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ON A PUZZLE ABOUT SUMS
While the problem of the philosophical significance of Riemann's theorem on conditionally convergent series has been discussed in detail for some time, specific versions of it have appeared in the literature very recently, over which there have been widespread disagreements. I argue that such discrepancies can be clarified by introducing a rather conventional type of composition rule for the treatment of some infinite systems (as well as supertasks) while analysing and clarifying the role of the concept of continuity by stripping it of the excesses that its application by the Leibnizian tradition has led to. The conclusion reached is that the indeterminacy associated with conditional convergence has a clear philosophical significance, but no fundamental ontological significance
The Metabolic Microbe: the historical split between medical and ecological microbiology from a feminist approach
This paper examines the historical split of microbiology into the fields of medicine and ecology from a feminist perspective, using Helen Longino’s contextual empiricism and her onto-epistemic view of interactions. Examining microbial interactions is interesting for two reasons, one is ontological as microbial metabolic interactions constitute the bio-geo-chemical cycles that are the driving force of life on Earth. The second reason is epistemic, involving our conceptual challenges in understanding microbial traits and classification, as their activities and ability to evolve are, for the most part, driven by their interactions. I follow the work and methodology of Sergei Vinogradskii (1856-1953) and Robert Koch (1843-1910), as two main founders each of a different microbiology field. Koch focused on medicine, developing pure mass cultures and the Koch postulates. Vinogradskii focused on soil microbiology and ecosystem ecology, developing the elective culture technique, and is known for the Winogradsky Column. I use contextual empiricism to discuss their methodological differences in classification and cultivation and reflect on their position regarding microbial individuality and interactions. For instance, Vinogradskii’s research focused on metabolic interactions and microbial life cycles, considering individual microbes as part of their environment and never in isolation. This view emphasizes the individual, the interactions, and the environment as equally focal in causal explanations. Thus, in his view, the individual should be studied as part of its milieu and never in isolation. Based on Longino's ontology of interactions, I elaborate on this view of the microbial individual in a given state of interdependence with changing levels of autonomy. This onto-epistemic understanding of the microbial phenomena is empirically consistent with today's microbiome studies and discussions on host-holobiont definitions in microbiology, ecology, and medicine
Dutch Strategies, Accuracy-Dominance, Lockean Beliefs, and their Plannings
Suppose we consider an agent with both numerical credences and all-or-nothing beliefs. This agent might also have a plan about how she is going to update her beliefs upon receiving new evidence. What rational requirements on such a plan can be justified from an epistemic value point of view? Plan Almost Lockean Revision is the claim that it is rationally required that one’s planned beliefs are exactly one’s sufficiently high conditional credences. We start by reviewing arguments available for Plan Lockean Revision in the current literature, ultimately concluding that they are non-optimal. We provide a better argument to the effect that the belief updating rule that is expected to be the best according to one’s current credences is exactly Plan Almost Lockean Revision, that is, we prove a Qualitative Greaves-Wallace Theorem. Furthermore, building on the work of (Rothschild, 2021), we investigate the dutchbookability of Lockean betting behavior for all-or-nothing beliefs and their plannings, ultimately proving a qualitative version of the dutch strategy theorem which leads to the development of novel dutch-strategy/accuracy-dominance arguments for Lockean norms on belief/belief-planning pairs
Global Gauge Symmetry Breaking in the Abelian Higgs Mechanism
This paper aims to resolve the incompatibility between two extant gauge-invariant accounts of the Abelian Higgs mechanism: the first account uses global gauge symmetry breaking, and the second eliminates spontaneous symmetry breaking entirely. We resolve this incompatibility by using the constrained Hamiltonian formalism in symplectic geometry. First we argue that, unlike their local counterparts, global gauge symmetries are physical. The symmetries that are spontaneously broken by the Higgs mechanism are then the global ones. Second, we explain how the dressing field method singles out the Coulomb gauge as a preferred gauge for a gauge-invariant account of the Abelian Higgs mechanism. Based on the existence of this group of global gauge symmetries that are physical, we resolve the incompatibility between the two accounts by arguing that the correct way to carry out the second method is to eliminate only the redundant gauge symmetries, i.e. those local gauge symmetries which are not global. We extend our analysis to quantum field theory, where we show that the Abelian Higgs mechanism can be understood as spontaneous global U(1) symmetry breaking in the C*-algebraic sense
A No-Go Theorem for psi-ontic Models? No, Surely Not!
In a recent reply to my criticisms (Found. Phys. 55:5, 2025), Carcassi, Oldofredi, and Aidala (COA) admitted that their no-go result for -ontic models is based on the implicit assumption that all states are equally distinguishable, but insisted that this assumption is a part of the psi-ontic models defined by Harrigan and Spekkens, thus maintaining their result's validity. In this note, I refute their argument again, emphasizing that the ontological models framework (OMF) does not entail this assumption. I clarify the distinction between ontological distinctness and experimental distinguishability, showing that the latter depends on dynamics absent from OMF, and address COA's broader claims about quantum statistical mechanics and Bohmian mechanics
Relating quasi-sets and rough sets: from quantum entities to AI
At present, there are at least two set theories motivated by quantum ontology: Décio Krause’s quasi-set
theory (Q) and Maria Dalla Chiara and Giuliano Toraldo di Francia’s quasi-set theory (QST). Recent work
[Jorge-Holik-Krause, 2023] has established certain links between QST and Pawlak’s rough set theory (RST),
showing that both are strong candidates for providing a non-deterministic semantics of N matrices that generalizes
those based on ZF. In this work, we show that the new atomless quasi-set theory Q− , recently introduced to
account for a quantum property ontology [Krause-Jorge, 2024], has strong structural similarities with QST and
RST. We study the level of extensionality that each theory presents, its relation to the Leibniz principle and the
rigidity property. We believe that developing common features among these three theories can motivate common
fields of research. By revealing shared structures, the developments of each theory can have a positive impact on
the others
Are Symmetry Principles Meta-Laws?
