14065 research outputs found
Sort by
Kuhnian History of Science and the “Great Man” of Science Model
Get PDFI argue that forays into history of science in Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962/1996) are by and large instances of “Great Man” history of science. “Great Man” history is the idea that history is the biography of great men. The “Great Man” of science model not only excludes women and people of color from science but also suggests that only special, exceptional people can succeed in science. If this is correct, then Kuhn (1962/1996) fails to usher in a “historiographic revolution in the study of science” or a “new historiography” (Kuhn 1962/1996, 3), as the book purports to do. Instead, it merely perpetuates the defunct historiography of the “Great Man” of science
Explanatory essentialism and cryptic species
Get PDFExplanatory Essentialism (EE) is the view that a property is the essence of a kind because it causally explains the many properties that instances of that kind exhibit. This paper examines an application of EE to biological species, which I call Biological Explanatory Essentialism (BEE). BEE states that a particular biological origin is the essence of a species on the grounds that it causes certain organisms to display the group of properties the species is associated with. Evaluating BEE is important, as it offers a novel argument for biological essentialism—the contentious claim that biological species have essences. This paper critically assesses the empirical foundations of BEE, focusing on the presupposition that a single biological origin causes the many properties associated with the species in question. By discussing a case of cryptic species among five-toed jerboas within the Scarturus elater species complex, I challenge that presupposition, thereby arguing that cryptic species present a serious obstacle to BEE. I conclude that BEE fails to support biological essentialism and suggest that essentialist philosophers reconsider the role of causal-explanatory factors in accounting for the purported essences of biological species. These philosophers may need to explore alternatives beyond such factors, one of which I briefly outline
Global Gauge Symmetries and Spatial Asymptotic Boundary Conditions in Yang-Mills theory
Get PDFIn Yang-Mills gauge theory on a Euclidean Cauchy surface the group of gauge symmetries carrying direct empirical significance is often believed to be the quotient of the group of boundary-preserving gauge symmetries by its subgroup of transformations that are generated by the constraints of the theory. These groups are identified respectively as the gauge transformations that become constant asymptotically and those that become the identity asymptotically. In the Abelian case G=U(1) the quotient is then identified as the group of global gauge symmetries, i.e. U(1) itself. However, known derivations of this claim are imprecise, both mathematically and conceptually. We derive the physical gauge group rigorously for both Abelian and non-Abelian gauge theory. Our main new point is that the requirement to restrict to the group of asymptotically constant gauge transformations does not follow from finiteness of energy only, but from the requirement that the Lagrangian of Yang-Mills theory be defined on a tangent bundle to configuration space. Moreover, we explain why the quotient consists precisely of a copy of the global gauge group for every homotopy class, even if the various gauge transformations apparently have different asymptotic rates of convergence. Lastly, we consider Yang-Mills-Higgs theory in our framework and show that asymptotic boundary conditions differ in the unbroken and broken phases
How is a relational formal ontology relational? An exploration of the semiotic logic of agency in physics, mathematics, and natural philosophy
Get PDFA speculative exploration of the distinction between a relational formal ontology and a classical formal ontology for modelling phenomena in nature that exhibit relationally-mediated wholism, such as phenomena from quantum physics and biosemiotics. Whereas a classical formal ontology is based on mathematical objects and classes, a relational formal ontology is based on mathematical signs and categories. A relational formal ontology involves nodal networks (systems of constrained iterative processes) that are dynamically sustained through signalling. The nodal networks are hierarchically ordered and exhibit characteristics of deep learning. Clarifying the distinction between classical and relational formal ontologies may help to clarify the role of interpretative context in physics (eg. the role of the observer in quantum theory) and the role of hierarchical nodal networks in computational models of learning processes in generative AI
A Soft Landing into the Singularity: Mediated Control through AGI-Produced Algorithmic Solutions
Get PDFThis paper examines the tension between the growing algorithmic control in safety-critical societal contexts—motivated by human cognitive fallibility—and the rise of probabilistic types of AI, primarily in the form of Large Language Models (LLMs). Although both human cognition and LLMs exhibit inherent uncertainty and occasional unreliability, some futurist visions of the "Singularity" paradoxically advocate relinquishing control of the main societal processes--including critical ones--to these probabilistic AI agents, heightening the risks of a resulting unpredictable or “whimsical” governance. As an alternative, a "mediated control" framework is proposed here: a more prudent alternative wherein LLM-AGIs are strategically employed as "meta-programmers" to design sophisticated--but fundamentally deterministic--algorithms and procedures, or, in general, powerful rule-based solutions. It is these algorithms or procedures, executed on classical computing infrastructure and under human oversight, the systems to be deployed--based on human deliberative decision processes--as the actual controllers of critical systems and processes. This constitutes a way to harness AGI creativity for algorithmic innovation while maintaining essential reliability, predictability, and human accountability of the processes controlled by the algorithms so produced. The framework emphasizes a division of labor between the LLM-AGI and the algorithms it devises, a rigorous verification and validation protocols as conditions for safe algorithm generation, and a mediated application of the algorithms. Such an approach is not a guaranteed solution to the challenges of advanced AI, but--it is argued--it offers a more human-aligned, risk-mitigated, and ultimately more beneficial path towards integrating AGI into societal governance, possibly leading to a safer future, while preserving essential domains of human freedom and agency
