14065 research outputs found
Sort by
Testing for consciousness beyond consensus cases
Get PDFThis chapter addresses the development of tests for consciousness (C-tests), defined as any protocol or methodology devised to detect specific properties that, if present, would justify higher credence in the belief that the system under test is phenomenally conscious. Though inherently defeasible, C-tests are vital for reducing epistemic uncertainty, balancing ethical and practical considerations regarding the attribution of consciousness to systems like patients with disorders of consciousness, non-human animals, and artificial systems. In this chapter, we first present a taxonomy of current available C-tests, describing how they rely on specific neural and/or psychological properties to reduce uncertainty about the presence of consciousness in various target systems. Second, we clarify the notion of phenomenal consciousness as the target of C-tests, delineating the limits of C-tests in being able to capture it. Third, we address the question of whether a well-established theory of consciousness and/or pre-theoretical intuitions are necessary for validation of C-tests. Fourth, we evaluate several inferential strategies to justify extrapolations of consciousness from consensus to non-consensus cases. Finally, we conclude by describing the iterative natural kind approach as a multidimensional method that integrates multiple tests with weighted evidence. This model would provide probabilistic assessments of consciousness across different populations, offering a more reliable framework for addressing non-consensus cases and providing a valuable aid for practical decision-making
The Relationship Between Lagrangian and Hamiltonian Mechanics: The Irregular Case
Get PDFLagrangian and Hamiltonian mechanics are widely held to be two distinct but equivalent ways of formulating classical theories. Barrett (2019) makes this intuition precise by showing that under a certain characterisation of their structure, the two theories are categorically equivalent. However, Barrett only shows equivalence between “hyperregular” models of Lagrangian and Hamiltonian mechanics. While hyperregularity characterises a large class of theories, it does not characterise the class of gauge theories. In this paper, I consider whether one can extend Barrett’s results to show that Lagrangian and Hamiltonian formulations of gauge theories are equivalent. I argue that there is a precise sense in which one can, and I illustrate that exploring this question highlights several interesting questions about the way that one can construct models of Hamiltonian mechanics from models of Lagrangian mechanics and vice versa, about the role that constraints play, as well as the definition and interpretation of gauge transformations
The Puzzle of Scientific Disagreement
Get PDFScientists often find themselves in disagreement with their peers, yet continue to hold fast to their views. While Conciliationism, a prominent position in the epistemology of disagreement, condemns such steadfastness as epistemically irrational, philosophers of science often defend it as rationally permissible —- indeed, even beneficial for scientific progress. This tension gives rise to what we call the puzzle of scientific disagreement
Put it to the Test: Getting Serious about Explanation in Explainable Artificial Intelligence
Get PDFArtificial Intelligence (AI) has become a topic of major interest to philosophers of science. Among the issues commonly discussed is AI’s opacity. To remedy opacity,
scientists have provided methods commonly subsumed under the label ‘eXplaibable Artificial Intelligence’ (XAI) that aim to make AI and its outputs ‘interpretable’ and ‘explainable’. However, there is little interaction between developments in XAI and philosophical debates on scientific explanation. We here improve on this situation and argue for a descriptive and a normative thesis: (i) When suitably embedded into scientific research processes, XAI methods’ outputs can facilitate genuine scientific understanding. (ii) In order for XAI outputs to fulfill this function, they should be made testable. We will support our theses by building on recent and long-standing ideas from philosophy of science, by comparing them to a recent framework from
the XAI community, and by showcasing their applicability to case studies from the life sciences
Projection-Based Semantics of Universal Theory of Differentiation
Get PDFWe introduce a projection-based semantic interpretation of differentiation within the Universal Theory of Differentiation (UTD), reframing acts of distinction as structured projections of relational patterns. Building on UTD’s categorical and topos-theoretic foundations, we extend the formalism with a recursive theory of differentiational convergence. We define Stable Differentiational Identities (SDIs) as the terminal forms of recursive differentiation, prove their uniqueness and hierarchical organization, and derive a transparency theorem showing that systems capable of stable recursion can reflect upon their own structure. These results support an ontological model in which complexity, identity, and semantic expressibility emerge from structured difference. Applications span logic, semantics, quantum mechanics, and machine learning, with experiments validating the structural and computational power of the framework
The Centrality of Progressive Realism to the Scientific Realism Debate
