so central to chemistry, cannot be recovered from the quantum mechanical description of molecules and that it must be imposed by hand through the BOA. Such an alleged failure of reduction is then taken to open the door to concepts such as emergence and downward causation.
Another mistaken view is that chemists have no choice but to use the BOA whereas there is an entire sub-discipline which involves non-Born Oppenheimer calculations, and which regularly and successfully calculates many chemical and biochemical properties of molecules. Yet another misconception, according to the present author, is the view that the application of the BOA represents a violation of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle.
Many of the claims made in the philosophy of chemistry community are based on the highly technical papers of authors such as Sutcliffe and Wooley, many of which date from about 50 years ago. While these authors remained skeptical of the possibility of recovering molecular structure from quantum mechanics, others
maintained that it would eventually possible to do so. Significant progress has now been made in this direction. For example, whereas it is claimed that the full, or Coulombic Hamiltonian, for a molecule precludes the existence of molecular dipoles, some recent calculations have succeeded in obtaining the exact value of dipole moment of the LiH molecule.
Even more significantly, a group in Norway has now succeeded in recovering the structure of the D3+ molecule in a completely ab initio manner without applying the BOA, but through the use of a Monte Carlo approach
Revised version of "A Brief Response to Seifert on Laws in Chemistry"
Get PDFAbstract. In this brief article I respond to Seifert’s recent views on the periodic law and the periodic table in connection with the views of philosophers regarding laws of nature. I argue that the author makes some factual as well as conceptual errors which are in conflict with some generally held views regarding the periodic law and the periodic table
On Reissner’s hypothesis: A review of 20th Century relational models for the unification of gravity and inertia
Get PDFThis paper revisits a largely overlooked line of thought originating with Reissner’s 1915 proposal: that gravity may be a necessary consequence of the relativity of inertia. We survey a range of historical models developed throughout the 20th Century that attempt to unify gravity and inertia by deriving the two in unison. While the unification of gravity and inertia is primarily recognized within the framework of Einstein’s general relativity, we show that several lesser-known and largely classical models go further by attempting to explain this equivalence, thereby aiming at a deeper unification. Our analysis distinguishes four classes of models and argues that those incorporating internal particle motion—especially Cook’s quantum-mechanical approach—offer the most comprehensive account of this unification. Cook’s model, which derives gravitational attraction from the quantum zitterbewegung of elementary particles, suggests a direct link between gravity, inertia, special relativity, and quantum mechanics. By systematically comparing these approaches, we revive a promising and under-explored avenue toward a dynamical explanation of gravity and inertia, combining the physics of the largest and smallest scales in nature: of cosmology and the quantum properties of elementary matter
Spacetime Models for Cosmology
Get PDFI revisit Roberto Torretti's "Spacetime Models for the World" [SHPMP 31 (2):171-186 (2000)] in the light of more recent work in (philosophy of) cosmology. I discuss the motivations for FLRW spacetimes as a natural starting point for inquiry, and I suggest contemporary cosmologists can avoid the rationalism that Torretti attributes to Einstein's early work in relativistic cosmology. I then discuss the senses in which FLRW models are idealized, and I show how those idealizations (and partial de-idealizations) have contributed to our understanding of the universe
Agential Epistemic Injustice in Clinical Interactions Is Bad for Medicine
Get PDFIn interactions characterized by agential epistemic injustice, the interpreter avoids engaging with the speaker’s perspective and challenges or distorts the speaker’s contribution before taking time to explore it. Where the success of the interaction depends on a genuine knowledge exchange between interpreters and speakers, epistemic injustice compromises the success of the interaction. Building on recent qualitative work on communication in youth mental health, I argue that clinical interactions are less likely to achieve their aims when practitioners fail to engage with the perspective of the person seeking support, and challenge or distort the person’s contribution before taking time to explore it
Naturalizing Free Will: Emergent Autonomy as Life's Tapestry
Get PDFThis paper naturalizes free will as emergent autonomy arising from biological organization and inherent indeterminacy. Critiquing classical determinism based on physical/informational limits (finite information vs. real numbers) and the distinction between creative and geometric time, we propose libertarian free will grounded in potentiality realism. Autonomy emerges from the interplay of organizational closure (self-maintenance), non-equilibrium thermodynamics, and the harnessing of ontic indeterminacy (objective potentialities) within the flow of creative time (duration). This framework synthesizes insights from systems biology, physics, and process philosophy. We outline the philosophical basis (emergence, potentiality realism), scientific principles (thermodynamics, dynamics in creative time), biological realization (minimal agency, materiality), and a model of choice involving downward constraint and emergent sourcehood. The paper addresses neural implementation, reinterprets Libet-style findings, and defends against standard objections (luck, manipulation, exclusion). It offers a coherent, empirically-grounded research program for understanding freedom as a natural phenomenon rooted in life's unique organization unfolding in creative time. (200 words
The direction of time in Bohmian mechanics
Get PDFIn this paper, we investigate the treatment of the direction of time in Bohmian mechanics. We show how Bohmian mechanics can account for the direction of time in different ways. In particular, we argue that Bohmian mechanics can be employed to accommodate reductionism, because there always is an asymmetry in the initial conditions when forward and backward evolutions of the configuration of matter are compared. It can also be employed to accommodate primitivism and relationalism due to the fact that Bohmian mechanics is a first order theory that recognizes only position as a primitive physical magnitude. We show how this fact can be employed to support a primitive direction of time by assuming Leibnizian relationalism, which reduces the direction of time to change in the configuration of matter with that change being directed as a primitive matter of fact