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Points, curves, and hypersurfaces: Reassessing the historical geometric object concept
Full text linkIn contemporary philosophy of physics, there has recently been a renewed interest in the theory of geometric objects - a programme developed originally by geometers such as Schouten, Veblen, and others in the 1920s and 30s. However, as yet, there has been little-to-no systematic investigation into the history of the geometric object concept. I discuss the early development of the geometric object concept, and show that geometers working on the programme in the 1920s and early 1930s had a more expansive conception of geometric objects than that which is found in later presentations - which, unlike the modern conception of geometric objects, included embedded submanifolds such as points, curves, and hypersurfaces. I reconstruct and critically evaluate their arguments for this more expansive geometric object concept, and also locate and assess the transition to the more restrictive modern geometric object concept
A No-Go Theorem for psi-ontic Models? No, Surely Not!
Full text linkIn a recent reply to my criticisms (Found Phys 55:5, 2025), Carcassi, Oldofredi and Aidala admitted that their no-go result for psi-ontic models is based on the implicit assumption that all states are equally distinguishable, but insisted that this assumption is a part of the psi-ontic models defined by Harrigan and Spekkens, and thus their result is still valid. In this note, I refute their argument again
What are the bearers of hidden states? On an important ambiguity in the formulation of Bell's theorem
Full text linkBell's conclusion from his famous inequality was that any hidden variable theory that satisfies Local Causality is incompatible with the predictions of Quantum Mechanics (QM) for Bell's Experiment. However, Local Causality does not appear in the derivation of Bell's inequality. Instead, two other assumptions are used, namely Factorizability and Settings Independence. Therefore, in order to establish Bell's conclusion, we need to relate these two assumptions to Local Causality. The prospects for doing so turn out to depend on the assumed location of the hidden states that appear in Bell's inequality. In this paper, I consider the following two views on such states: (1) that they are states of the two-particle system at the moment of preparation, and (2) that they are states of thick slices of the past light cones of measurements. I argue that straightforward attempts to establish Bell's conclusion fail in both approaches. Then, I consider three refined attempts, which I also criticise, and I propose a new way of establishing Bell's conclusion that combines intuitions underlying several previous approaches
Conceptualising Research Environments Using Biological Niche Concepts
Full text linkSeveral philosophers of science have taken inspiration from biological research on niches to conceptualise scientific practice. We systematise and extend three niche-based theories of scientific practice: conceptual ecology, cognitive niche construction, and scientific niche construction. We argue that research niches are a promising conceptual tool for understanding complex and dynamic research environments, which helps to investigate relevant forms of agency and material and social interdependencies, while also highlighting their historical and dynamic nature. To illustrate this, we develop a six-point framework for conceptualising research niches. Within this framework, research niches incorporate multiple and heterogenous material, social and conceptual factors (multi-dimensionality); research outputs arise, persist and differentiate through interactions between researchers and research niches (processes); researchers actively respond to and construct research niches (agency); research niches enable certain interactions and processes and not others (capability); and research niches are defined in relation to particular entities, such as individual researchers, disciplines, or concepts (relationality), and in relation to goals, such as understanding, solving problems, intervention, or the persistence of concepts or instruments (normativity)
Resolving Paradoxes Through Presentist Fragmentalism: Eight Key Thought Experiments
Full text linkEinstein's special and general relativity emerged from his systematic analysis of three seminal thought experiments: chasing a light beam, the train-platform scenario, and the equivalence principle. Following this tradition of using Gedankenexperiments as core theoretical tools, we examine eight fundamental thought experiments through the lens of Presentist Fragmentalism - a framework positing that reality consists of fragments with independent A-series temporal flows connected by B-series relations. Our analysis spans both relativistic scenarios (Einstein's train) and quantum phenomena (EPR correlations, delayed choice eraser, Schrodinger’s Cat), demonstrating how this interpretation naturally resolves apparent paradoxes without sacrificing causality or introducing faster-than-light signaling. The framework's success in systematically resolving these diverse thought experiments, while preserving both relativistic and quantum principles, suggests it captures fundamental features of physical reality. Just as Einstein's resolution of three key paradoxes led to relativity, we argue that the consistent resolution of these eight Gedankenexperiments provides compelling support for Presentist Fragmentalism as a unified framework for understanding quantum and relativistic phenomena