Get PDFWe report new findings from an empirical study of scientists from seven disciplines and scholars working in history and philosophy of science (HPS) regarding their views about scientific realism. We found that researchers’ general disposition to endorse or reject realism was better predicted by their views regarding scientific progress than their views about the mindindependence of scientific phenomena or other common theses in the realism debate. Age and gender also significantly predicted endorsement of scientific realism. Implications of these findings for philosophical debates about scientific realism and scientific progress are considered
Many Discrete Worlds
Get PDFWe present the case for a fixed, finite number of discrete, non-interacting, spatiotemporally finite, decohered spacetimes emerging from Everett’s Universal Wave Function, which we refer to as “Many Discrete Worlds” (MDW). No universes “split” in MDW. We argue that a Many Worlds Interpretation (MWI) branching structure that emerges after decoherence is equivalent to individual, weighted universes, each of which is divided into an immense number of discrete, identical copies, the number being proportional to the individual weighting. This ensures that repeated experiments within any such universe will demonstrate consistency with the Born rule. Each of these universes should be considered as complete, containing every decohered outcome over the entire extent of its spacetime, including every event/interaction occurring beyond any cosmological particle horizon for the entire duration of the given universe. We show that a countably infinite number of interactions needs an uncountably infinite number of universes, and show why measures such as the Lebesgue measure will fail in that case, with the result that the Born rule would not be demonstrable. This leads to the conclusion that the number of universes in the multiverse must be finite and, as a surprising corollary, that the universes themselves are finite, both in space and duration
Character Trouble in Times of Metascientific Trouble
Get PDFIn this critical response to John Doris's book "Character Trouble: Undisciplined Essays on Moral Agency and Personality," I analyze his updated take on character skepticism—the view that character traits have surprisingly limited influence on behavior across diverse situations—from a philosophy of science perspective. While I find his updated view compelling, I challenge his reliance on Cohen's conventional effect size benchmarks, arguing that qualitative labels for effect sizes obscure rather than clarify the practical significance of results. I propose that Doris's strongest argument lies in what I call the "disproportion thesis"—the view that personality variables exert less influence, and situational variables more influence, on behavior than our intuitive expectations would predict, creating a disconcerting gap. However, I argue that this thesis requires a more explicit quantification of those prior expectations. I conclude that character skepticism would benefit from formulations of its insights in a way that directly addresses character theorists' empirical commitments, avoiding vague benchmarks and contextualizing effects
On the unfairness of the “fair-share principle” for health research
Get PDFHow ought scarce health research resources be allocated, where health research spans “basic”, translational, clinical, health systems and public health research? In this paper I first outline a previously suggested answer to this question: the “fair-share principle” stipulates that total health research funding ought to be allocated in direct proportion with suffering caused by each disease. Second, I highlight a variety of problems the fair-share principle faces. The principle is inattentive to problems of aggregation and distribution of harms incurred from disease and benefits accrued from research, and neglects considerations of cost-effectiveness. Moreover, the principle fails to recognise that using Global Burden of Disease Study estimates as proxies for “suffering” underdetermines health research resource allocation. Importantly, in drawing on these estimates, which are disease-centric and only take “proximal” causes of health loss into account, the fair-share principle disregards the social determinants of health. Along with them, the principle ignores public health research, which often focusses on “distal” causes of health loss to improve population health and reduce health inequalities. Following the principle therefore leads to inequitable priority-setting. I conclude that despite relatively widespread appeals to it, the fair-share principle is not an ideal to aim for during priority-setting
Consciousness Defies Functionalism in Many Worlds
Get PDFThis paper argues that functionalism, a dominant theory in philosophy of mind, fails to adequately explain the emergence of conscious experience within the Everettian (Many-Worlds) interpretation of quantum mechanics. While the universal wavefunction contains many possible ways of decomposition, functionalism cannot account for why consciousness appears only in decohered, classical-like branches and not in other parts of the wavefunction that are equally real. This limitation holds even if those other parts do not instantiate complex functional structure. We argue that consciousness, as it is observed in many worlds, defies the predictions and explanatory resources of functionalism. Therefore, functionalism must be supplemented or replaced in order to account for the observed phenomenology