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Dark Matter Realism: How Referential Semantics Restricts Realism in Contemporary Fundamental Physics
Get PDFPhilosophers increasingly treat semantics as decisive for realism about dark matter. In this paper, I consider a recent proposal from Vaynberg (2024) anchored in the causal-descriptive theory of reference from Psillos (1999, 2012). I argue that the application of Psillos’ general scientific realist framework in the local context of dark matter is misguided, partly because of the overlooked metaphysical commitments underpinning causal-descriptivism, and partly because the extension of ‘dark matter’ on this account includes entities we do not currently consider to be dark matter, and exclude entities that we currently consider could be dark matter. Furthermore, I argue that this discord between scientific realism and dark matter should be regarded endemic in contexts where empirical evidence is scarce: the semantic details required by the proposed scientific realism is dependent on canonical empirical confirmation, because it is against that background that scientific realism has been formulated and developed
Values and Objectivity
Get PDFObjectivity is a contested notion that has many meanings. Over the last half-century, the philosophical discussion of objectivity in science has revolved around criticisms of two influential accounts of objectivity: objectivity as faithfulness to facts, and objectivity as value-freedom. This chapter introduces these two accounts and details a number of arguments that have led to their nearly unanimous rejection. While this rejection has led several philosophers of science to propose abandoning the notion entirely, others still wish to retain it. This chapter examines various attempts to develop viable accounts of objectivity in science, and concludes by mentioning some issues and connections that currently remain unexplored
Judging the Worth of Pursuing: Assessing the Dynamic Responsivity of a Project to Experimental and Model-Building Practices
Get PDFWe argue that scientific projects should be judged as pursuit-worthy in virtue of their dynamicity. We give three non-exhaustive dimensions of dynamicity, developed in the context of three case studies: (1) dynamic responsivity to experimental and observational practices, developed by comparing Ptolemaic astronomical projects to pseudoscientific geocentrism; (2) dynamic responsivity to concurrent developing modeling projects, developed by analyzing epidemiologist risk-assessments and resulting projective choices; (3) responsivity to evolving contexts for application and implementation, the evolution of which is driven by the very development of the project, developed by analyzing the 2013 Eindhoven conference assessment of climate modeling and shaping of policy. We argue in the second half that judgments of dynamism can be philosophically and practically implemented in real-time assessments of current projects. Specifically, tracking responsivity to increasingly stable past practices allows us to track a project’s changing viability, and tracking responsivity to projections of stabilizing projects and practices allows us to track a project’s changing promise. We argue that both of these assessments can be most effectively performed by those who both understand the history and philosophy of science and the specific science projects themselves. Therefore, we argue that embedding philosophers of science, who continue to participate in the philosophical community for assessment of their philosophical work and capability, will yield the best results for judging the worth of pursuing a scientific project. Decisions about the proportional allocation of resources will therefore be made as part of dynamic trajectories of support, rather than static determinations of value and worth
Learning Curves in Orbit: Progress with AI in Space Science
Get PDFAI methods are being touted as a powerful new source of scientific progress. Are they? If so, what kind of progress do they facilitate? To find out, we employed qualitative research methods to explore how space scientists conceive of AI. We show that space scientists are mainly concerned with whether AI can help them solve specific problems, and more generally, to extend their abilities in useful ways. This coheres best with a “functional” account of scientific progress (Kuhn 1962; Laudan 1978; Shan 2019, 2022). Despite recent work applying functional accounts to seismology (Miyake 2022) and economics (Boumans and Herfeld 2022), the functional account is still “insufficiently assessed” (Shan 2022, 2). Inspired by our qualitative data, we propose a new type of functional account according to which scientific progress is simply improving scientific abilities
Autopoietic Bodily Integrity: A Biological Approach to Hybrid Minds
Get PDFRecent cases of forced explantation of neurotechnologies seem to be grounded on a naturalist conception of the body as an entity that cannot have a non-biological object as a proper part. However, this conception has been challenged by functional approaches, according to which if an artifact robustly contributes to the function of a body, it is part of it and should be legally treated as such.
