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Imagining at the Threshold: Thought Experiments and Constraints in Quantum Gravity
Full text linkThought experiments (TEs) are indispensable conceptual tools in scientific research, particularly in the study of quantum gravity. Many scholars argue that the epistemic significance of TEs hinges on the proper and ineliminable use of imagination. However, there is disagreement regarding the specific nature of the imagination involved. A valuable perspective on this debate is provided by a TE proposed by Matvei Bronstein in 1936 to support a quantum theory of gravity. His contribution serves as a notable example of destructive TE, aiming to highlight the internal inconsistency within a unified theory of both quantum mechanics and general relativity. In this paper, I reconstruct Bronstein's TE in the context of recent discussions on the relationship between TEs and imagination. I argue that this case study challenges existing epistemological frameworks for understanding TEs. I contend that Bronstein's TE introduces a new form of imagination, termed operational imagination, as indispensable for reaching its intended conclusion. I conclude that operational imagination can be integrated into simulative model-based accounts of TEs
Processes and Continuity: A Look from Quantum Gravity
Full text linkProcess jargon is widespread in the physical sciences. Beginning with the work of Wesley Salmon, several accounts in philosophy of science have attempted to provide a definition of "process" compatible with scientists' understanding of causation and explanation. The proposed characterisation links processes to the properties of the spacetime they inhabit as regards continuity and genuine causality. Recent developments in theories of quantum gravity challenge the validity of process ontologies at the fundamental scale. In particular, this paper examines how arguments based on minimal length in the literature question the traditional definition of process. Process realism does not favour the processualist against these arguments. I conclude that certain theories of quantum gravity prevent a processual representation of the intended phenomena at the fundamental scale because they predict a violation of either the spatiotemporal specification or the causality conditions. In the end, the processualist faces a dilemma: either weaken the accepted definition of process without falling into substance ontologies, or hope that problematic theories of quantum gravity will be disconfirmed
The Hole Argument and Determinism(s)
Full text linkThis paper first offers an interpretation and clarification of Halvorson and Manchak (2025)’s recent argument that there is no mathematical basis for the Hole Argument; the upshot of this is that it depends on whether the notion of “rigidity” discussed in that paper can be understood as a form of determinism. It then reviews various notions of determinism that have been put forward in the Hole Argument literature, to argue that rigidity cannot be so understood—but that rigidity does stand in a close relationship to certain species of determinism
How Informational Teleosemantics Works: Towards a Realist Theory of Content
Full text linkRepresentations appear to play a central role in cognitive science. Capacities such as face recognition are thought to be enabled by internal states or structures representing external items. However, despite the ubiquity of representational terminology in cognitive science, there is no explicit scientific theory outlining what makes an internal state a representation of an external item. Nonetheless, many philosophers hope to uncover an implicit theory in the scientific literature. This is the project of the current thesis. However, all such projects face an obstacle in the form of Frances Egan's argument that content plays no role in scientific theorising. I respond that, in some limited regions of cognitive science, content is crucial for explanation. The unifying idea is that closer attention to the application of information theory in those regions of cognitive neuroscience enables us to uncover an implicit theory of content. I examine the conditions which must be met for the cognitive system to be modelled using information theory, presenting some constraints on how we apply the mathematical framework. For example, information theory requires identifying probability distributions over measurable outcomes, which leads us to focus specifically on neural representation. I then argue that functions are required to make tractable measures of information, since they serve to narrow the range of possible contents to those potentially explanatory of a cognitive capacity. However, unlike many other teleosemanticists, I argue that we need to use a non-etiological form of function. I consider whether non-etiological functions allow for misrepresentation, and conclude that they do. Finally, I introduce what I argue is the implicit theory of content in cognitive neuroscience: maxMI. The content of a representation is that item in the environment with which the representation shares maximal mutual information
Two quantum-mechanical arguments against the metaphysical equivalence between substratum and bundle theories of individuality
Full text linkIt is a widespread consensus among metaphysicians that the bundle and substratum theories are substantially different metaphysical theories of individuality. In a realist stance towards metaphysics, they cannot both track the truth when describing fundamental reality, thus they’re rival metaphysical theories. Against that consensus, Jiri Benovsky has advanced a metametaphysical thesis that they are in fact metaphysically equivalent. This paper challenges Benovsky’s equivalence thesis with two counter-arguments based on the metaphysics of quantum mechanics: quantum metaphysical indeterminacy and wavefunction realism. As we shall argue, while both substratum and bundle theories arguably fail in standard quantum mechanics, they fail in different ways. Hence, given Benovsky’s own notion of metaphysical equivalence, they are not equivalent
