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The History of Hilbert-Space Formulations of Classical Physics
Full text linkHilbert-space techniques are widely used not only for quantum theory, but also for classical physics. Two important examples are the Koopman-von Neumann (KvN) formulation and the method of “classical” wave functions. As this paper explains, these two approaches are conceptually distinct. In particular, the method of classical wave functions was not due to Bernard Koopman and John von Neumann, but was developed independently by a number of later researchers, perhaps first by Mario Schönberg, with key contributions from Angelo Loinger, Giacomo Della Riccia, Norbert Wiener, and E. C. George Sudarshan. The primary goals of this paper are to explain these two approaches, describe the relevant history in detail, and give credit where credit is due
Self and Other in Schizophrenia: A Structural Analysis of Delusion
Full text linkThis article draws from phenomenological authors such as Sartre to investigate pathogenetic issues in psychopathology from a first-person perspective. Psychosis is a “total experience” that points to orientating changes in subjectivity, supported by evidence regarding self-disorders in the schizophrenia spectrum. This article proposes that schizophrenia is essentially characterized (and therefore distinguished) by specific structural alterations of (inter)subjectivity around the relationship between self and Other, which all its seemingly disparate signs and symptoms eventually point to. Two reciprocal distortions are present in psychotic schizophrenia patients: (A) an encroaching and substantialized Other, and (B) a self transformed into being-for-the-Other. Under the altered conditions of (A & B), delusional mood is the presence but inaccessibility of the Other; a delusional perception is an eruption or surfacing of objectification of self by Other; a delusion is an experience of the Other, which fulfills certainty, incorrigibility, and potentially falsehood. Theoretical arguments show how (A & B) leads to delusions as meeting Jaspers’ criteria, and clinical examples throughout show the phenomenological accuracy of the theory
Multi-field as a Determinable
Full text linkThe paper advances the hypothesis that the multi-field is a determinable, that is, a physical object characterized by indeterminate values with respect to some properties. The multi-field is a realist interpretation of the wave function in quantum mechanics, specifically it interprets the wave function as a new physical entity in three-dimensional space: a “multi-field” (Hubert & Romano 2018; Romano 2021). The multi-field is similar to a field as it assigns determinate values to N-tuples of points, but is also different from a field as it does not assign pre-existing values at each point of three-dimensional space. In particular, the multi-field values corresponding to the empty points (points where no particles are located) have indeterminate values until a particle is located at those points. The paper suggests that the multi-field so defined can be precisely characterized in terms of determinable-based, object-level, account of metaphysical indeterminacy. Under this view, the multi-field as novel physical entity is, in fact, a metaphysically indeterminate quantum object, that is, a determinable
Three grades of subject-dependency in object perception
Full text linkIn this paper, we argue that a perceiver’s contributions to perception can substantially affect what objects are represented in perceptual experience. To capture the scalar nature of these perceiver-contingent contributions, we introduce three grades of subject-dependency in object perception. The first grade, “weak subject-dependency,” concerns attentional changes to perceptual content like, for instance, when a perceiver turns their head, plugs their ears, or primes their attention to a particular cue. The second grade, “moderate subject-dependency,” concerns changes in the contingent features of perceptual objects due to action-orientation, location, and agential interest. For instance, being to the right or left of an object will cause the object to have a corresponding locative feature, but that feature is non-essential to the object in question. Finally, the third grade, “strong subject-dependency,” concerns generating perceptual objects whose existence depends upon their perceivers’ sensory contributions to perception. For this final grade of subject-dependency the adaptive perceptual system shapes diverse representations of sensory information by contributing necessary features to perceptual objects. To exemplify this nonstandard form of object perception we offer evidence from the future-directed anticipation of perceptual experts, and from the feature binding of synesthetes. We conclude that strongly subject-dependent perceptual objects are more than mere material objects, but are rather a necessary combination of material objects with the contributions of a perceiving subject
An "Absolute" Type of Logic
Full text linkThis paper proposes an alternative to standard first-order logic that seeks greater naturalness, generality, and semantic self-containment. The system removes the first-order restriction, avoids type hierarchies, and dispenses with external structures, making the meaning of expressions depend solely on their constituent symbols. Terms and formulas are unified into a single notion of expression, with set-builder notation integrated as a primitive construct. Connectives and quantifiers are treated as operators among others rather than as privileged primitives. The deductive framework is minimal and intuitive, with soundness and consistency established and completeness examined. While computability requirements may limit universality, the system offers a unified and potentially more faithful model of human mathematical deduction, providing an alternative foundation for formal reasoning
The Logic of Causal Models
Full text linkWhile causal models are introduced very much like a formal logical system, they have not yet been taken to the level of a proper logic of causal reasoning with structural equations. In this paper, we furnish causal models with a distinct deductive system and a corresponding model-theoretic semantics. Interventionist conditionals will be defined in terms of inferential relations in this logic of causal models
Prediction and discovery in the search for chemical elements
Full text linkIt has become increasingly difficult to discover new chemical elements. Whether this is because science approaches the endpoint of this endeavour or because of experimental limitations, this difficulty affects how we conceive two central concepts: element discovery and the periodic table’s predictive power. First, I argue that the concept of element discovery has undergone a shift and that latest attempts to offer specific criteria for an element’s discovery have rendered the concept flexible and fluid. Secondly, I argue that the way in which scientists try to discover elements beyond atomic number 118 shows that the periodic table no longer possesses the predictive power that is standardly associated with it. Therefore, we should construe differently what it means for the table to be predictively powerful
The Propensity Approach to Quantum Systems
Full text linkThe purpose of this paper is to revisit a neglected understanding of quantum mechanics, the so-called propensity theory and to propose a amended version of it. According to this version, the causal-structural approach adopted here, a quantum system has a physical structure, consisting of relata (components, say electrons) and relations (determining the interrelations between the components). This structure is mathematically encoded in wave functions and forms the base, on which propensities supervene. This paper proposes that propensities or intrinsic dispositions supervene on the structural properties of the system. A propensity is a disposition of a quantum system to display selective aspects in response to an encounter with a measurement situation. The selective propensities manifest themselves as probabilities, in accordance with the application of the Born rule to respective wave functions
Preregistration does not improve the transparent evaluation of severity in Popper’s philosophy of science or when deviations are allowed
Full text linkOne justification for preregistering research hypotheses, methods, and analyses is that it improves the transparent evaluation of the severity of hypothesis tests. In this article, I consider two cases in which preregistration does not improve this evaluation. First, I argue that, although preregistration may facilitate the transparent evaluation of severity in Mayo’s error statistical philosophy of science, it does not facilitate this evaluation in Popper’s theory-centric approach. To illustrate, I show that associated concerns about Type I error rate inflation are only relevant in the error statistical approach and not in a theory-centric approach. Second, I argue that a test procedure that is preregistered but that also allows deviations in its implementation (i.e., “a plan, not a prison”) does not provide a more transparent evaluation of Mayoian severity than a non-preregistered procedure. In particular, I argue that sample-based validity-enhancing deviations cause an unknown inflation of the test procedure’s Type I error rate and, consequently, an unknown reduction in its capability to license inferences severely. I conclude that preregistration does not improve the transparent evaluation of severity (a) in Popper’s philosophy of science or (b) in Mayo’s approach when deviations are allowed