14065 research outputs found
Sort by
Timekeeping Beyond Human Whim: A Critical Analysis of Strong Conventionalism about Clocks
Get PDFConventional elements play an integral role in measuring time. Clocks unavoidably require a chosen standard of synchrony. The periodic process selected for the standard is not imposed upon us in any way. Conventionalism, in this regard, offers an insightful perspective on temporal measurement. The strong formulation of this doctrine is, however, questionable. After elaborating on strong
conventionalism, it will be argued that it has three downsides: (i) it fails to properly distinguish between highly stable natural processes and complete randomness, as periodicities differ in terms of regularity; (ii) it does not explain that a clock actually measures something, to wit, parts of its own path along its worldline in spacetime; (iii) and relatedly, it omits the distinction between a
temporal interval as a physical quantity and the arbitrarily chosen unit of time, leaving the distinction between temporal quantities and units a mystery
Category Theory as an Explanatory Foundation
Get PDFCan category theory be a foundation of mathematics? While category theory is taken to organize the body of mathematical knowledge and practice, its status as a foundational theory has been disputed. I argue that category theory can serve as a foundation of mathematics especially in an explanatory sense. The explanatory sense of foundation is both historically situated and philosophically motivated; I examine its historical uses by some of the pioneering figures as well as its theoretical ramifications across several philosophical topics. Then what makes category theory explanatory in the relevant sense? I argue that the explanatory nature of category theory can be understood as its capacity to offer abstract explanation. To support this, the case studies on mathematical explanation through Galois theory and category theory will be considered, which will be tied in with more traditional accounts of category theory’s foundational status. Thus, I argue that category theory’s foundational status can be supported through the lens of mathematical explanation, which demonstrates a successful interplay between the two traditions in philosophy of mathematics, i.e., the foundation-oriented tradition and the practice-oriented tradition
Towards a Better Understanding of the Electron’s Magnetic Moment: A Reply to Sanchioni
Get PDFIn this short article, I seek to clarify some of the broader motivations and ambitions guiding my work on electron spin. I respond to Sanchioni (Found. Phys. 55(67), 2025), who has criticized my recent study of the electron's anomalous magnetic moment (Sebens in Found. Phys. 55(48), 2025). I argue against viewing quantum field theory instrumentally as merely "an architecture of consistent predictions" and in favor of explaining physical phenomena using descriptions of what is actually out there in nature. I defend the importance of asking how the move from the Dirac equation (with self-interaction) to quantum field theory takes you from a variable to fixed magnetic moment, emphasizing my agreement with Sanchioni that the Dirac equation yields only a flawed model of the electron. I explain that quantum field theory, as it stands, is incomplete, and discuss how we might be able to arrive at a better explanation of the electron's anomalous magnetic moment
Categorification of Perspectives
Get PDFTo characterize scientific perspectivism as a realist stance, Massimi introduces her own notion of perspectival truth, which necessitates scientific theories or models from different perspectives being stitched together. Drawing on recent efforts to reify scientific theories using category theory, we propose adjunction as a formal mechanism whereby scientific theories interconnect across different perspectives. Finally, we argue that enriching perspectival realism with this foundational framework does not compromise the symmetry of scientific perspectives to which it adheres
Randomized experiments and causal inference: Randomization balances the impact of confounders in the statistical sense
Get PDFIn their recent defense of randomization, Martinez and Teira (2022) endorsed Worrall’s (2002; 2007) arguments that randomization does not assert the balance of confounding factors and delivered two other epistemic virtues of random assignment (efficiency balance and Fisherian balance). Worrall’s criticism claiming that randomization does not assert Millean balance shape the philosophical debates concerned with the role of randomization in causal inference and evidence hierarchies in medicine. We take issue with Worrall’s claim that randomization does not assert the balance of confounders. First, we argue that randomization balances the influence of confounders on an outcome in the statistical sense. Second, we analyze the potential outcome approach to causal inference and show that the average treatment effect (ATE) is an unbiased estimator of the average causal effect and observe that actual causal inferences rely on randomization balancing the impact of confounders
The Replication Crisis is Less of a "Crisis" in Lakatos' Philosophy of Science
Get PDFPopper’s (1983, 2002) philosophy of science has enjoyed something of a renaissance in the wake of the replication crisis, offering a philosophical basis for the ensuing science reform movement. However, adherence to Popper’s approach may also be at least partly responsible for the sense of “crisis” that has developed following multiple unexpected replication failures. In this article, I contrast Popper’s approach with that of Lakatos (1978) as well as with a related but problematic approach called naïve methodological falsificationism (NMF; Lakatos, 1978). The Popperian approach is powerful because it is based on logical refutations, but its theories are noncausal and, therefore, potentially lacking in scientific value. In contrast, the Lakatosian approach considers causal theories, but it concedes that these theories are not logically refutable. Finally, NMF represents a hybrid approach that subjects Lakatosian causal theories to Popperian logical refutations. However, its tactic of temporarily accepting a ceteris paribus clause during theory testing may be viewed as scientifically inappropriate, epistemically inconsistent, and “completely redundant” (Lakatos, 1978, p. 40). I conclude that the replication “crisis” makes the most sense in the context of the Popperian and NMF approaches because it is only in these two approaches that the failure to replicate a previously corroborated theory represents a logical refutation of that theory. In contrast, such replication failures are less problematic in the Lakatosian approach because they do not logically refute theories. Indeed, in the Lakatosian approach, replication failures can be temporarily ignored or used to motivate theory development