Replication is an epistemic principle in material theory of induction
Full text linkIn John Norton’s Material Theory of Induction, background facts provide the warrant for inductive inference and determine evidential relevance. Replication, however, is excluded as a principle of inductive logic. While Norton argues replication lacks the precision and methodological clarity to serve as a material principle of inference, I argue that replication nonetheless functions as an epistemic principle of induction. I examine how replication contributes to epistemic justification within both externalist and internalist frameworks and show that its role extends beyond procedural repetition. Replication acts as a reliable belief-forming process for identifying stable facts and inferences. This reframes MTI as a theory shaped not only by local facts but by how scientists determine which facts can function as background warrant
Epistemology of Topological Data Analysis
Full text linkTopological Data Analysis (TDA) is a relatively new technique used for analysing large datasets, which comprise high-dminestional, usually incomplete and often noisy data. Among some other fields of data-driven research TDA proved particularly effective in the Life Sciences including the neuroscience, biomedicine, genomics and evolution studies. For a philosopher of science TDA is interesting for several reasons. First, it provides an example of effective application in science of a mathematical theory, to wit the the Algebraic Topology, which has been earlier thought of as highly abstract and fully detached from the world of human experience. Second, TDA supports a powerful visualisation technique that allows one to literally see on a computer screen various topological shapes of given datasets and thus to grasp their essential features. As a universal mathematical tool for science TDA can be compared with more traditional mathematical tools such as Partial Differential Equations (PDEs). But the way in which TDA helps scientists to represent and understand relevant empirical data is clearly not the same. Analysing recent examples from the Life Sciences we give some preliminary answers to the question What sort of scientific understanding of empirical phenomena TDA may possibly provide
Randomness, Quantum Uncertainty, and Emergence: A Suggestion for Testing the Seemingly Untestable
Full text linkThe functioning of complex natural structures, such as living systems, has been awaiting a generally accepted theoretical basis and respective empirical verification for decades, partly due to a lack of meaningful experiments. We therefore propose a class of experiments designed to test whether an unknown principle of order is at work in natural dynamical systems that cannot be captured by known physical laws. The working hypothesis is that the quantum mechanical uncertainty principle allows for ordering phenomena in chaotic or nearly chaotic physical systems, in the sense of a strong emergence principle, which would not be expected when they are modelled conventionally, as several authors have already formulated in various forms. In order to account for the harsh conditions prevailing in living systems which appear to preclude fragile macroscopic quantum coherence, our hypothesis does not require such coherence at all, contrary to earlier proposals that included coherent quantum mechanical states. The key idea behind testing this bold hypothesis is to compare two virtually identical, sufficiently complex experimental setups. One setup operates with deterministic pseudo-random number generators at key sensitive points, while the other uses quantum-based physical random-number generators, the two setups being otherwise identical. Existing artificial neural networks are proposed as possible test objects for this purpose, and their overall performance under identical training conditions could be used as a quantitative benchmark. As this working hypothesis extends far beyond artificial networks, a successful outcome of such an experiment could have significant implications for many other branches of science
Without microphysical causation, just anything cannot begin to exist just anywhere
Full text linkAccording to the Causal Principle, anything that begins to exist has a cause. In turn, various authors -- including Thomas Hobbes, Jonathan Edwards, and Arthur Prior -- have defended the thesis that, had the Causal Principle been false, there would be no good explanation for why entities do not begin at arbitrary times, in arbitrary spatial locations, in arbitrary number, or of arbitrary kind. I call this the Hobbes-Edwards-Prior Principle (HEPP). However, according to a view popular among both philosophers of physics and naturalistic metaphysicians -- Neo-Russellianism -- causation is absent from fundamental physics. I argue that objections based on the HEPP should have no dialectical force for Neo-Russellians. While Neo-Russellians maintain that there is no causation in fundamental physics, they also have good reason to reject the HEPP
The Hole Argument and Putnam's Paradox
Full text linkWe discuss affinities and differences between (i) the hole argument in general relativity and (ii) Putnam's model-theoretic argument against metaphysical realism ('Putnam's paradox'). Following Pooley (2002), we maintain that the hole argument is not a special case of Putnam's paradox. This notwithstanding, both of these arguments have been responded to through meta-linguistic means. While van Fraassen (1997) claims that Putnam’s paradox dissolves due to our inability to identify a function mapping our theories to objects in the world independent of our total language, Bradley and Weatherall (2022) maintain that the language of general relativity does not allow for the hole argument to be formulated. We compare these responses and assess the extent to which either is successful, concluding that we find van Fraassen's argument more persuasive precisely because of the greater generality of Putnam's paradox