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Are nonmeasurable sets significant for epistemology?
Get PDFProbabilism holds that rational credence functions are probability functions defined over some probability space . According to some recent philosophical arguments, in some situations, rational credence function must be total, i.e.
, a view which I call credence totalism. Arguments for credence totalism are based on the premise that non-Lebesgue measurable subsets of are epistemically significant, in the sense that an agent has reasons to assign probability to these sets. This paper argues that nonmeasurable sets are not epistemically significant in this sense. Consequently, the arguments for credence totalism are not successful. My argument is based on a careful consideration of the role of the Axiom of Choice in probabilistic practice. I also discuss some topics considered closely related, viz. the existence of total chance functions and the truth value of the Continuum Hypothesis. I argue that the role of nonmeasurability in epistemology does not shed light on these issues
On Mechanisms, Pathways, and their Models
Get PDFLauren Ross has recently argued that the current philosophical enthusiasm for mechanisms poses a threat to a proper understanding of the diversity of causal structures found in biology, and of the diversity of ways in which biologists explain biological phenomena. Ross argues that new mechanists have collapsed a variety of distinct causal structures within the confining analytical strictures of mechanism, and in so doing have failed to appreciate the diversity of concepts and strategies needed to describe and explain biological phenomena. Ross grants that mechanisms are important in biology, but argues that there are other causal structures, like pathways and cascades, that are distinct from mechanisms, and that require distinctive treatments. In this paper I’ll argue that Ross’s worries arise from a failure to distinguish ontological questions about causal structure from methodological questions about modeling and explanation. I’ll argue that a mechanistic ontology is compatible with conceptual and explanatory pluralism, and along the way I will offer a new analysis of pathways and pathway models that draws on some of Ross’s insights
Textual Analysis and Conceptual Cartography
Get PDFAt first blush, it might seem as though digital approaches could provide us with precisely the kind of input we need to perform something like conceptual analysis in the philosophy of science: querying the expressed intuitions of the “folk” (here, practicing scientists publishing in the journal literature) to see how they put various concepts to use, to which cases they believe they can be applied, etc. In this chapter, I want to nuance this argument, both by clarifying what we might mean by “conceptual analysis” in this case and by tempering expectations about what digital approaches could be reasonably expected to give us. I claim that such a more moderate goal, which I’ll call here “conceptual cartography,” can still provide the philosophy of science with a number of advantages (which are otherwise difficult to attain), while avoiding the possibility of making promises that we can’t fulfill
What Are the Contexts of Complementarities?
Get PDFThe explanatory structure of quantum mechanics and quantum gravity is marked by complementarity: the existence of distinct, mutually incompatible descriptions that are nonetheless each empirically valid in specific observational settings. In recent work, Ryoo (2025) proposed a context-dependent mapping framework (f_c) as an epistemic tool to capture this phenomenon. This framework maps each physically defined “context” to a set of laws that yield coherent and predictive explanations within that context. In this paper, I formally define the notion of “context” underlying the f_c mapping, offer a general structural typology, and present case studies from quantum gravity and entanglement wedge reconstruction to illustrate how explanatory fragmentation is grounded in physical theory rather than epistemic limitation
Why We Should Not Characterize Aging as a Disease
Get PDFMany scientists and philosophers characterize aging as a disease. In this article, I argue against doing so. Characterizing aging as a disease would likely exacerbate age-based discrimination, perpetuate beliefs that undermine our health, and embolden medical professionals to treat their patients unjustly. It would risk these harms without promising any benefits that would be substantial enough to make up for them. If we aim to avoid risking harms unnecessarily, we should not characterize aging as a disease
The Aharonov-Bohm effect: reality and folklore
Get PDFThe Aharonov-Bohm (A-B) effect has been a major focus of the foundations of physics. And yet, much confusion persists. In particular, the effect purportedly leads to a dilemma: on one horn, we have a non-local action of a gauge-invariant quantity on charged particles; on the other, we get a local action on these particles, but of a non-gauge invariant quantity. This is the folklore, but the folklore is filled with misconceptions. Here, by deploying a recently defended formulation of gauge theory that dispenses with principal bundles, gauge potentials, and explicit gauge symmetries, I argue, with previous authors, that the A-B effect can be understood gauge-independently. But here my argument will go further: I will show that the A-B effect, when expressed in terms of the covariant derivative of a vector bundle, is \emph{entirely} analogous to the holonomy of \emph{spacetime} vectors, and can be understood completely locally. The only surprising idea illustrated by the A-B effect is that, in some circumstances, there is more to the covariant derivative than can be accounted for by the curvature and underlying topology of a vector bundle
