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Reimagining the Potential of Feminist Epistemologies in Science: Epistemic Achievements, Social Structure, and Diversity
Full text linkStandpoint and feminist epistemologies have provided a number of theoretical advancements concerning the ways we ought to think about the production of knowledge across scientific disciplines. Despite these theoretical contributions, in this paper, we critique what we call the ‘thin’ application/implementation of diversity within the epistemic practices of science and academia. As an alternative, we place these theories in conversation with recent philosophy of science and Indigenous epistemology focused on the epistemic aims of communal explanation and understanding. We contend that conceptions of diversity that focus on the standpoints of individual researchers and attempts to merely ‘add diversity and stir’ make it more difficult for these epistemic goals of science to be achieved. We then argue that, for diversity to contribute to increasing the variety of explanations and promote more substantive understanding of epistemic communities requires a ‘thick’ implementation that incorporates lessons from standpoint, feminist, and Indigenous epistemologies into the heart of scientific practices
Epistemic Control and the Normativity of Machine Learning-Based Science
Full text linkThe past few years have witnessed an increasing use of machine learning (ML) tools in science. Paul Humphreys has argued that, because of specific characteristics of ML systems, human scientists are pushed out-of-the-loop of science. In this chapter, I investigate to what extent this is true. First, I express these concerns in terms of what I call ‘epistemic control’. I identify two conditions for epistemic control, which I call ‘tracking’ and ‘tracing’, drawing on works in philosophy of technology. With this new understanding of the problem, I then argue against Humphreys’ pessimistic view. Finally, I construct a more nuanced view of epistemic control in ML-based science
Equivalent Gravities and Equivalence Principle: Foundations and experimental implications
Full text linkThe so-called Geometric Trinity of Gravity includes General Relativity (GR), based on spacetime curvature; the Teleparallel Equivalent of GR (TEGR), which relies on spacetime torsion; and the Symmetric Teleparallel Equivalent of GR (STEGR), grounded in nonmetricity. Recent studies demonstrate that GR, TEGR, and STEGR are dynamically equivalent, raising questions about the fundamental structure of spacetime, the under-determination of these theories, and whether empirical distinctions among them are possible.
The aim of this work is to show that they are equivalent in many features but not exactly in everything. In particular, their relationship with the Equivalence Principle (EP) is different. The EP is a deeply theory-laden assumption, which is assumed as fundamental in constructing GR, with significant implications for our understanding of spacetime. However, it introduces unresolved conceptual issues, including its impact on the nature of the metric and connection, its meaning at the quantum level, tensions with other fundamental interactions and new physics, and its role in dark matter and dark energy problems.
In contrast, TEGR and STEGR recover the EP, in particular in its strong formulation, but do not rely on it as a foundational principle. The fact that GR, TEGR, and STEGR are equivalent in non-trivial predictions, but the EP is not necessary for TEGR and STEGR, suggests that it may not be a fundamental feature but an emergent one, potentially marking differences in the empirical content of the three theories.
Thus, the developments within the Geometric Trinity framework challenge traditional assumptions about spacetime and may help to better understand some of the unresolved foundational difficulties related to the EP
Expediting the Flow of Knowledge Versus Rushing into Print
Full text linkRecent empirical work has shown that many scientific results may not be reproducible. By itself, this does not entail that there is a problem (or a "reproducibility crisis"). However, I argue that there is a problem: the reward structure of science incentivizes scientists to focus on speed and impact at the expense of the reproducibility of their work. I illustrate this using a well-known failure of reproducibility: Fleischmann and Pons' work on cold fusion. I then use a rational choice model to identify a set of sufficient conditions for this problem to arise, and I argue that these conditions plausibly apply to a wide range of research situations. In the conclusion I consider possible solutions and implications for how Fleischmann and Pons' work should be evaluated
Constituting Emotional Phenomena — A Mach-Influenced Empiricist Perspective
Full text linkUsing the philosophical writings of Ernst Mach as a backdrop, I explore how concepts and classifications partly
constitute the phenomena studied in the science of emotion by selecting features from a larger population of
features. This process of selection is a matter of decision and is not inevitable, but it promotes populating
concepts with empirical content. The openness of empirical concepts suggests that this selectionist
constituting does not characterise only the early stages in the development of a science because background
and foreground shifts are potentially ongoing. The theory of psychological construction, which contends that
emotional episodes are constructed on the fly out of shifting sets of components, exemplifies this selectionist
sense of constituting to the extent that it advocates for a resemblance nominalism, similar to that of Locke, in
which selection is involved in naming kinds. Examples of constituting can be seen in changing definitions of
whether animals experience emotion and in the choice of causal models
A Realist Approach to Quantum Individuality: Against the “Received” and “Alternative” Views
