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Revisiting the Base in Evidence-Based Policy
Get PDFEvidence-based policy (EBP) has become widely embraced for its commitment to greater uptake of scientific knowledge in policymaking. But what legitimizes EBP and in what respect are evidence-based policymaking practices better than other policymaking practices? In this article, we distinguish and refine three potential legitimizers of EBP. We suggest that evidence-based policymaking practices are better because they "follow the science," because they focus on "what works," or because they "follow the rules." We discuss some consequences, for advocates of EBP, of consciously adopting one or other of these legitimizers. Finally, we examine whether it is appropriate to switch from advocating for EBP to advocating for evidence-informed policy
The Rise and Fall of a Myth about British Emergentism
Get PDFWhile emergentism enjoys some good fortune in contemporary philosophy, attempts at elucidating the history of this view are rare. Among such attempts, by far the most influential certainly is McLaughlin’s landmark paper “The Rise and Fall of British Emergentism” (1992). While McLaughlin’s analysis of the recent history of emergentism is insightful and instructive in its own ways, in the present paper we offer reasons to be suspicious of some of its central claims. In particular, we advance evidence that rebuts McLaughlin’s contention that British Emergentism did not fall in the 1920–1930s because of philosophical criticism but rather because of an alleged empirical inconsistency with fledgling quantum mechanics
Equivalence, reduction, and sophistication in teleparallel gravity
Get PDFWe discuss the (in)equivalence of various formulations of teleparallel gravity, building upon recent work by Weatherall and Meskhidze (2024). We then think about these different versions of teleparallel gravity from the point of view of reduction/sophistication---a distinction drawn by Dewar (2019) in the context of philosophical literature on symmetries---and along the way introduce and scrutinise the resources of Cartan geometry and of higher gauge theory
Getting off the Hoek with Newton's laws
Get PDFHow to make sense of the notion of force-free motion which seems to be presupposed by Newton's first law? One can identify in the literature various different answers to this question, one among which is to be found in the writings of Torretti (1983). In a wonderful recent article, however, Hoek (2023) has proposed a radical revision to our understanding of Newton's first law, motivated on both exegetical and philosophical grounds. In light of this, one is left wondering whether this reconceptualisation of the content of Newton's first law obviates the need to provide a notion of force-free motion with which to undergird it. In this note, I'll argue that this is not the case: one can (and should!) endorse Hoek's understanding of the first law, while nevertheless seeking to define force-free motions in one of the various ways which have been proposed in the literature
Quantum Measurement Without Collapse or Many Worlds: The Branched Hilbert Subspace Interpretation
Get PDFThe interpretation of quantum measurements presents a fundamental challenge in quantum mechanics, with concepts such as the Copenhagen Interpretation (CI), Many-Worlds Interpretation (MWI), and Bohmian Mechanics (BM) offering distinct perspectives. We propose the Branched Hilbert Subspace Interpretation (BHSI), which describes measurement as branching the local Hilbert space of a system into parallel subspaces. We formalize the mathematical framework of BHSI using branching and the engaging and disengaging unitary operators to relationally and causally update the states of observers. Unlike the MWI, BHSI avoids the ontological proliferation of worlds and copies of observers, realizing the Born rule based on branch weights. Unlike the CI, BHSI retains the essential features of the MWI: unitary evolution and no wavefunction collapse. Unlike the BM, BHSI does not depend on a nonlocal structure, which may conflict with relativity. We apply BHSI to examples such as the double-slit experiment, the Bell test, Wigner and his friend, and the black hole information paradox. In addition, we explore whether recohering branches can be achieved in BHSI. Compared to the CI and MWI, BHSI provides a minimalist, unitarity-preserving, collapse-free, and probabilistically inherent alternative interpretation of quantum measurements
Models: Measuring or Cognitive Instruments?
Get PDFA number of authors (Morgan, 1999; Boumans, 2005; Morrison, 2009; Massimi and Bhimji, 2015; Parker, 2017) have argued that models can be quite literally thought of as measuring instruments. I here challenge this view by reconstructing three arguments from the literature and rebutting them. Further, I argue that models should be seen as cognitive rather than measuring instruments, and that the distinction is important for understanding scientific change: Both yield two distinct sources of insight that mutually depend on each other, and should not be equated. In particular, we may perform the exact same actions in the laboratory but
conceive of them entirely differently by virtue of the models we endorse at different points in time
Spacetime's Gauge Reality: Testing Loop Quantum Gravity with the AB Effect
Get PDFThe gravitational Aharonov-Bohm (AB) effect, where quantum particles acquire phase shifts in curvature-free regions due to a gauge-fixed metric perturbation , highlights the intriguing gauge dependence of spacetime. This study explores whether Loop Quantum Gravity (LQG), which views spacetime as emerging from SU(2)- and diffeomorphism-invariant spin networks, can accommodate this effect. The AB effect suggests that LQG should incorporate gauge dependence at the quantum level, which appears challenging within its relational, gauge-invariant framework. Potential modifications to LQG, such as introducing gauge-fixing constraints or effective fields, may require assumptions aligned with substantivalism, potentially diverging from its emergent paradigm. These results invite a thoughtful reconsideration of spacetime’s ontological status, encouraging a dialogue between relational and substantivalist perspectives in quantum gravity
Varieties of Wave Function Realism, or, WTF is WFR?