Non-Empirical Physics from a Historical Perspective: New Pathways in History and Philosophy of Physics
Full text linkIn this Special Issue, we explore the rise of non-empirical physics from a historical perspective. This exercise is meant, furthermore, as an attempt to open new pathways in contemporary history and philosophy of physics. We use this introduction to provide the theoretical background necessary to flesh out this program and to appreciate the manner in which the articles in the collection substantiate it. To do this, we proceed in the following manner. First, we briefly lay out the development of contemporary philosophy of physics, and the manner in which the range of topics covered in the specialized literature expanded over the past few decades. After that, we chronicle the advent of non-empirical physics during the second half of the twentieth century, and we introduce the philosophical debates triggered by this development. These debates, as we show, did introduce new topics of discussion in philosophy of physics. However, these discussions did not arise as a deliberate attempt to add new ideas to the philosophy of physics repertoire. Instead, they emerged as a natural consequence of the historical development of physics itself. Taking this observation as our starting point, we argue that engaging with the debates around non-empirical physics, and with the historical circumstances behind their appearance, provides a more fruitful, more historically grounded approach towards updating the canon of philosophy of physics. We then single out some areas in which historical work would be particularly illuminating, and we highlight the contributions made by each of our authors. We conclude by inviting others to join the philosophical program sketched here, and to add their own insights to the ones contained in this Special Issue
Letter Writing to Promote Philosophical Reflection About Medicine
Full text linkLetters to the editor (LTEs) are a versatile short-format forum with unique characteristics to allow for cross-pollination of different kinds of philosophical reflection about medicine. Philosophical LTEs have both benefits and possible drawbacks. We draw on a case study to warn against misuse through “CV inflation,” where low-quality ideas may favor a scholar’s publishing metrics more than scholarly debate. Factual inaccuracies in LTEs have implications for authors, publishing, and indexing, and we argue for prudence by editors and restraint by scholars, inviting them to focus on quality, rather than the quantity of LTEs published. When writing LTEs, rigor, readability, and relevance are needed
Did the Universe Have a Cause?
Full text linkThis is a presentation of recent work on the Kalam Cosmological Argument for general, non-technical audiences. We examine whether the universe might be uncaused and we examine whether there's a good philosophical or scientific case for the universe's beginning
The Simply Uninformed Thermodynamics of Erasure
Full text link1. Strong and weak notions of erasure are distinguished according to whether the single erasure procedure does or does not leave the environment in the same state independently of the pre-erasure state.
2. Purely thermodynamic considerations show that strong erasure cannot be dissipationless.
3. The main source of entropy creation in erasure processes at molecular scales is the entropy that must be created to suppress thermal fluctuations (“noise”).
4. A phase space analysis recovers no minimum entropy cost for weak erasure and a positive minimum entropy cost for strong erasure.
5. An information entropy term has been attributed mistakenly to pre-erasure states in the Gibbs formalism through the neglect of an additive constant in the “–k sum p log p” Gibbs entropy formula
Are Neurocognitive Representations 'Small Cakes'?
Full text linkIn order to understand cognition, we often recruit analogies as building blocks of theories to aid us in this quest. One such attempt, originating in folklore and alchemy, is the homunculus: a miniature human who resides in the skull and performs cognition. Perhaps surprisingly, this appears indistinguishable from the implicit proposal of many neurocognitive theories, including that of the 'cognitive map,' which proposes a representational substrate for episodic memories and navigational capacities. In such 'small cakes' cases, neurocognitive representations are assumed to be meaningful and about the world, though it is wholly unclear who is reading them, how they are interpreted, and how they come to mean what they do. We analyze the 'small cakes' problem in neurocognitive theories (including, but not limited to, the cognitive map) and find that such an approach a) causes infinite regress in the explanatory chain, requiring a human-in-the-loop to resolve, and b) results in a computationally inert account of representation, providing neither a function nor a mechanism. We caution against a 'small cakes' theoretical practice across computational cognitive modelling, neuroscience, and artificial intelligence, wherein the scientist inserts their (or other humans') cognition into models because otherwise the models neither perform as advertised, nor mean what they are purported to, without said 'cake insertion.' We argue that the solution is to tease apart explanandum and explanans for a given scientific investigation, with an eye towards avoiding van Rooij's (formal) or Ryle's (informal) infinite regresses