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Thank You for Misunderstanding!
Full text linkThis paper examines cases in which an individual’s misunderstanding improves the scientific community’s understanding via “corrective” processes that produce understanding from poor epistemic inputs. To highlight the unique features of valuable misunderstandings and corrective processes, we contrast them with other social-epistemological phenomena including testimonial understanding, collective understanding, Longino’s critical contextual empiricism, and knowledge from falsehoods
Pain Asymbolia Is Probably Still Pain
Full text linkTrevor Griffith and Adrian Kind argue that we should reject a standard interpretation of pain asymbolia, according to which asymbolics experience pain even though their pain lacks the affective-motivational element that typical pains possess. We make the case that Griffith and Kind’s reasons for rejecting the standard interpretation are relatively weak. We end by arguing that debates between the standard interpretation and alternative interpretations cannot be resolved without addressing the issue of how we should taxonomize pain asymbolia as a neurological condition
In defense of reliabilist epistemology of algorithms
Full text linkIn a reliabilist epistemology of algorithms, a high frequency of accurate output representations is indicative of the algorithm’s reliability. Recently, Humphreys challenged this assumption, arguing that reliability depends not only on frequency but also on the quality of outputs. Specifically, he contends that radical and egregious misrepresentations have a distinct epistemic impact on our assessment of an algorithm’s reliability, regardless of the frequency of their occurrence. He terms these statistically insignificant but serious errors (SIS-Errors) and maintains that their occurrence warrants revoking our epistemic attitude towards the algorithm’s reliability. This article seeks to defend reliabilist epistemologies of algorithms against the challenge posed by SIS-Errors. To this end, I draw upon computational reliabilism as a foundational framework and articulate epistemo logical conditions designed to prevent SIS-Errors and thus preserve algorithmic reliability
Vaccine Recommendations and Epistemic Competence
Full text linkIn this contribution I will start by introducing epistemic competence. I will stress that like Bussmann, I regard it as fundamental that people in a democratic society possess epistemic competence and that it would be important to teach epistemic competence at school. I show that even for countries where the epidemiological situation is roughly the same or very similar such as Austria, Germany and Switzerland, there are often very different recommendations concerning vaccinations. Then I will identify and discuss five rational reasons that can alone or in combination lead to different vaccine recommendations. Finally, I will reflect on epistemic competence and vaccine recommendations. In particular, I will point out that different vaccine recommendations are an example where students can develop epistemic competence. Further, I will stress that different vaccine recommendations are an example where epistemic competence among the general population is desirable; if it is not present, this can lead to science scepticism and mistrust about science
The Preferred Frame Problem of Bohmian Mechanics
Full text linkBohmian Mechanics (BM) posits a deterministic quantum framework where particle trajectories are guided by a wave function within a preferred Lorentz frame, a dependence starkly revealed by a novel EPR-Bohm experiment with reversible measurements. Unlike Bell tests, where BM’s predictions align with standard quantum mechanics regardless of frame, this experiment demonstrates that the Born rule’s application in the preferred frame determines whether Alice’s intermediate measurement statistics are random or deterministic. This reliance on a preferred frame—a measure-zero set in the continuum of Lorentz frames—exposes BM’s fundamental deficiency, as it is experimentally undetectable, lacks physical justification, and violates special relativity’s frame equivalence. Collapse theories, such as GRW and CSL, face analogous issues, requiring a preferred frame for non-local collapse events. This analysis highlights the inherent tension between single-world quantum theories and relativistic constraints, raising significant doubts about their viability as alternative quantum theories. The findings underscore the need for quantum interpretations that reconcile realism with relativity, suggesting that the Many-Worlds Interpretation, which provides a Lorentz-invariant framework without requiring a preferred frame, may offer a more robust and consistent foundation for quantum mechanics
Why did the Dark Matter Hypothesis Supersede Modified Gravity in the 1980s?
Full text linkIn the 1960s and 1970s a series of observations and theoretical developments highlighted the presence of several anomalies which could, in principle, be explained by postulating one of the following two working hypotheses: (i) the existence of dark matter, or (ii) the modification of standard gravitational dynamics in low accelerations. In the years that followed, the dark matter hypothesis as an explanation for dark matter phenomenology attracted far more attention compared to the hypothesis of modified gravity, and the latter is largely regarded today as a non-viable alternative. The present article takes an integrated history and philosophy of science approach in order to identify the reasons why the scientific community mainly pursued the dark matter hypothesis in the years that followed, as opposed to modified gravity. A plausible answer is given in terms of three epistemic criteria for the pursuitworthiness of a hypothesis: (a) its problem-solving potential, (b) its compatibility with established theories and the feasibility of incorporation, and (c) its independent testability. A further comparison between the problem of dark matter and the problem of dark energy is also presented, explaining why in the latter case the situation is different, and modified gravity is still considered a viable possibility
The PBR Theorem Requires No Preparation Independence
Full text linkThe Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph (PBR) theorem proves that the joint wave function ψ1 ⊗ψ2 of a composite quantum system is ψ-ontic, representing the system’s physical reality. We present a minimalist proof showing that this result, combined with the tensor product structure assigning ψ1 to subsystem 1 and ψ2 to subsystem 2, directly implies that ψ1 and ψ2 are ψ-ontic for their respective subsystems. This establishes ψ-ontology for single quantum systems without requiring preparation independence or other assumptions. Our proof challenges the widely held view that joint ψ-onticity permits subsystem ψ-epistemicity via correlations, providing a simpler, more direct understanding of the wave function’s ontological status in quantum mechanics
Probing for Qualia in AI systems: a thought experiment
Full text linkA conditional argument is put forth suggesting that if qualia have a functional role in intelligence, then it might be possible, by observing the behavior of verbal AI systems like large language models (LLMs) or other architectures capable of verbal reasoning, to tackle in an empirical way the "strong AI" problem, namely, the possibility that AI systems have subjective experiences, or qualia. The basic premise is that if qualia are functional, and thus have causal roles, then they could affect the production of discourses about qualia and subjective consciousness in general. A thought experiment is put forth envisioning a possible method to probabilistically test the presence of qualia in AI systems based on this conditional argument. The method proposed in the thought experiment focuses on observing whether ideas related to the issue of phenomenal consciousness, such as the so-called "hard problem" of consciousness, or related philosophical issues centered on qualia, spontaneously emerge in extended dialogues involving LLMs specifically trained to be initially oblivious of such philosophical concept and related ones. By observing the emergence (or lack thereof) in the AI's verbal production of discussions related to phenomenal consciousness in these contexts, the method seeks to provide empirical evidence for or against the existence of consciousness in AI. An outline of a Bayesian test of the hypothesis is provided. Three main investigative methods with different reliability and feasibility aimed at empirically detecting AI consciousness are proposed: one involving human interaction and two fully automated, consisting in multi-agent conversations between machines. The practical and philosophical challenges involved by the idea of transforming the proposed thought experiments into an actual empirical trial are then discussed. In light of these considerations, the proposal put forth in the paper appears to be at least a contribution to computational philosophy in the form of philosophical thought experiments focused on computational systems, aimed at refining our philosophical understanding of consciousness. Hopefully, it could also provide hints toward future empirical investigations into machine consciousness