The Costs of Rejecting Quantum Immortality
Get PDFProponents of the Many Worlds Interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics are divided in their attitudes to the idea of quantum immortality. Some, e.g. Max Tegmark (immortalists), believe one should always expect to experience subjective survival in a quantum suicide thought experiment, because one can only ever be on a branch of the universal wavefunction where one is alive. Others, e.g. Sean Carroll, David Papineau and David Wallace (mortalists), believe that the truth of the MWI has no such consequences and that our situation is analogous to that of an observer in a single, non-branching, stochastically-evolving universe. A related question concerns whether we can take survival of a quantum suicide experiment as evidence confirming the MWI. This paper focuses on the core principles underlying these debates by considering each of these questions in turn for idealised cases of quantum immortality, arguing that while rejecting such applications of the idea of quantum immortality is tenable, to do so requires Everettians to pay various methodological and metaphysical costs that are in tension with the particular strand of austere Everettianism exemplified by Carroll, Papineau and Wallace in particular
The Real-Alignment Interpretation: A Single Postulate for Discreteness and the Born Rule
Get PDFWe introduce the Real Alignment Interpretation (RAI), a new structural framework for quantum mechanics in which discreteness, Born-type probabilities, and contextuality follow from a single postulate. Alongside the system state f(t), a contextual state g(t) represents the measurement setting or environment. A discrete event occurs whenever the overlap ⟨f, g⟩ is real, with the recorded eigenvalue selected by a dominance rule. This real alignment criterion predicts null outcomes, intervals in which no event occurs, as an intrinsic feature rather than a detector imperfection. Under ergodic exploration of the event hypersurface, the long run frequencies of outcomes reproduce the Born rule; systematic deviations would arise if ergodicity fails, providing a clear avenue for experimental tests. In this first paper we establish the postulate, illustrate it with a two-state model, and present a geometric reformulation on projective Hilbert space. RAI thus offers a unified, empirically testable starting point for a new approach to quantum foundations
Causation Beyond Manipulation: Revisiting the Butterfly “Effect”
Get PDFCounterfactual dependence and probabilistic dependence are two criteria frequently used to analyze causation. ``Mere correlations'' - instances of probabilistic dependence and counterfactual independence - are a well-studied class of cases where these criteria diverge. In this essay, I provide an example of the opposite type of divergence: counterfactual dependence and probabilistic independence. The butterfly effect of chaos theory says that had a butterfly in the distant past not flapped its wings, but everything else was identical, it is possible (and indeed probable) that a present tornado would not have occurred. However, the math of chaos also tells us that whether or not the butterfly flaps its wings, the probability of the tornado is the same. I show how these two claims fit together, highlighting the distinct and unorthodox counterfactual origin of probabilistic independence in chaotic systems. Examining the case under different theories of causation, I find widespread disagreement about whether the butterfly's flap causes the tornado. I argue that this disagreement can be explained by an underlying semantic indeterminacy in our ordinary conception of causation. Rather than being exceptional, we should expect these types of relationships, and thus indeterminacies, to predominate in chaotic systems over long timescales
Autogenic transitions in individuality
Get PDFMajor evolutionary transitions in individuality occur when independently reproducing entities fuse to form a new unit with a shared reproductive fate. Less considered are transitions that originate from within, when an autogenic innovation — a component generated internally within a lineage rather than acquired from outside — becomes a heritable part of a higher-level entity. The emergence of AI and its deepening interdependence with humans make it timely to explore such internal pathways. Three routes can be distinguished: (1) centralised, non-replicating AI that shapes but does not reproduce with humans; (2) replicating AI lineages forming symbioses with humans; and (3) synthetic endosymbioses in which AI becomes a developmentally inherited module. The first alters selection without creating new individuals; the latter two could generate composite lineages in which humans and AI reproduce together. Viewing individuality as capable of arising from within reframes how new Darwinian individuals can emerge across both natural and synthetic domains