Noether’s first theorem demonstrates that continuous symmetries give rise to
conserved quantities (under appropriate conditions). This fact tempts many to
hold that symmetry principles explain conservation laws. Yet there is a puzzle:
the derivation goes both ways. So why does symmetry explain conservation when the derivation is bidirectional? Lange (2007, 2009) provides an answer: symmetry principles are meta-laws, and meta-laws explain first-order laws just as first-order laws explain facts. Using a “non-standard” Lagrangian, Smith (2008) claims that conservation of angular momentum can hold without rotational symmetry, providing a counter-example to Lange. In this paper, I show that Smith’s non-standard Lagrangian fails to serve as a counterexample. However, that doesn’t leave Lange’s account unchallenged. I argue that the debate between Lange and Smith ultimately revolves around an ambiguity which, once clarified, leads to a dilemma. Which symmetry principle explains? Is it the symmetry of the action or the symmetry of equations of motion? If the former, then the symmetry is no more stable than conservation laws. Hence, we lose the desired explanatory direction. If the latter, the symmetry lacks explanatory relevance and fails to exhibit greater stability than conservation laws. However one disambiguates ‘symmetry’, it remains mysterious why symmetry principles explain conservation laws
Naturalistic Metaphysics and the Parity Thesis: Why Scientific Realism Doesn’t Lead to Realism about Metaphysics
In recent work, Nina Emery has defended the view that, in the context of naturalistic metaphysics, one should maintain the same epistemic attitude towards science and metaphysics. That is, naturalists who are scientific realists ought to be realists about metaphysics as well; and naturalists who are antirealists about science should also be antirealists about metaphysics. We call this the ‘parity thesis’. This paper suggests that the parity thesis is widely, albeit often implicitly, accepted among naturalistically inclined philosophers, and essentially for reasons similar to Emery’s. Then, reasons are provided for resisting Emery’s specific inference from scientific realism to realism about metaphysics. The resulting picture is a more nuanced view of the relationship between science and metaphysics within the naturalistic setting than the one which is currently most popular
Cosmic conundrums, common origins, and omnivorous constraints
The paper revisits Janssen’s seminal proposal of Common Origin Inferences (COIs), a powerful and scientifically
fruitful inference pattern that (causally) traces striking coincidences back to a common origin. According to Janssen,
COIs are a decisive engine for rational theory change across disciplines and eras. After a careful reconstruction of
Janssen’s central tenets, we critically assess them, highlighting three key shortcomings: its strong realist and
ontological commitments, its restriction to (or strong penchant for) causal/ontic explanations, and its intended
employment for conferring evidential-epistemic status. To remedy these shortcomings, we moot a natural
generalisation and amelioration of Janssen’s original conception—COI*s: Constraint-Omnivorous Inferences. COI*s
warrant inference to pursuit-worthy hypotheses: it’s rational to further study, work on, elaborate/refine or test
hypotheses that account for multiple constraints in one fell swoop. As a demonstration of the utility of COI*-
reasoning, we finally show how it sheds light on, and dovetails, the three most significant breakthroughs in recent
cosmology: the Dark Matter hypothesis, the Dark Energy postulate, and the theory of cosmic inflation
Challenging Umberto Eco's Logical Critique of Theism via Physica Mutabilis and Omnis Verum Simul
The traditional dispute regarding the existence of God has historically hinged upon the foundations of logic and epistemology, wherein principles such as causality and non-contradiction have proven crucial for arguments both supporting and opposing divine attributes. Umberto Eco’s critique of theism, representative of Western rationalism, assumes a classical logic of universal and timeless validity. However, recent advancements in multiscale thermodynamics, specifically the concepts of Physica Mutabilis (changing physical laws) and Scientia Præteriti (structural time lag between knowledge and the physical present of the universe), could potentially alter the very structure of logic. This paper explores a scenario wherein logic itself becomes contextually dependent, rendering the coexistence of a proposition and its negation (Omnis Verum Simul ) an ontological possibility. Furthermore, it analyzes how this perspective challenges classical logical objections to the existence of God (omnipresence, omniscience, and omnipotence) as advanced by Eco, suggesting that logic, anchored to a particular set of physical laws, lacks absolute universality. The resolution of apparent contradictions in divine attributes, such as simultaneous presence and absence, within asynchronous causal frameworks is discussed. Moreover, the idea of external forces, characteristic of the Principium Luxuriæ which permits Physica Mutabilis and the dynamics of the entities composing the universe, is posited as a factor that could enable the simultaneity of presence and absence in an entity. Ultimately, while this work does not constitute proof of God’s existence, it is argued that a dynamic universe necessitates a reconsideration of fundamental philosophical distinctions and the very notion of existence under a temporally displaced logic, thereby reopening the metaphysical plausibility of the divine and challenging the limits of a metaphysics predicated upon a static logic