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Is the Universe As Large As It Can Be? A Study of Spacetime Possibility
This book concerns the modal structure of spacetime within the context of Einstein’s general relativity. The aim is to expose a rich set of philosophical issues somewhat informally and from a bird’s eye view. No familiarity with general relativity is presupposed. A large number of examples (worked out in coordinates) and corresponding diagrams (over 130) will play a central role in illustrating the ideas involved. One of the intended readers is a non-expert. She is perhaps a philosophy graduate student just getting started with an interest in better understanding cosmic possibility delimited by Einstein’s theory. Under her belt, she has little more than some basic set theory and a passing acquaintance with calculus and vector spaces. The other intended reader is the expert. She will find several interconnecting lines of current research mapped out and a clear thesis defended.
The investigation will focus on the maximality property of spacetime -- the requirement that (a model of) the universe must be “as large as it can be.” The maximality of spacetime is something of a dogma within the context of generality relativity. In the background, it is often presupposed by practitioners without comment in order to go on to investigate a number of other foundational topics (e.g. determinism). Here, I do not defend or oppose the case for spacetime maximality. Instead, I simply put forward a thesis that nonetheless runs counter to the prevailing orthodoxy: it is not at all clear that the universe is as large as it can be. To shed light on the situation, 120 precise questions are identified and most are settled (see the final page). My hope is that, by drawing attention to these issues, even more progress can be made by others
Entropy-Induced Wavefunction Collapse: A Thermodynamic Resolution of the Quantum Measurement Problem
One of the most elusive questions in Quantum mechanics has been: why do quantum systems that can exist in many states at once (like Schrödinger’s cat being both alive and dead) appear to “collapse” into a single outcome when measured?
This paper argues that instead of assuming that “collapse” happens as an unexplained process, wavefunction collapse is not a fundamental event, but a natural consequence of thermodynamics, the same laws that govern heat, disorder, and irreversibility.
Primarily, when we measure a quantum system, we entangle it with a measuring device and its environment. If this process produces enough entropy (a kind of disorder or lost information), then the system becomes effectively classical. It looks like the wavefunction has collapsed, though in truth, the global quantum state remains untouched. What we experience as a single outcome is actually the result of irreversible entropy hiding the quantum coherence from view.
The paper proposes a precise equation that links how much coherence remains in a system to how much entropy the environment has absorbed. Once a minimal threshold is crossed (about the same as recording one bit of information), the quantum system becomes practically indistinguishable from a classical one. That’s when “collapse” becomes irreversible—for all practical purposes.
This approach unifies ideas from quantum physics, thermodynamics, and information theory. It doesn’t require adding any new physics; no hidden variables, no many worlds, no mysterious consciousness-induced effects. Instead, it reframes collapse as a thermodynamic phase transition, offering a testable and intuitive path to resolving one of physics' most stubborn puzzles.
In short: collapse isn’t magic. It’s heat
Two senses of representation in science
Accounts of scientific representation typically assume that there is a single sense of “represent”, and they attempt to develop a theory that can account for all its features. The aim of this article is to draw the consequences of a distinction between two senses of “represent” that has been proposed recently. Taking inspiration from the distinction between speaker-meaning and expression-meaning in philosophy of language, a first sense is analysed in terms of the mental states of the user of a vehicle in context, and a second sense in terms of communal norms constraining contextual uses. I argue that making this distinction, and thus understanding the representation relation as essentially indexical and normative, can help us move beyond the controversies between various accounts of scientific representation, notably what have been dubbed informational and functional accounts, as well as debates regarding the ontology of scientific models
The harms of non-derogatory uses of slurs and the Potential Normalization Argument
There is no doubt that slurs harm. They do so by denigrating their targets, by putting them down, by marginalizing them. This is why in many legislations around the world, the use of slurs has been banned or penalized. But should all uses of slurs be banned? Many uses of slurs seem to be non-derogatory and to have beneficial effects. However, such uses are double-faceted: as both armchair reflection and experimental studies have shown, they are able to produce harm as well. In this paper, I approach the broad question of whether all non-derogatory uses of slurs should bebanned. I first present the main uses of slurs that have been considered to be non-derogatory and recent reactions to those. The upshot of this surveyis that uses of slurs that have been considered non-derogatory do, in fact, produce harm. I also flag what various authors have recommended in relation to the issue of banning such uses. Against this background, I engage with a recent view put forward by Alba Moreno Zurita and Eduardo Pérez-Navarro, who urge extreme caution with respect to any uses of slurs, due to their potential to normalize derogation. After presenting their view and their main argument, I raise an objection related to their treatment of neutral uses of slurs. I end with pointing out that, while their endeavour has merit in that it pushes the discussion further, it raises certain issues – of both an empirical and a normative nature – that need to be addressed
The internal structure of dual character concepts: A corpus-based study of SCIENTIST
Over the past decade, there has been a growing interest in dual character concepts (DCCs). These concepts are defined by their internal structures, which consist of two distinct dimensions: a descriptive and an independent normative dimension. However, a more in-depth exploration of their internal structures is still needed. This article examines the internal structure of one DCC that has garnered significant attention in the literature, scientist. First, I analyze the components of the different dimensions of this concept. Second, I explore the interaction between these two dimensions. To do so, I investigate scientist in the enTenTen20 corpus using Sketch Engine, focusing on the expressions “good scientist” and “true scientist”, as the literature suggests they interact more directly with the descriptive and normative dimensions, respectively. The findings from this investigation offer valuable insights for studying other DCCs, as the results suggest, among others, the following key points: first, that the complexity of the two dimensions of scientist is greater than previously recognized; and second, contrary to what is agreed, both the descriptive and the normative dimension interact with “good” and “true,” which implies that both expressions can be used to make the two types of normative evaluation proper of DCCs
