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Quantum Foundations of Consciousness: A Framework for Psionic Interaction and Non–Human Intelligence Integration
Full text linkThe Hard Problem of consciousness—explaining why and how physical processes are accompanied by subjective experience—remains one of the most challenging puzzles in modern thought. Rather than attempting to resolve this issue outright, in this paper I explore whether empirical science can be broadened to incorporate consciousness as a fundamental degree of freedom. Drawing on Russellian monism and revisiting the historical “relegation problem” (the systematic sidelining of consciousness by the scientific revolution), I propose an extension of quantum mechanics by augmenting the Hilbert space with a “consciousness dimension.” This framework provides a basis for reinterpreting psi phenomena (e.g., telepathy, precognition) as natural outcomes of quantum nonlocality and suggests that advanced non– human intelligence (NHI) technology might interface with a quantum–conscious substrate. For a detailed mathematical exposition of this framework, see my preprint [3]. I demarcate the philosophical issues from the empirical ones and propose several experimental strategies— including entanglement–based psi research, quantum–enhanced neuroimaging, and quantum sensor applications—to test the model. Although this framework does not resolve the Hard Problem, it offers a rigorously formulated, historically informed, and empirically testable approach to integrating subjective experience into the scientific study of mind
What do philosophers talk about when they talk about autism?
Full text linkSeveral anecdotal claims about the relationship between philosophical discourse and the subject of autism have been forwarded in recent years. This paper seeks to verify or debunk these descriptive claims by carefully examining the philosophical literature on autism. We conduct a comprehensive scoping review to answer the question, what do philosophers talk about when they talk about autism? This empirical work confirms that the philosophy of autism is underdeveloped as a subfield of philosophy. Moreover, the way that philosophers engage with autism is often unreflective and uncritical. As a result, much work in the discipline serves to perpetuate pathologising, dehumanising, and stigmatising misinformation about autistics and autistic behaviour. By highlighting the significant gaps in the philosophical literature on autism, this review aims to deepen our understanding of philosophical thought surrounding autism and contributes to ongoing dialogues pertaining to neurodiversity, madness, and disability rights more generally
The Mean and the Variance as Dual Concepts in a Fundamental Duality
Full text linkA basic duality arises throughout the mathematical and natural sciences. Traditionally,
logic is thought to be based on the Boolean logic of subsets, but the development
of category theory in the mid-twentieth century shows the duality between subsets and
partitions (or equivalence relations). Hence, there is an equally fundamental dual logic
of partitions. At a more basic or granular level, the elements of a subset are dual to the
distinctions (pairs of elements in different blocks) of a partition. The quantitative version of
subset logic is probability theory (as developed by Boole), and the quantitative version of
the logic of partitions is information theory re-founded on the notion of logical entropy. The
subset side of the duality uses a one-sample (or one-element) approach, e.g., the mean of a
random variable; the partition side uses a two-sample (or pair-of-elements) approach. This
paper gives a new derivation of the variance (and covariance) based on the two-sample
approach, which positions the variance on the partition and information theory side of the
duality and thus dual to the mean
Questionable and Unquestionable in Quantum Mechanics
Full text linkAccording to the Kolmogorovian Censorship Hypothesis, everything that quantum theory says about the world in the language of the quantum mechanical Hilbert space formalism is actually about relationships between ordinary relative frequencies expressible in operational terms using classical Kolmogorovian probability theory. In other words, a quantum theoretical description of a system should in principle be translatable into a purely operational–probabilistic description. However, our goal in this paper is different; we do not want to deal with the problem how to translate the known theory of quantum mechanics into operational terms, or to reconstruct the theory from postulates which can be interpreted in operational terms. Our aim is somewhat broader and points in the opposite direction. We start with a general scheme for the operational description of an arbitrary physical system. The description is based solely on the notion of observable events (measurement operations and measurement results) and on general, empirically established simple laws concerning their relative frequency. These laws are so simple and fundamental that they apply equally to any physical system—no plausibly conceivable physical system is known that would violate our basic assumptions. In the first part of the paper, we outline the basic elements of such an operational–probabilistic theory; such as the notion of state, the mathematical description of state space, and the basic notions of dynamics. All these notions are expressed in classical terms, within the framework of Kolmogorovian probability theory, and, since our goal is not necessarily to reproduce standard quantum mechanics, we try to avoid making assumptions that are restrictive and would not hold in the most general case. In the second part of the paper, we discuss how this operational–probabilistic description compares to the quantum mechanical description and to what extent the standard Hilbert space quantum mechanics can be regarded as a reformulation of the general operational–probabilistic theory
Reassessing the Explanatory Indispensability Argument: A Bayesian Defence of Nominalism
Full text linkAdvocates of the explanatory indispensability argument for platonism say two things. First, we should believe in the parts of our best scientific theories that are explanatory. Second, mathematical objects play an explanatory role within those theories. I give a two-part response. I start by using a Bayesian framework to argue that the standards many have proposed must be met to show that mathematical objects are dispensable are too demanding. In particular, nominalistic theories may be more probable than platonistic ones even if they are extremely complicated by comparison. This is true even if there are genuine cases of mathematical explanation in science. The point made here is a matter of principle, holding regardless of how one assesses nominalistic theories already on offer. I then examine my recent nominalization of second-order impure set theory in light of the correct, laxer standards. I make a tentative case that my nominalistic theory meets those standards, which would undermine the explanatory indispensability argument. While this case is provisional, I aim to bring attention to my nominalization and others in light of the revised standards for demonstrating dispensability
Towards a consistent Semiclassical Theory of Gravity
Full text linkWe argue that semiclassical gravity can be rendered consistent by assuming that quantum systems only emit a gravitational field when they interact with stable determination chains (SDCs), which are specific chains of interactions modeled via decoherence and test functions obeying a set of conditions. When systems are disconnected from SDCs, they do not emit a gravitational field. This denies the universality of gravity, while upholding a version of the equivalence principle. We argue that this theory can be tested by experiments that investigate the gravitational field emitted by isolated systems like in gravcats experiments or by investigating the gravitational interactions between entangled systems like in the (Bose-Marletto-Vedral) BMV experiment. Our theory fits into a new framework which holds that in the absence of certain conditions, quantum systems cannot emit a gravitational field. There are many possible conditions for systems to emit a gravitational field, and we will adopt a subset of them. We will show how this subset of conditions provides multiple benefits beyond rendering semiclassical gravity consistent, which includes deriving the value of the cosmological constant from first principles and providing an explanation for why the vacuum does not gravitate
The Spectre of Underdetermination in Modern Cosmology
Full text linkThe scientific status of physical cosmology has been the subject of philosophical debate ever since detailed mathematical models of the Universe emerged from Einstein's general theory of relativity.