Networks, Dynamics and Explanation
Get PDFThis paper explores some issues having to do with the use of networks in scientific explanations. It focuses on the very common case in which what is of interest is the spread of some process (a disease, a neural signal etc.) along a network. In such cases, the use of a network in explanation requires the specification of a dynamics governing this process in addition to and independent of the network structure. Such a dynamics will incorporate causal information. This is one of several reasons why it is a mistake to think of network explanations, at least in typical applications, as entirely non-causal. In addition the independence of the network structure and the dynamics of the process occuring on it provides the key to the "directional" features of such explanations. Other topics discussed include the circumstances in which use of networks is most likely to be fruitful and the interpretation of edges in undirected networks as encoding information about constraint relations
Ontomorphic Peircean Calculus: A Universal Mathematical Framework for Identity, Logic, and Semantic Computation
Get PDFThis paper introduces the conceptual foundations of the Ontomorphic Peircean Calculus, a first-order formal system constructed from Charles Sanders Peirce’s triadic logic and recast in categorical, topological, and algebraic terms. Identity, inference, and modality are defined as consequences of recursive morphism closure over a non-metric symbolic manifold. Presence arises from symbolic saturation governed by the compression functional. This system unifies logic, physics, and ontology through symbolic recursion and curvature, replacing metric assumptions with recursive cost topology. All structures—identity, mass, time, causality—emerge from the self-coherence of morphic braids in a purely symbolic substrate, thereby replacing metric foundations with compression-curvature dynamics that computationally bridge the essential logical architecture of the theoretical and practical sciences simultaneously
Thomas Kuhn and the Causal Theory of Reference
Get PDFIt is typically held that Thomas Kuhn was committed to a descriptivist view of the meaning of theoretical terms, and that his most infamous thesis – incommensurability – was a consequence of this. The causal theory of reference supposedly rules out incommensurability by allowing the extension of a term, rather than merely the intension, to (at least partly) constitute the meaning of the term, thereby ensuring that part of the ‘meaning’ remains constant across theory changes. It is therefore surprising to find Kuhn endorsing aspects of the causal theory in several later essays while still maintaining the possibility of incommensurability. This paper will investigate how Kuhn understood both the causal theory and incommensurability, such that his endorsement of both was not the bald-faced contradiction it would be according to the standard reading. In fact, many of the affinities of Kuhn’s view with the causal theory are part of what make incommensurability possible, or so I will argue. More generally, I will suggest that Kuhn should be thought of as rejecting the very idea that the meaning of scientific terms is some aggregate of extension, and intension or sense
Segmenting Ontology
Get PDFOntological universalism is widespread, but this paper argues that the validity of many ontological
claims is bounded, and thus that segmented (though not fragmented) ontologies may represent the
world more accurately. To be more specific, it criticizes the work of Karen Barad, and of James
Ladyman and Don Ross. Both draw ontological conclusions from interpretations of quantum
mechanics and then attempt to universalize the reach of those conclusions. By contrast, the paper
adapts a loosely Bhaskarian critical realism to develop a segmented ontology. This identifies two
boundaries between three related but also substantially different ontological segments. At the
boundary between the quantum and material segments, quantum particles can become entangled
with larger systems in ways that provide determinate relative locations for material objects. This
enables the emergence of causal powers that depend on determinate spatial relations between the
parts of material objects. At the boundary between the material and social segments, mental
properties provide the possibility of human agents forming intentional relations and thus enable the
emergence of social causal powers. Regardless of the merits of this particular ontological scheme, I
argue that segmented ontologies are likely to fit better with the causal structure of our universe
The Pursuitworthienss of Experiments
Get PDFScientists decide to perform an experiment based on the expectation that their efforts will bear fruit. While assessing such expectations belongs to the everyday work of prac-ticing scientists, we have a limited understanding of the epistemological principles un-derlying such assessments. Here I argue that we should delineate a “context of pursuit” for experiments. The rational pursuit of experiments, like the pursuit of theories, is gov-erned by distinct epistemic and pragmatic considerations that concern epistemic gain, likelihood of success, and feasibility. A key question that arises is: what exactly is being evaluated when we assess experimental pursuits? I argue that, beyond the research questions an experiment aims to address, we must also assess the concrete experi-mental facilities and activities involved, because (1) there are often multiple ways to address a research question, (2) pursuitworthy experiments typically address a combi-nation of research questions, and (3) experimental pursuitworthiness can be boosted by past experimental successes. My claims are supported by a look into ongoing de-bates about future particle colliders