Equivalence and Theory Expansion
This paper presents a novel framework for understanding theoretical equivalence that reconciles two familiar approaches to the problem: formal and content-based. Formal approaches are based on the logical and syntactical features of theories, while content-based approaches focus on their content as construed in various metaphysical approaches to semantics. I argue that these approaches are complementary and that a deeper view of equivalence emerges when we consider a theory's expansion potential---its capacity to be embedded in broader theoretical contexts. This notion links content to syntax, as syntactical structure constrains how a theory's expressions can be used, and this use in turn determines the theory's possibilities for representing the world across different theoretical contexts. The framework is applied to various cases where formal and content-based approaches face difficulties, showing that it can explain the equivalence and inequivalence of theories where previous approaches failed, and that it can better justify the strategies employed by proponents of these approaches in each case
Comment on "Aharonov-Bohm Phase is Locally Generated Like All Other Quantum Phases"
Marletto and Vedral [Phys. Rev. Lett. 125, 040401 (2020)] propose that the Aharonov-Bohm (AB) phase is locally mediated by entanglement between a charged particle and the quantized electromagnetic field, asserting gauge independence for non-closed paths. In this Comment, we critically analyze their model and demonstrate that the AB phase arises from the interaction with the vector potential , not from entanglement, which is a byproduct of the quantum electrodynamics (QED) framework. We show that their field-based energy formulation, intended to reflect local electromagnetic interactions, is mathematically flawed due to an incorrect prefactor and yields in the Coulomb gauge, conflicting with QED’s . This equivalence to holds only approximately in the Coulomb gauge under static conditions, failing for time-dependent fields and other gauges, undermining their claim of a gauge-independent local mechanism. Furthermore, we confirm that the AB phase is gauge-dependent for non-closed paths, contradicting their assertion. Our analysis reaffirms the conventional explanation in the semi-classical picture, where the AB phase is driven by the vector potential , with entanglement playing no causal role in its generation
Reflection, Introspection, and Book
The much-debated Reflection principle states that a coherent agent's credences must match their estimates for their future credences. Defenders claim that there are Dutch-book arguments in its favor, putting it on the same normative footing as probabilistic coherence. Critics claim that those arguments rely on the implicit, implausible assumption that the agent is introspective: that they are certain what their own credences are. In this paper, we clarify this debate by surveying several different conceptions of the book scenario. We show that the crucial disagreement hinges on whether agents who are not introspective are known to reliably act on their credences: if they are, then coherent Reflection failures are (at best) ephemeral; if they aren't, then Reflection failures can be robust---and perhaps rational and coherent. We argue that the crucial question for future debates is which notion of coherence makes sense for such unreliable agents and sketch a few avenues to explore
Recasting Schrödinger’s Cloud-Like Entity within Relativistic Geometry
This paper revisits Schrödinger’s 1927 concept of a particle as a spatially diffuse "cloud," redefining it as a true spacetime entity equipped with its own intrinsic metric. Each cloud-like entity is structured by constant proper time slices, across which mass density is continuously distributed, while a single world line threading these slices carries all gauge charges. The intrinsic metric is determined by the mass density via a Poisson-like equation, with a Green kernel that exhibits two distinct phases. In the free phase, the kernel has a non-local Coulomb-like form that links every point within the cloud-like entity. During measurement, however, the detector imposes a time-dependent boundary condition, smoothly deforming the kernel into a sharply localized monopole well. This defines a finite "collapse window," during which the wave packet’s width contracts, avoiding singularity and allowing for potential re-expansion if the detector pulse ceases prematurely. The formalism provides specific, testable predictions: mass-dependent localization times (of the order of 10 ps for electrons), reversible loss and revival of interference patterns, gradual decay of Bell correlations, and an ultra-weak, transient metric force on nearby probes. Together, these results offer a deterministic yet non-separable framework that bridges quantum non-locality with relativistic causality
Equivalent Gravities and Equivalence Principle: Foundations and experimental implications
The so-called Geometric Trinity of Gravity includes General Relativity (GR), based on spacetime curvature; the Teleparallel Equivalent of GR (TEGR), which relies on spacetime torsion; and the Symmetric Teleparallel Equivalent of GR (STEGR), grounded in nonmetricity. Recent studies demonstrate that GR, TEGR, and STEGR are dynamically equivalent, raising questions about the fundamental structure of spacetime, the under-determination of these theories, and whether empirical distinctions among them are possible.
The aim of this work is to show that they are equivalent in many features but not exactly in everything. In particular, their relationship with the Equivalence Principle (EP) is different. The EP is a deeply theory-laden assumption, which is assumed as fundamental in constructing GR, with significant implications for our understanding of spacetime. However, it introduces unresolved conceptual issues, including its impact on the nature of the metric and connection, its meaning at the quantum level, tensions with other fundamental interactions and new physics, and its role in dark matter and dark energy problems.
In contrast, TEGR and STEGR recover the EP, in particular in its strong formulation, but do not rely on it as a foundational principle. The fact that GR, TEGR, and STEGR are equivalent in non-trivial predictions, but the EP is not necessary for TEGR and STEGR, suggests that it may not be a fundamental feature but an emergent one, potentially marking differences in the empirical content of the three theories.
Thus, the developments within the Geometric Trinity framework challenge traditional assumptions about spacetime and may help to better understand some of the unresolved foundational difficulties related to the EP