Get PDFThe phrase “Wave Function Realism” (WFR) has come to be used for a family of views according to which quantum theory motivates us to think that quantum wave functions are fields on a space of extremely high dimension, which is in some sense more fundamental that ordinary three-dimensional space or four-dimensional spacetime.
With an aim at gaining clarity about the nature of the project, I distinguish between varieties of Wave Function Realism that one might hold. I focus on two axes of distinction. One has to do with the nature of the project. Is it an Interpretive project, one of accepting standard quantum theory pretty much as we have it, and exploring its implications for ontology? Or is it a Constructive project, which finds standard quantum theory wanting in crucial aspects, and seeks to construct a new theory that will satisfy some set of metaphysical constraints? The other has to do with how radical the claims are that are made about the nature of spacetime. Does the fundamental space on which the wave functions of WFR are defined have intrinsic structure corresponding to the low-dimensional spacetime structure? I call versions of WFR on which this is so “Mild” versions, as on such a view any sense in which the low-dimensional spatial structure is non-fundamental would be at best a highly attenuated one. A more radical view, which I call “Spicy,” has it that the fundamental space has no intrinsic structure corresponding to our low dimension spacetime, and that such structure is emergent from the structure and evolution of certain sort of wave functions.
Judging from what they say about the view, it seems that proponents of WFR intend it to be Interpretive and Spicy. I will argue that there can be no such position. Standard quantum mechanics makes such heavy use of low-dimensional spacetime structure that an Interpretive version of WFR must be Extremely Mild. A Spicy but Constructive version has yet to be formulated
From Redundancy to Reality: Local Gauge Invariance as a Physical Symmetry
Get PDFThis paper proposes a transformative reinterpretation of local gauge invariance, a cornerstone of gauge theories, as a physical symmetry rather than a mathematical redundancy. Conventionally, gauge invariance ensures that only gauge-invariant quantities, such as the electromagnetic field strength Fµν = ∂µAν − ∂νAµ, bear physical significance, rendering the potential Aµ a calculational tool. Challenging this view, I argue that local gauge invariance, analogous to translation invariance, reflects a fundamental phase freedom of quantum fields, with Aµ and the wave function ψ, fixed in the Lorenz gauge (∂µAµ = 0), constituting real physical states. This thesis is grounded in a novel analysis of the Aharonov-Bohm effect [1], where Aµ drives continuous phase shifts in field-free regions, evidencing its causal role. A rigorous derivation demonstrates that the minimal coupling rule, Dµ = ∂µ + iqAµ, emerges naturally from this symmetry, paralleling translation invariance’s role in free wave equations. Robust counterarguments address objections, including Aµ’s non-uniqueness and the primacy of invariants, affirming the Lorenz gauge’s unique determination. A critique of Rivat’s Lorentz-driven derivation highlights its limitations, reinforcing the proposed view’s generality and empirical grounding. This potential-centric ontology, rooted in the phase structure of quantum fields, suggests a unified framework for gauge interactions and gravity. The paper concludes with future directions, including dynamic Aharonov-Bohm experiments and extensions to non-Abelian theories and quantum gravity, redefining the foundations of gauge theories and their place in modern physics
Einstein, Evolution of Knowledge, and the Anthropocene: A Critical Reading of Jürgen Renn's Historiography
Get PDFThis article offers a critical engagement with Jürgen Renn’s historiographical approach, with particular focus on "The Evolution of Knowledge" and "The Einsteinian Revolution" (co-authored with Hanoch Gutfreund). It explores how Renn reinterprets Albert Einstein’s contributions to modern physics, especially special and general relativity, not primarily as the product of individual insight, but as emergent from broader epistemic structures and long-term knowledge systems. The discussion centers on key concepts such as “challenging objects,” “epistemic matrices,” “mental models,” and “borderline problems,” and situates Renn’s framework within broader debates involving Thomas Kuhn, Ludwik Fleck, and Mara Beller. While recognizing the historiographical strengths of Renn’s structuralist approach, the article raises questions about its implications for understanding individual agency, conceptual creativity, and the philosophical dimensions of scientific change. The paper contends that a balanced account of scientific innovation must preserve both the historical embeddedness of knowledge and the originality of conceptual breakthroughs