Bublitz (2022) argues that a series of problems would result from revising the law to accommodate a functional view and, for this reason, naturalism is the best option. We claim that it is unacceptable to endorse naturalism for purely pragmatic reasons while recognizing that it is theoretically groundless.
We argue that contemporary versions of Autopoietic Theory can be used to provide a theoretically sound naturalistic view. We articulate a criterion for the attribution of degrees of bodiliness to any given object, depending on how closely it is related to autopoiesis, and then specify a threshold that defines the degree required to be a part of the body. Crucially, according to our view, only a very restricted set of devices can become body parts, which significantly mitigates the legal problems of body/device hybridization
Ecology in context. A conceptual model for analyzing the significance of context in ecological research
Get PDFThis paper proposes a conceptual model for analyzing context dependent ecological phenomena. Many ecological processes, from relatively simple species interactions to biological invasions, are systematically dependent on the environmental context and can lead to entirely different outcomes depending on the circumstances in which they occur. Because of this, causal relations that hold in one ecosystem may not hold or even reverse in another, raising far-reaching concerns about the validity of causal inference and the extent to which causal relationships can be stable across different environments. However, despite the importance of context for causal inference and transferability and the frequency of reports of context-dependent results in the ecological literature, until recently, the concept of context has rarely been theorized. This paper fills this gap by providing a conceptual model that can serve as a common framework for considering different types of conditions and their different roles in the occurrence of ecological phenomena
What is Science For? Modern Intersections of Science and Humanism
Get PDFHumanism, conceived as a worldview concerning, among other things, how we understand ourselves and our relationships with others, and science, conceived as a family of forms of inquiry into the world, are deeply interwoven over our intellectual and cultural histories. Chakravartty considers their co-evolution as a prelude to the present, reviewing formative aspects of Renaissance humanism and deepening associations of values central to the Enlightenment with precursors to modern science, en route to an arguably peculiar situation today. While some past, humanist conceptions of the aim of science seem intimately connected to the idea of making a better world – one featuring better and more widespread human and planetary flourishing – contemporary thinking seems largely devoid of normative discussions of what science itself is for. This chapter offers reflections on a possible return to a humanist conception of the role and promise of science
Categorification of Perspectives
Get PDFTo characterize scientific perspectivism as a realist stance, Massimi introduces her own notion of perspectival truth, which necessitates scientific theories or models from different perspectives being stitched together. Drawing on recent efforts to reify scientific theories using category theory, we propose adjunction as a formal mechanism whereby scientific theories interconnect across different perspectives. Finally, we argue that enriching perspectival realism with this foundational framework does not compromise the symmetry of scientific perspectives to which it adheres
Beyond Values:The Introduction of Subjectivity and Its Use in Decision-Making Under Uncertainty
Get PDFWithin the philosophical literature, there has been a trend to discuss subjectivity, and its impacts on science, from the perspective of value judgments. While this discussion is necessary and has proven to be fruitful, I contend that the type of subjectivity referenced in this discussion extends beyond the use of values. In this paper, I argue that the type of subjectivity of concern in this literature is regarding some personal aspect of the individual and the use of this aspect in addressing the uncertainty present within scientific decision-making contexts. I begin by arguing that, while it is not explicitly stated, the current discussions of this subjectivity within the literature actually focus on instances of normative uncertainty present within these decision-making contexts, where I claim that values are used to address this uncertainty. In this way, I identify a connection between the use of values in science and the presence of normative uncertainty. However, other forms of uncertainty are also present in scientific decision-making contexts, modal and empirical uncertainty, which must also be addressed. Using examples from climate science, I show how these uncertainties are addressed by other means, specifically through a scientist’s tacit knowledge and intuition. Subsequently, tacit knowledge and intuition are shown to maintain the same type of subjectivity as value judgments, where the use of this subjectivity is a necessary part of decision-making. In this way, I highlight additional vehicles of subjectivity and novel contexts of uncertainty where this subjectivity can be introduced into science. Thus, when someone recognizes the type of subjectivity, which is historically only associated with values, to be present in science they should no longer assume that the introduction was due to a value judgment. Ultimately, I conclude by discussing these other vehicles of subjectivity and their impact on epistemic reliability