Full text linkIn this work we address the contemporary debate about quantum individuality expressed as an opposition between those who, like Décio Krause, defend the reference of the theory to “non-individual particles”, and those like Dennis Dieks, who propose instead to preserve the notion of “classical particle” as commonly applied by contemporary physicists. We will argue that these viewpoints rather than truly opposed share a common methodology which has helped to reinforce the doctrine of classical concepts that was imposed by Bohr and Dirac within the “standard” formulation —which remains the orthodox physical account of the theory of quanta. We will also discuss a recently proposed relativist yet objective relational account of quantum individuality [25] which, going back to Einstein’s methodological approach, opens the doors to a completely new, truly realist understanding of quantum individuality
Simulated Selfhood in LLMs: A Behavioral Analysis of Introspective Coherence
Full text linkLarge Language Models (LLMs) increasingly generate outputs that resemble introspection, including self-reference, epistemic modulation, and claims about their internal states. This study investigates whether such behaviors reflect consistent, underlying patterns or are merely surface-level generative artifacts.We evaluated five open-weight, stateless LLMs using a structured battery of 21 introspective prompts, each repeated ten times to yield 1,050 completions. These outputs were analyzed across four behavioral dimensions: surface-level similarity (token overlap via SequenceMatcher), semantic coherence (Sentence-BERT embeddings), inferential consistency (Natural Language Inference with a RoBERTa-large model), and diachronic continuity (stability across prompt repetitions). Although some models exhibited thematic stability, particularly on prompts concerning identity and consciousness, no model sustained a consistent self-representation over time. High contradiction rates emerged from a tension between mechanistic disclaimers and anthropomorphic phrasing. Following recent behavioral frameworks, we heuristically adopt the term pseudo-consciousness to describe structured yet non-experiential self-referential output in LLMs. This usage reflects a functionalist stance that avoids ontological commitments, focusing instead on behavioral regularities interpretable through Dennett’s intentional stance. The study contributes a reproducible framework for evaluating simulated introspection in LLMs and offers a graded taxonomy for classifying such reflexive output. Our findings carry significant implications for LLM interpretability, alignment, and user perception, highlighting the need for caution when attributing mental states to stateless generative systems based on linguistic fluency alone
Topological Interpretation of Quantum Collapse and Entanglement
Full text linkThis work proposes a reinterpretation of wave function collapse as the result of a geometric intersection between our space-time universe and a higher-dimensional reality, here referred to as the bulk. In this framework, time in the bulk does not unfold as a sequence of moments but exists instead as a static and extended dimension, one in which all possible states of subatomic particles are present simultaneously.
In our universe time is experienced in a strictly one-dimensional, point-like manner and we access only a single instant at once, giving rise to the perception of a flowing sequence. From this perspective what we perceive as the collapse of the wave function may arise from the interaction between our unidimensional timeline and this timeless multidimensional reality. Rather than a process of selection among alternatives, the collapse would be the result of our space-time intersecting a pre-existing landscape of possibilities, effectively slicing through the bulk and revealing a single outcome from an already complete set of quantum configurations.
Within the same framework, quantum entanglement emerges as a cointersection in the bulk. Even when particles appear distant within our universe, they remain correlated because their states are rooted in the same geometric anchor point of the higher-dimensional domain
Is string field theory background independent?
Full text linkString field theory is supposed to stand to perturbative string theory as quantum field theory stands to single-particle quantum theory; as such, it purports to offer a substantially more general and powerful perspective on string theory than the perturbative approach. In addition, string field theory has been claimed for several decades to liberate string theory from any fixed, background spatiotemporal commitments---thereby (if true) rendering it `background independent'. But is this really so? In this article, we undertake a detailed interrogation of this claim, finding that the verdict is sensitive both to one's understanding of the notion of background independence, and also to how one understands string field theory itself. Although in the end our verdicts on the question of the background independence are therefore somewhat mixed, we hope that our study will elevate the levels of systematicity and rigour in these discussions, as well as equip philosophers of physics with a helpful introduction to string field theory and the variety of interesting conceptual questions which it raises
Does Functional Connectivity Explain?
Full text linkMany successful explanations show how causally individuated parts are responsible for the occurrence of the phenomena that scientists seek to explain. On this view, parts that are chosen only by convention, and related only through correlations, cannot possibly figure in successful explanations. This is because without some form of causal grounding, it seems unintelligible why any explanatory relation between these parts and the phenomenon of interest would hold. This problem is particularly pronounced in functional connectivity models (FC) in neuroscience. These models typically represent time series of recurrent neural activity in conventionally determined spatial regions (as a network’s nodes) and synchronization likelihoods among these time series (as its edges). Many neuroscientists and philosophers maintain that because of this, FC models cannot provide explanations. We formulate this problem more precisely and then show that it rests on an impoverished interpretation of scientific models in general and FC models in particular. We then provide a positive account of how FC models provide a variety of neuroscientific explanations