Such debates have revolved around whether and to what extent cosmology meets established demarcation criteria for a discipline to be scientific, as well as determining how to best characterize cosmology as a science, given the unique challenges and limitations faced by a discipline which aims to study the origin, composition, and fate of the Universe itself. The present article revisits, in light of the dramatic progress in cosmology in recent decades, an earlier debate held in the 1950s between Herman Bondi and Gerald Whitrow regarding the scientific status of cosmology. We analyse cosmology's transition from an emerging science to a cornerstone of modern physics, highlighting its empirical successes in establishing the -Cold Dark Matter (CDM) model and in its delivery of various successful novel predictions.
Despite this remarkable scientific success and progress, we argue that modern cosmology faces a further profound challenge: the permanent underdetermination of the microphysical nature of its exotic energy components: inflation, dark matter, and dark energy. Drawing historical parallels with the role of spectroscopy in revealing the microphysical nature of atomic physics, we argue that the epistemic barriers obstructing us from ascertaining the microphysical nature of these exotic energy components are significant, in turn casting doubt upon whether cosmology can ever transcend these particular epistemic challenges. We conclude by reflecting on the prospects for future breakthroughs and/or non-empirical arguments which could decide this issue conclusively
The Possibility of a General Theory of Normativity in Light of the Number-Counts-Debate
Full text linkThis article revisits Taurek’s famous question: Should the greater number be saved in situations of resource scarcity? At the heart of this debate lies a central issue in normative ethics—whether numerical superiority can constitute a moral pro tanto reason. Engaging with this question helps to illuminate core principles of normative theory. Welfarism presents a pro-number position. The article first outlines Taurek’s original argument. It then examines non-welfarist responses and explains why they remain unsatisfactory. Finally, it identifies the main shortcomings of the hybrid welfarism approach and suggests a possible alternative for more adequately addressing the Taurek problem
The impossibility of generating comparative probabilities from primitive conditional probabilities
Full text linkThere are four well-known models of fundamental objective probabilistic reality: classical probability, comparative probability, non-Archimedean probability, and primitive conditional probability. I offer two desiderata for an account of fundamental objective probability, comprehensiveness and non-superfluity. It is plausible that classical probabilities lack comprehensiveness by not capturing some intuitively correct probability comparisons, such as that it is less likely that 0 = 1 than that a dart randomly thrown at a target will hit the exact cen-
ter, even though both classically have probability zero. We thus want a comparison between probabilities with a higher resolution than we get from classical probabilities. Comparative and non-Archimedean probabilities have a hope of providing such a comparison, but for known reasons do not appear to satisfy our desiderata. The last approach to
this problem is to employ primitive conditional probabilities, such as Popper functions, and then argue that P(0 = 1 | 0 = 1 or hit center) =
0 < 1 = P(hit center | 0 = 1 or hit center). But now we have a technical question: How can we reconstruct a probability comparison, ideally satisfying the standard axioms of comparative probability, from a primitive
conditional probability? I will prove that, given some plausible assumptions, it is impossible to perform this task: conditional probabilities just
do not carry enough information to define a satisfactory comparative probability. The result is that of the models, no one satisfies our two desiderata. We end by briefly considering three paths forward
Rigour from rules: Deduction and definition in mathematical physics
Full text linkWe ask how and why mathematical physics may be seen as a rigorous discipline. Starting with Newton but drawing on a philosophical tradition ranging from Aristotle to (late) Wittgenstein, we argue that, as in mathematics, rigour ultimately comes from rules. These include logical rules of inference as well as definitions that give a precise meaning to physical concepts such as space and time by providing rules governing their use in models of the theories in which they are defined. In particular, so-called implicit definitions characterize "indefinables" whose traditionally assumed familiarity through "intuition" or "acquaintance" from Aristotle down to Russell blasts any hope of both rigour and innovation. Given the basic physical concepts, one may subsequently define derived concepts (like black holes or determinism). Definitions are seen as a priori meaning-constitutive conventions that are neither necessary à la Kant nor arbitrary à la Carnap, as they originate in empirical science as well as in the autonomous development of mathematics and physics. As such definitions are best seen as hypothetical