Ameliorating Epistemic Injustice with Digital Health Technologies
Get PDFThis chapter discusses the potential of digital phenotyping
to ameliorate epistemic injustice in mental health. Digital phenotyping,which analyses behavioural patterns from user datas or smart devices,shows promise in improving mental health care. Whilst concerns exist that it may exacerbate epistemic injustice by overshadowing individual experiences, the chapter presents a different viewpoint. Through a fictional case study, digital phenotyping is portrayed as aiding individuals seeking help by offering more accurate evidence and supporting shared decision making. The objection that digital technology overrides personal claimsis countered by arguing against absolute epistemic priority for any diag11
nostic tool in medicine. The chapter acknowledges the need for technological advancements and ethical considerations but maintains a positive outlook on the future of digital phenotyping in mental health care
Alternative cosmologies
Get PDFA few remarkable examples of alternative cosmological theories are shown, ranging from a compilation of variations on the Standard Model (inhomogeneous universe, Cold Big Bang, varying physical constants or gravity law, zero-active mass, Milne cosmology, cyclical models), through the more distant quasi-steady-state cosmology, plasma cosmology, or universe models as a hypersphere such as the Dynamic Universe, to the most exotic cases including static models with non-cosmological redshifts of galaxies.
Most cosmologists do not usually work within the framework of alternative cosmologies very different from the standard one because they feel that these are not at present as competitive as the standard model. It is true that they are not so developed, but that is because cosmologists do not work on them. This vicious circle is to a great extent due to a sociological phenomenon known as the ``snowball effect'', in which resources are distributed to the most successful theory at a given time; the effect acts as a potential in a field that attracts cosmologists, causing funds, research positions, prestige, telescope time, publication in top journals, citations, conferences, and other resources to be dedicated almost exclusively to standard cosmology
The extraterrestrial hypothesis: an epistemological case for removing the taboo
Get PDFThe extraterrestrial hypothesis (ETH), the hypothesis that an extraterrestrial civilization (ETC) is active on Earth today, is taboo in academia, but the assumptions behind this taboo are faulty. Advances in biology have rendered the notion that complex life is rare in our Galaxy improbable. The objection that no ETC would come to Earth to hide from us does not consider all possible alien motives or means. For an advanced ETC, the convergent instrumental goals of all rational agents – self-preservation and the acquisition of resources – would support the objectives of removing existential threats and gathering strategic and non-strategic information.
It could advance these objectives by proactively gathering information about and from inhabited planets, concealing itself while doing so, and terminating potential rivals before they become imminently dangerous. Other hypotheses of ETC behavior, including the zoo/interdict hypothesis and the dark forest hypothesis also undercut the claim that the ETH is highly improbable, and the ETH overturns none of
our well-tested scientific knowledge. It follows that evidence offered in its support need not be extraordinary. The fact that most reports of unidentified anomalous phenomena (UAP) have natural or human explanations does not count against the ETH. Inference to the best explanation offers a way to find evidence for the hypothesis
and some evidence exists, some of it taking the form of reliable witness reports. The most plausible alternative explanation for some UAP declines in probability over
time. A hypothesis that does not contradict well-established facts or theories, is not highly improbable for other reasons and explains otherwise unexplained evidence is
a rational hypothesis. Since the ETH meets this test, it should be evaluated alongside other possibilities when the case-specific evidence warrants it
Is the value-free ideal of science untenable? Part I: Inductive risk
Get PDFThe inductive risk argument challenges the value-free ideal of science by asserting that scientists should manage the inductive risks involved in scientific inference through social values, which consists in weighing the social implications of errors when setting evidential thresholds. Most of the previous analyses of the argument fall short of engaging directly with its core assumptions, and thereby offer limited criticisms. This paper critically examines the two key premises of the inductive risk argument: the thesis of epistemic insufficiency, which asserts that the internal standards of science do not suffice to determine evidential thresholds in a non-arbitrary fashion, and the thesis of legitimate value-encroachment, which asserts that non-scientific value judgments can justifiably influence these thresholds. A critical examination of the first premise shows that the inductive risk argument does not pose a unique epistemic challenge beyond what is already implied by fallibilism about scientific knowledge, and fails because the mere assumption of fallibilism does not imply the untenability of value-freedom. This is demonstrated by showing that the way in which evidential thresholds are set in science is not arbitrary in any sense that would lend support to the inductive risk argument. A critical examination of the second premise shows that incorporating social values into scientific inference as an inductive risk-management strategy faces a meta-criterion problem, and consequently leads to several serious issues such as wishful thinking, category mistakes in decision making, or Mannheim-style paradoxes of justification. Consequently, value-laden strategies for inductive risk management in scientific inference would likely weaken the justification of scientific conclusions in most cases